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ABSTRACT 
Olga Rajevska’s doctoral dissertation “Adequacy and Equity of Pensions as a Function of 
Pension System Institutional Design: a Case of the Baltic States” focuses on identifying and 
assessing key factors of pension adequacy and equity.  
The aim of this study was to compare the institutional design of old-age pension systems in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; to identify how certain elements of their design influence 
adequacy and equity of pensions; as well as to elaborate recommendations for policy makers.  
The first chapter sets out the discussion on taxonomy of pension systems, their functional and 
organizational elements, criteria for their evaluation and assessment and provides a brief 
analysis of the economics of pensions outside the context of any particular country.  
The second chapter reviews pension legislation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It starts with 
a recapitulative survey of its retrospective development since early 90s, which is followed by 
comprehensive compendium of the currently existing laws and regulations, with a special 
emphasis on the most recent amendments and the lessons of crisis.  
The third chapter provides comparative analysis of the design and up-to-date performance of 
the pension systems in the Baltic States, from the perspective of their compliance with the 
criteria of adequacy and equity. First, the dimensionality and measurement instruments of 
each criterion are discussed, and then those instruments are applied to the systems studied.  
Key words: pension systems, adequacy, equity, public pensions, Baltic States, comparative 
analysis 
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ANOTĀCIJA 
Olgas Rajevskas promocijas darbs “Pensiju adekvātums un taisnīgums kā pensiju sistēmas 
institucionālā dizaina funkcijas: Baltijas valstu gadījums” fokusējas uz pensiju adekvātuma un 
taisnīguma noteicošo faktoru identificēšanu un izvērtēšanu.  
Pētījuma mērķis ir salīdzināt Igaunijas, Latvijas un Lietuvas vecuma pensiju sistēmu 
institucionālo dizainu, identificēt, kā dizaina noteikti elementi ietekmē pensiju adekvātumu un 
taisnīgumu, kā arī izstrādāt rekomendācijas politikas veidotājiem.   
Darba pirmajā nodaļā analizētas diskusijas par pensiju sistēmas taksonomiju, tās 
funkcionālajiem un organizatoriskajiem elementiem, izvērtējuma kritērijiem, kā arī sniegta īsa 
pensiju ekonomikas analīze ārpus valsts specifiskā konteksta.   
Otrajā nodaļā analizēta pensiju likumdošanas attīstība Igaunijā, Latvijā un Lietuvā, sākot ar 
1990. gadu retrospektīvu apskatu, kuram seko plašs spēkā esošo likumu un noteikumu 
izvērtējums, īpaši akcentējot pēdējo gadu grozījumus un krīzes mācības. 
Trešajā nodaļā sniegta institucionālā dizaina salīdzinošā analīze un pašreizējo Baltijas valstu 
pensiju sistēmu funkcionēšana atbilstoši to adekvātuma un taisnīguma kritērijiem. Sākumā 
tiek analizētas katra kritērija dimensijas un mērījuma instrumenti un pēc tam instrumenti tiek 
piemēroti pētāmo sistēmu analīzei.  
Darba noslēgumā ir secinājumi un rekomendācijas. 
Atslēgas vārdi: pensiju sistēmas, adekvātums, taisnīgums, valsts pensijas, Baltijas valstis 
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Introduction 
All countries in Central and Eastern Europe passed through very radical pension reforms in 
the 1990s. It requires a certain temporal distance to evaluate the results of the reforms, so that 
the principles contained in them could be able to demonstrate their strengths and weaknesses, 
viability, adaptability, could be understood and accepted by the population as effective and 
fair and at the same time affordable for the country's financial system. Twenty years is a 
sufficient period, so now it quite right time to learn from the exercise. 
Pension systems in the Baltic States have passed such evaluation test; they represent a 
variety of institutional design elements, so they are a promising object of research as a very 
good case for such comparative analysis. The three countries demonstrate significant 
variations in adequacy and equity of their pension systems, and these variations can be 
reasonably attributed exactly to variations in their designs and/or manner of effecting the 
reforms, bearing in mind that the external circumstances were (and still are) very much 
similar:  
- all three countries had practically identical starting conditions and commenced 
modernizing of their pension systems at one time; 
- all three countries had (and still have) similar population structure in terms of age, 
education level and employment patterns; 
- economic structures of the Baltic States do not have substantial differences; 
- they are in the similar geopolitical situation, the same duration of EU membership; and 
- finally, the overall design of their reformed old-age pension systems is structurally 
similar: three pillars of pension insurance (I – mandatory public PAYG pillar, II – mandatory 
private funded pillar, and III – voluntary private funded pillar). 
The topicality of the research is endorsed by wide-range studies by numerous experts 
from different countries and of different areas of expertise. These are political and social 
scientists, economists and financial analysts. Research investigation is supported also by 
many established international bodies such as the World Bank, IMF, ILO, OECD, ISSA, 
supra-national EU institutions – ASISP and ESPN expert networks providing counselling to 
the European Commission.  
Special public and private research institutions are focusing on pension investigations. 
A number of universities have created separate single-purpose units concentrating on pension 
issues – e.g., Pensions Institute at City University of London, Mannheimer Forschungsinstitut 
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Ökonomie und Demographischer Wandel (Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of 
Ageing) at the Mannheim University, Forschungszentrum Generationenverträge (Research 
centre for inter-generational contracts) at Freiburg University, Pension Research Council at 
the University of Pennsylvania, etc. Social security (with pension provision being its essential 
integrant) is among the fields of studies of the Cato Institute, Australian Centre for Financial 
Studies, as well as many other think tanks all over the world.  
The European Commission is also actively articulating its objectives and priorities in 
the sphere of pension policies, which laid the ground for the open method of coordination 
(OMC) on pensions
1
. The OMC on pensions contributes to the development of a common EU 
social-policy paradigm
2
. Starting from 2009 the ASISP (Analytical Support on the Socio-
Economic Impact of Social Protection Reforms)
3
 network published annual national reports 
on pensions, health and long-term care, in 2011 and 2012 national reports have been 
accompanied by synthesis report covering all 34 participating countries (including 28 Member 
States). In 2014, on the basis of ASISP and the European network of experts in social 
inclusion and social protection
4
, the European Social Policy Network (ESPN) was established. 
At the heart of the ESPN are country teams of independent experts on social policies. They 
are supported and coordinated by a central team of international experts
5
.  
In 2010, the EC programme document on priorities in pension policies "Green Paper: 
towards adequate, sustainable and safe European pension systems” launched a consultation 
about how overcome the incomplete and fragmented framework of policy coordination. The 
consultation resulted in the “White Paper: on adequate, safe and sustainable pensions” that 
came out in 2012. It puts forward a range of initiatives to a better balance between time in 
work and time in retirement; to ensure the portability of pension rights between member 
states, to ensure that pension promises are kept and people get what they expect in retirement. 
The research object – are institutional structures of old-age pension systems of Latvia, 
Estonia and Lithuania, as well as the parties involved in their proper operation. 
                                                          
1
 European Commission, DG for Employment and Social Affairs (2003). Adequate and sustainable pensions. 
Joint report by the Commission and the Council. Luxembourg. 
2
 Eckardt, M. (2005). The open method of coordination on pensions: an economic analysis of its effects on 
pension reforms. Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 15, pp. 247-267. 
3
 ASISP web-page - http://www.socialprotection.eu/   
4
 The peer reviews in Social Protection and Social Inclusion prepared by that network members touched , inter 
alia,  pension-related issues and are available online: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1024&langId=en   
5
 European Social Policy Network (ESPN) - http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1135 
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The research subject  - are the mechanisms of achieving adequate and equitable old 
age pensions by the means of institutional design, their interrelations and manifestations. 
The aim of this study was to compare the institutional design of old-age pension 
systems in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in order to identify how certain elements of their 
design influence adequacy and equity of pensions; as well as to elaborate recommendations 
for policy makers.  
The tasks arising out of this purpose included  
1. reviewing of pension system  and their institutional elements classifications and 
management peculiarities, 
2. identifying the appropriate indicators of pension adequacy and equity and their 
trajectories; 
3.  analysing factors shaping the current pension systems of the Baltic States;  
4. analysing pension legislation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania including 
retrospective of their development since 1990s ;  
5. analysing the indicators of pension adequacy and equity in reference to both present 
and prospective pensioners; elaborating of recommendations for improving pension 
adequacy and equity through modernization of certain system design elements. 
Research methods included: 
- Analysis of the existing academic literature; 
- Analysis of the normative acts (laws and regulations); 
- Comparative analysis of official statistical data from Eurostat, national statistical 
bodies, national social insurance agencies (including unpublished data, obtained in 
personal communication); 
- Processing of data of the specifically tailored survey („Inequality, integration and 
sustainable development of territories”, conducted by LU SZF in June 2013); using 
SPSS software  
- Simulation analysis using statistical and normative data; 
- Interviews with country experts. 
The novelty of this thesis is based on generalization and synthesis of vast literature and 
representative statistical data, and manifests in 
- the original comparative analysis of pension legislation and regulation in Latvia, 
Estonia and Lithuania. In the course of analysis, the author logically dismantles the 
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institutional design of pension systems into separate elements and studies the role of 
each element in providing adequate and equitable pension benefits to elderly 
population in each study country; 
- new approaches in the analysis of statistical data – the first comparative analysis of 
pension distribution by size and gender; analysis of pension expectations on 
replacement rate; expounding of discrepancies in statistical data; 
- the model of retrospective simulation was elaborated and tested empirically in order 
to assess system outputs at varying initial conditions and assumptions (different 
wage levels, different notional capital valorisation rules, participation or non-
participation in II pillar); 
In a wider context, this thesis contributes to the research tasks defined by the international 
team of pension experts relating specifically to reflections on Notional Defined Contribution 
(NDC) pension schemes, namely: 
 “Assessing the outcomes of NDC schemes in view of the primary goals of pension 
systems (coverage, adequacy, sustainability) and in comparison with alternative scheme 
designs. 
 Developing better measurements of pension assets and liabilities to guide the introduction, 
adjustment, and sustainability of NDC schemes. 
 Clarifying the interaction of NDC (as a central consumption-smoothing pillar) with other 
pillars and benefits. 
 Addressing the design and implementation issues of NDC schemes in low- and middle-
income countries”6 . 
The author’s approach is mainly based on the conceptual framework for pension systems 
assessment elaborated by leading experts of the World Bank
7
. According to it, the primary 
evaluation criteria are the ability of the system to maintain adequacy, affordability, 
sustainability, equity, predictability and robustness. This thesis is dedicated particularly to two 
of the above mentioned parameters: to adequacy and to equity, as they are, to a great extent 
depending on system endogenous variables: its organisation and design elements. The rest 
four parameters are to a much more significant extend depending on exogenous 
                                                          
6
Holzmann, R., Palmer, E., Robalino, D. (2013) NDC pension schemes in a changing pension world: Volume 2 - 
gender, politics, and financial stability, The World Bank, p. xvii. 
7
 Holzmann R., Hinz R., Dorfman M. (2008). Pension Systems and Reform Conceptual Framework. The World 
Bank SP Discussion Paper No. 0824.  
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circumstances. Various design elements’ contribution to the performance of the whole system 
can be assessed both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
Following the definitions of the WB experts, an adequate system is one that provides 
benefits to the full breadth of the population, the benefits are sufficient for preventing old-age 
poverty on a country-specific absolute level in addition to providing reliable means to smooth 
down the lifetime consumption for the majority of the population. Meanwhile, an equitable 
system is one that provides the income redistribution from the lifetime rich to the lifetime 
poor, it is consistent with the societal preferences in a way that does not tax the rest of society 
external to the system; and one that provides the same benefit for the same contribution. 
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the author of this thesis is using the terms ‘adequacy’ 
and ‘equity’ bearing in mind the above definitions. It is to be noted that conceptual 
understanding of what constitutes pension adequacy and / or pension equity is developing and 
the borderlines between these notions are not ‘bullet-proof’. 
The main hypothesis of the thesis can be formulated as follows: 
H0: Despite the resemblance in the organization of pension systems in the Baltic States 
some principal features of their institutional design vary significantly exerting a decisive 
influence on their adequacy and equity. 
Should this hypothesis be validated, its implications can be subsequently stated in the 
following terms “In order to improve adequacy and/or equity of a pension system, certain 
element(s) should be introduced / removed / modified”. 
The basic hypothesis is specified in detail by the following propositions that are 
defended stepwise, chapter to chapter, shaping the structure of the dissertation. 
Proposition 1. Institutional design of pension systems comprises various functional and 
organizational elements, each contributing to one or more system objectives.  
The first chapter sets out the discussion on taxonomy of pension systems, their 
functional and organizational elements, criteria for their evaluation and assessment and 
provides a brief analysis of the economics of pensions outside the context of any particular 
country.  
Proposition 2. Pension systems of the Baltic States have been maturing in similar 
external environment. They have many common elements, in the meantime having 
considerable distinctions.  
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The second chapter reviews pension legislation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It 
starts with a recapitulative survey of its retrospective development since early 90s, which is 
followed by comprehensive compendium of the currently existing laws and regulations, with 
a special emphasis on the most recent amendments and the lessons of crisis.  
Proposition 3. There are sizeable variations in pension adequacy and equity between 
the Baltic States and these variations can be substantially explained by differences in pension 
system design elements.  
The third chapter provides comparative analysis of the design and up-to-date 
performance of the pension systems in the region, from the perspective of their compliance 
with the criteria of adequacy and equity. First, the dimensionality and measurement 
instruments of each criterion are discussed, and then those instruments are applied to the 
systems studied. 
The major findings are the following: 
- Different levels of adequacy and equity of pensions in Baltic States derive from different 
institutional design of their pension systems 
- The principal pension system elements in the Baltic States affecting their adequacy are: 
o Presence of decent minimum guaranteed pension and its affixment to average 
wage 
o Presence of  non-contributory component (basic pension) 
o In NDC-system – notional capital valorisation rules preventing diminution of 
accumulated capital from inflation or from other reasons (depopulation, fall in 
GDP, etc.) 
o In point systems –  indexation rules preventing monetary value of accumulated 
points from diminution  
o In any type of pay-as-you-go system – indexation rules preventing pensions in 
payment from losing purchasing power  
o Level of administrative fees in II pillar 
o Minimum guaranteed rates of return in II pillar (missing in all three countries) 
- The major pension system elements in the Baltic States affecting their equity are: 
o Presence of earnings-related schemes (pension points, notional accounts) 
o Methodology of converting pre-reform service record into new schemes 
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o In point systems – regular update of denominator and its affixment to average 
wage 
o In NDC-system – notional capital valorisation rules preventing from abrupt jumps 
in index (moving averages, balancing mechanisms) 
o Uprating pensions in payment and pension rights in accumulation at the same pace 
o Actuarially fair rules for early / deferred pension calculation 
o Possibility to participate in several II pillar pension funds simultaneously 
o Tax exempts and progressive taxation 
o Pension ceilings without ceilings on contributions 
o Indexation rules  beneficial to low pension recipients 
o Parental pensions 
o Non-contributory bonus for long service record 
o In NDC and in II pillar – inheritance gains and/or hereditability of II pillar 
accumulations. 
The author has elaborated recommendations what elements may the countries domesticate 
from each other in order to improve adequacy and equity of their pension systems. 
Used sources contained academic literature, primary and secondary legislation, political 
documents, surveys data, statistical databases and reports. 
Functioning of pension systems is being studied extensively by academic community. 
Pension’s agenda is many-faceted and comprises topics related to economics, finances, public 
administration and public policy, social work administration and social policy, health studies, 
sociology, legal studies and even philosophy.  
The list of the world’s most prominent scholars, the authors of conceptual overarching 
publications includes such names as Nicholas Barr, Peter Diamond, Robert Holzmann, 
Edward Palmer, Richard Paul Hinz, Peter Orzag, Joseph Stiglitz, Gosta Esping-Andersen, 
David Robalino, Mark Dorfman, Aaron Grech, Bernhardt Ebbinghaus.   
They are followed by numerous researchers, specialising in more ‘niche’ studies. Such 
international organisations as the World Bank, OECD, ILO, ISSA and European Commission 
are also regularly publishing both research papers and political documents on pension themes. 
Each chapter of this thesis starts with a brief review of academic literature related to its 
subject.  
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The Baltic States researchers in the pensions’ field are represented by such leading 
country experts as Andres Võrk and Lauri Leppik from Estonia, Feliciana Rajevska, Edgars 
Voļskis and Ruta Zilvere from Latvia, Jolanta Aidukaite, Romas Lazutka and Teodoras 
Medaiskis from Lithuania. In the last years, young scientists
8,9,10,11,12,13
 are also joining this 
list, but the field is still insufficiently studied in the region.    
The Journal of Pension Economics and Finance (JPEF) issued by Cambridge 
University Press is the only academic journal focusing on the economics and finance of 
pensions and retirement income. JPEF provides a valuable and influential forum for 
international debate in this area. Its senior editors are working in the Netherlands, USA and 
UK, the editorial board comprises experts from France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Australia, Canada and other countries. The journal was started in 2002, and its 
volume has been steadily increasing. JPEF publishes original research papers, covering a 
variety of topics, including pension fund management, the regulation of pensions, links 
between pensions and labour markets. Some of the topics covered relate to quite specific field 
of studies, thus, issue 4 of volume 10 (October 2011) was almost completely dedicated to 
financial literacy and retirement planning, while issue 2 of volume 14 (April 2015) – to 
assessing the U.S. pension insurance modelling system (PIMS).   
The vast majority of the papers are country-specific studies, however a number of 
articles cover more general problems. The most interesting (for the purpose of this thesis) 
were the articles of the second type: e.g., an international benchmarking study by David 
Tuesta on administrative costs of private pensions
14
. A valuable source of information, 
especially on the funded pillars, was also the article by Polish researchers Marcin Kawinski, 
                                                          
8
 Arefjevs, I., Lindemane, M. (2014). The Market Potential Assessment Model for Private Pension Savings. 
Procedia – Social and Behavioral Studies, Vol. 110, pp. 755–766. 
9
 Mavlutova, I., Titova, S. (2014). Economic environment impact on pension system: Case of Latvia, Procedia - 
Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 110, pp. 1063–1072. 
10
 Võrk, A., Piirits, M., Jõgi, E. (2015). The Impact of Introduction of Funded Pension Schemes on 
Intragenerational Inequality in Estonia. NETSPAR Academic Series, DP 06/2015-021,  
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=137638 
11
 Stavausis, D. (2013). Izglītības veicināšana finanšu jautājumos kā spējināšanas instruments Latvijā: valsts 
fondēto pensiju gadījums. In Rajevska, F. (Ed.) Sociālā cilvēkdrošība: spēju attīstība, sadarbība, iekļaušana . 
Rīga, LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 141–160 lpp. 
12
 Dundure, I. (2013). Role of the Elderly in Building Sustainability of Pension System. Journal of International 
Scientific Publication: Economy & Business, Vol. 6(2), pp. 131–141. 
13
Bartkus, A. (2013). On Future Pensions from Second Pillar Pension Funds. Organizations and Markets in 
Emerging Economies. Vol. 4-1(7), pp. 121–140.  
14
 Tuesta, D. (2014). Factors behind the administrative fees of private pension systems: an international analysis. 
Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Vol. 13, pp. 88-111.   
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Dariusz Stanko and Johanna Rutecka
15
, providing a broader context for comparison. A wide 
international spectrum is covered by Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia Mitchell
16
 in their study 
of the importance of financial literacy of population in modern pension schemes. Gilles Le 
Garrec studied different pension systems
17
 to shed light on the dilemma between inequality 
and economic growth in retirement systems: greater progressivity results in less lifetime 
inequality but also less growth. Eelco Zandberg and Laura Spierdijk
18
 studied the sample of 
54 countries to examine whether changes in the degree of pension funding affect economic 
growth (and did not find almost any effect). Franziska Tausch, Jan Potters and Arno Riedl 
explored the different aspects of solidarity (risk solidarity, income solidarity, subsidizing 
solidarity) in pensions
19
. 
On the other hand, some country-specific articles were also very instructive and induced 
fertile lines of research by adopting their approaches to the Baltic context: e.g., the article on 
minimum pension in Poland
20
, on expected and actual replacement rates in the Netherlands
21
, 
a comparison of adequate standard of living on retirement in the Netherlands and the USA
22
 
and others. 
Only few (less than ten) journal entries over more than twelve years relate to some 
extent to the Baltic States, some of them being not the articles stricto sensu, but 1-2 pages 
long reviews of books devoted to pension reforms in Eastern Europe. Surely, many other 
scientific journals give the floor to discussions on various aspects of pension systems and 
their development, pension reforms and related political processes, pension funds and 
occupational pension plans, etc. To name just few of them - Journal of Banking & Finance,  
                                                          
15
 Kawinski, M., Stanko, D., Rutecka, J.  (2012). Protection mechanisms in the old-age pension systems of the 
CEE countries. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Vol.11, pp. 581-605. 
16
 Lusardi, A., Mitchell, O. S. (2011). Financial literacy around the world: an overview. Journal of Pension 
Economics and Finance, Vol. 10, pp. 497-508. 
17
 Le Garrec, G. (2012). Social security, income inequality and growth. Journal of Pension Economics and 
Finance, Vol. 11, pp. 53-70. 
18
 Zandberg, E., Spierdijk, L. (2013). Funding of pensions and economic growth: are they really related?. 
Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Vol.12, pp. 151-167. 
19
 Tausch, F., et al. (2013). Preferences for redistribution and pensions. What can we learn from experiments?. 
Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Vol. 12, pp. 298-325. 
20
 Chłoń-Domińczak, A., Strzelecki, P. 2013. The minimum pension as an instrument of poverty protection in 
the defined contribution pension system – an example of Poland, in Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 
Vol. 12 (03), pp. 326-350. 
21
 van Duijn, M., Mastrogiacomo, M, Lindeboom, M., Lundborg, P. (2013). Expected and actual replacement 
rates in the pension system of the Netherlands: how and why do they differ? Journal of Pension Economics and 
Finance, Vol. 12, pp. 168-189. 
22
 Binswanger, J., Schunk, D. (2011). What is an adequate standard of living during retirement? Journal of 
Pension Economics and Finance. Vol. 11, pp. 203-222. 
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Planning Theory, Journal of Public Economics, Social Policy & Administration, International Social 
Security Review, Comparative Political Studies, Journal of European Social Policy,  Journal of Baltic 
Studies, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, as well as many others. 
Secondary data sources used for this thesis include statistics on pensions and other 
related subjects mainly obtained from online databases of national statistical bodies
23
 and 
Eurostat, as well as databases and reports of statistical departments of national social 
insurance agencies
24
, reports of pension funds supervisory authorities
25
. European Value 
Studies (EVS) data
26
 were used for comparing social trust levels in the study countries. A 
more detailed analysis of data sources forms a special section 3.1 in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
Approbation of results of research (publications, conferences) 
Results of the research were presented and discussed in 12 scientific publications and 18    
scientific international and local conferences (in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, 
Norway, Italy and Russia). 
Author’s scientific publications in 12 reviewed publications: 
• Rajevska, O. (2016). Theoretical old-age pension benefits and replacement rates in the 
Baltic States: A Retrospective Simulation. Economics and Business, ISSN 2256-0394. 
Vol.28, pp. 13–19. Available in EBSCO.  
• Rajevska, O. (2015). Sustainability of pension systems in the Baltic States. 
Entrepreneurial Business and Economics Review. ISSN 2353-8821. Vol. 3/4, pp. 139-
153. Available in EBSCO. 
• Rajevska, O. (2014). Pension statistics in Latvia: resources and weaknesses. The 
Journal of Economics and Management Research. ISSN 2255-9000. Vol.3, pp. 65-74.  
• Rajevska, O. (2014). Adequacy of pensions in the Baltic region. Regional Review. 
ISSN 1691-6115. Vol. 10, pp. 41-51. Available in EBSCO. 
• Rajevska, O. (2014). Latvian pension system: calibration by crisis. In: International 
scientific conference "New challenges of economic and business development": 
                                                          
23
 Statistics Estonia (www.stat.ee),  Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia - CSB (Centrālā statistikas pārvalde, 
CSP, http://www.csb.gov.lv) and Statistics Lithuania (Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, http://www.stat.gov.lt) 
24
 The Social Insurance Board (Sotsiaalkindlustusamet,  http://www.sotsiaalkindlustusamet.ee), State Social 
Insurance Agency, SSIA (Valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas aģentūra, VSAA, http://www.vsaa.gov.lv) and State 
Social Insurance Fund Board (“Sodra”, http://atvira.sodra.lt/) 
25
 Estonian Financial Supervision Authority, EFSA (Finantsinspektsioon, http://www.fi.ee), Financial Capital 
and Market Commission, FCMC (Finanšu kapitāla un tirgus komisija, FKTK, http://www.fktk.lv) and Bank of 
Lithuania (Lietuvos Bankas, http://www.lb.lt) 
26
 Online database of EVS is available from http://www.gesis.org/unser-angebot/daten-
analysieren/umfragedaten/european-values-study/data-access/ 
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conference proceedings, 8-10 May, 2014, Riga, University of Latvia. ISBN 978-9984-
45-836-6. pp. 307-315. Available also in Thomson Reuters Web of Science base. 
• Rajevska, O. and Rajevska, F. (2014). Notional Defined Contribution pension scheme 
experience in Latvia: some lessons. Studia Humanistyczne AGH (Contributions to 
Humanities). ISSN 2084-3364. Vol. 13/4, pp. 185-197. 
• Rajevska, O. (2014). Sociālais taisnīgums un sociālā nevienlīdzība sociālās politikas 
dizainā. In: Tabuns, A. and Rajevska, F. (eds.). Latvijas iedzīvotāju identitātes un 
vienlīdzības vērtības. Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds. ISBN 978-9984-45-880-9, pp. 
113.-137. 
• Rajevska, O. (2014). Social justice in pension systems of the Baltic States – possible 
inspiration for Eastern Partnership. In: Muravska, T. and Berlin, A. (eds.). EU Eastern 
Partnership: from capacities to excellence: strengthening research, regional and 
innovation policies in the context of horizon 2020. Riga: University of Latvia Press, 
ISBN 978-9984-45-901-1, pp. 104-116. 
• Rajevska, O. (2013). Funded pillars in the pension systems of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. Economics and Business. ISSN 1407-7337. Vol.23, pp. 83-89. Available in 
EBSCO.  
• Rajevska, O. (2013). Equity criterion in pension systems assessment and its 
manifestation in Estonian and Latvian pension schemes. Journal of Economics and 
Management Research. ISSN 2255-9000. Vol. 2, pp. 118-130. 
• Rajevska, F., Rajevska, O. and Stāvausis. D. (2013). Izaicinājumi Latvijas pensiju 
sistēmas ilgtspējai. In: Bela, B. (ed.). Latvija. Pārskats par tautas attīstību 2012/2013: 
Ilgtspējīga nācija. Rīga: LU Sociālo un politisko pētījumu institūts. ISBN 978-9984-
45-784-0, pp. 34-44. 
• Rajevska, O. (2012). The impact of globalisation and europeanisation on pension 
systems in the Baltic States. In Kuznetsova, N. et al. (eds.) Экономическая теория и 
хозяйственная практика: глобальные вызовы. Материалы международной 
конференции „Эволюция международной торговой системы: проблемы и 
перспективы”, 11-12 октября 2012 г., Санкт-Петербург, Российская 
Федерация. Санкт-Петербург: Скифия-принт, ISBN 978-5986-20-082-8, pp. 184-
196. 
Results of the research were presented and discussed at 18 scientific international and local 
conferences (in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, Norway, Italy and Russia). 
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• Rajevska, O. Tools for Measuring Pension Adequacy and Pension Equity: The Results 
of European and Baltic Expert Poll. 74th University of Latvia Conference, Riga, 
01.02.2016.  
• Rajevska, O. Theoretical old-age pension benefits and replacement rates in the Baltic 
States: a retrospective simulation. 56th RTU Conference SCEE’2015 “Scientific 
Conference on Economics and Entrepreneurship”, RTU, Riga 14-16/10/2015. 
• Rajevska, O. and Rajevska, F. Old-age pension benefits: state responsibilities in the 
design of pension systems of the Baltic countries. 2nd International Conference on 
Public Policy ICPP-2015, The International Public Policy Association in cooperation 
with Éupolis Lombardia - Institute for Research, Statistics and Training and Università 
Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan 01-04/07/2015. 
• Rajevska, O. Acquisition of pension rights in the Baltic States pension systems. 
International Conference „European Integration and Baltic Sea Region: Diversity and 
Perspectives -2015”, University of Latvia and Baltic Sea Region University Network, 
Riga 11-13/06/2015. 
• Rajevska, O. Notional defined contribution pension systems experience. 73rd 
University of Latvia Conference, Riga, 05/02/2015. 
• Rajevska, O. Sustainability of pension systems in the Baltic States. International 
conference " Contemporary Issues in Business, Management and Education' 2014", 
Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, Vilnius, 13-14/11/2014. 
• Rajevska, O. Sustainability of pension systems in Latvia and Estonia. 12th Annual 
ESPAnet conference „Beyond the Crisis in Europe - New Opportunities for 
reconciling sustainability, equality and economic robustness”, Norwegian Social 
Research (NOVA) and Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences 
(HiOA), Oslo 04-06/09/2014. 
• Rajevska, O. Social justice in pension systems of the Baltic States. BIGSSS 
International Conference 2014 „(UN-)STABLE, (UN-)EQUAL & (UN-
)PREDICTABLE: The Link between Social Stratification and the Welfare State”, 
Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences and Centre for Social Policy 
Research / Zentrum für Sozialpolitik (ZeS), Bremen 12-13/06/2014. 
• Rajevska, O. Pension Trends in Baltic Countries. International Jean Monnet 
Conference „EU Eastern Partnership: Capacities to Excellence. Strengthening 
Research, Regional and Innovation Policies in the Context of Horizon 2020”, 
University of Latvia and EU Jean Monnet Centre Programme,  Riga 11-13/06/2014. 
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• Rajevska, O. Latvian pension system: calibration by crisis. International conference 
"New challenges of economic and business development - 2014", University of Latvia, 
Riga, 8-10/05/2014. Best doctoral paper presentation award. 
• Rajevska, O. Why pension expectations of Latvian residents are unrealistic?  72nd 
University of Latvia Conference, Riga, 04/02/2014. 
• Rajevska, O. and Rajevska, F. Deepening of the social inequality among elderly as a 
result of implementation of NDC pension system in Latvia. The International 
Conference: Between Work and Retirement. Transition to Retirement in Central and 
Eastern European Societies, AGH University of Science and Technology, Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education (Republic of Poland), Krakow 24/01/2014. 
• Rajevska, O. Adequacy of old age pension benefits in the Baltic States. 54th RTU 
Conference SCEE’2013 “Scientific Conference on Economics and Entrepreneurship”, 
RTU, Riga 14-15/10/2013. 
• Rajevska, O. Pension statistics in Latvia: resources and weaknesses. International 
conference "New challenges of economic and business development - 2013", 
University of Latvia, Riga, 9-11/05/2013. 
• Rajevska, O. Valorisation of I pillar pension capital: approaches and consequences. 
71
st
 University of Latvia Conference, Riga, 31/01/2013.  
• Rajevska, O. Funded pillars in the pension systems of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
53th RTU Conference SCEE’2012 “Scientific Conference on Economics and 
Entrepreneurship”, RTU, Riga 10-12/10/2012. 
• Rajevska, O. The impact of globalisation and europeanisation on pension systems in 
the Baltic States. International Conference “Evolution of International Trading 
System: Prospects and Challenges”, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg 
(Russia), 11-12/10/2012. 
• Rajevska, O. Pensiju sistēmas pirmā līmeņa taisnīguma principa darbība Latvijā un 
Igaunijā. Zinātniski praktiskā konference "Sadarbība reģiona attīstībai", Vidzemes 
Augstskola, Valmiera, 07/09/2012. 
The work was supported by the State Research Programme “National Identity” (sub-project 
“National Identity and Social Human Security”, LU No. ZD2010/26465) and the State 
Research Programme EKOSOC-LV (sub-project 5.2.6 “Social and Political Transformations 
in Latvia in the Post-Crisis Period”, LU No. ZD2014/29934). 
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Chapter 1. Pension Systems: prolegomena. Theoretical approaches 
and criteria of assessment 
The first chapter is based on the publications of such accredited authorities in the field 
of pensions as Professor of Public Economics of the London School of Economics Nicholas 
Barr
27,28,29,30,31,32,33
, the WB expert in pensions, a reference to whom is a sine qua non for 
practically any serious publication on pensions. He has also several joint publications
34,35,36
 
with Nobel laureate in economics working at MIT Department of Economics, Peter Diamond. 
The latter author has also his own publications in this field
37,38
. The conceptual framework for 
assessing pension systems and their reforms has been gradually elaborated by a group of WB 
pension experts leaded by professor of economics Robert Holzmann
39,40,41,42
. He is also the 
                                                          
27
Barr, N. (2002a). Reforming pensions: Myths, truths, and policy choices. International Social Security Review, 
Vol. 55, pp. 3–36.  
28
 Barr, N. (2002b). The Pension Puzzle: Prerequisites and Policy Choices in Pension Design’, IMF, Economic 
Issues No. 29, http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/issues/issues29/ 
29
 Barr, N. (2006a). Non-Financial Defined Contribution Pensions: Mapping the Terrain. In Holzmann, R., 
Palmer, E. (eds.) Pension Reform: Issues and Prospects for NCD Schemes. The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank,  pp. 57-70. 
30
 Barr, N. (2006b). Pensions: overview of the issues. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 22 (1). pp. 1-14 
31
 Barr, N. (2011). A toolkit for assessing reform of public sector pensions. 
https://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/nb/Barr_CARE111119.pdf 
32
 Barr, N. (2013). The pension system in Finland: Adequacy, sustainability and system design. Finnish Center 
for Pensions, Vaasa. 
33
 Barr, N. (2014). The Role of Public and Private Sectors in Ensuring Adequate Pensions: Theoretical 
Considerations. In Clements, D. et al. (eds.) Equitable and Sustainable Pensions: Challenges and Experience.  
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, pp. 59-86. 
34
 Barr, N., Diamond, P. (2006). The Economics of Pensions. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 22 (1), 
pp. 15-39. 
35
 Barr, N., Diamond, P. (2008). Reforming Pensions: Principles, Analytical Errors, and Policy Directions. 
International Social Security Review, Vol. 62, pp. 5-19. 
36
 Barr, N., Diamond, P. (2010). Pension Reform in China: Issues, Options and Recommendations, China 
Economic Research and Advisory Programme. http://economics.mit.edu/files/ 
37
 Diamond, P. (2006). Conceptualization of Non-Financial Defined Contribution Systems. In Holzmann, R., 
Palmer, E. (eds.). Pension reform: issues and prospects for non-financial defined contribution (NDC) schemes, 
The World Bank, pp. 76-80. 
38
 Diamond, P. (2009). Economic Globalisation and Swedish Pensions. Expert report no. 28 to Sweden’s 
Globalisation Council. http://www.government.se/contentassets/92f0ba5f434945f59e186b6d3b8851c3/ 
economic-globalisation-and-swedish-pensions 
39
 Holzmann, R. (2000). The World Bank approach to pension reform. International Social Security Review, Vol. 
53, pp. 11–35. 
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author and co-author of many other books and papers dealing with different aspects of 
pensions
43,44
. A particular subject of Robert Holzmann’s interests are non-financial defined 
contribution pension schemes: together with Swedish professor of Uppsala Center for Labor 
Studies and Department of Economics Edward Palmer, Robert Holzmann edited three 
volumes of collective monographs on this topic (more detailed review of these books is given 
herebelow). Theoretical considerations of pension systems taxonomy are also generalised by 
Professor of Sociology, Director of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, 
Bernhardt Ebbinghaus
45
, as well as in OECD-authored monographs
46,47
. Political economy of 
pensions is covered in the above mentioned publications of Nicholas Barr, as well as in works 
of Pierre Pestieau
48,49,50,51
 of the University of Liège.  A very valuable source is also a paper 
by a very prominent economist, formerly working in administrations of Barak Obama and Bill 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
40
 Holzmann, R., Hinz, R. P. (2005). Old Income Support in the 21st Century: An International Perspective on 
Pension Systems and Reform. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.   
41
 Holzmann, R., Hinz R. P., Dorfman M. (2008). Pension Systems and Reform Conceptual Framework. The 
World Bank SP Discussion Paper No. 0824, June 2008. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Pensions-DP/ 
0824.pdf 
42
 Holzmann, R. (2012). Global Pension Systems and Their Reform: Worldwide Drivers, Trends, and 
Challenges. Social Protection & Labor Discussion Paper 1213. The World Bank. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Pensions-DP/ 
1213.pdf 
43
 Holzmann, R., Guven, U. (2009). Adequacy of retirement income after pension reforms in Central, Eastern, 
and Southern Europe: eight country studies. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The 
World Bank. 
44
 Holzmann, R., Palmer, E. (2012). NDC in the Teens: Lessons and Issues. In Holzmann, R., Palmer, E., 
Robalino, D. (eds). Nonfinancial Defined Contribution Pension Schemes in a Changing Pension World: Volume 
1 Progress, Lessons and Implementation. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, pp. 3-29. 
45
 Ebbinghaus, B. (ed.) (2011). The Varieties of Pension Governance: Pension Privatization in Europe, Oxford 
University Press. 
46
 OECD (2011). Pensions at a glance 2011: retirement - income systems in OECD and G20 countries. Paris: 
OECD. 
47 OECD (2013a). Architecture of national pension systems. In OECD. Pensions at a Glance 2013: OECD and 
G20 Indicators, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2013-6-en 
48
 Cremer, H., Pestieau, P. (2003). Social insurance competition between Bismarck and Beveridge. Journal of 
Urban Economics, Vol. 54 (1), pp. 181-196. 
49
 Pestieau P. (2006). The Welfare State in the European Union: Economic and Social Prospectives. Oxford 
University Press. 
50
 Pestieau, P., Ponthiere, G. (2012). The Public Economics of Increasing Longevity. Hacienda Pública 
Española, IEF, Vol. 200(1), pp. 41-74. 
51
 Artige, L., Cavenaile, L., Pestieau, P. (2014).  The macroeconomics of PAYG pension schemes in an aging 
society. CORE Discussion Paper 2014/33, http://uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2014_ 
33web.pdf 
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Clinton Peter R. Orszag and Nobel laureate in Economic Sciences Joseph Stiglitz (then Senior 
Vice President and Chief Economist at the WB): “Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths 
About Social Security Systems”52. The paper was first presented at the WB Conference in 
1999. Further in 2001 its updated version opened the book edited by him together with 
already mentioned Robert Holzmann – “New Ideas about Old Age Security: Toward 
Sustainable Pension Systems in the 21st Century”.  
1.1. Institutional design of pension systems: objectives, taxonomy and constituent 
elements  
A pension scheme is an arrangement by which individuals are provided with 
an income (a regular periodical payment) when they have reached a certain 
age and are no longer earning a steady income from employment  
(definition of International Labour Organisation)
53
. 
 
All societies, in one way or another, try to meet people's needs as they age and can no 
longer provide for themselves. As developing countries grow, they face difficult issues about 
when and how to establish pension systems that their more complex economies require. As 
post-communist states had to adopt their social security systems to market conditions, they 
faced similar challenges and have (with different degree of success) carried out drastic 
pension systems reforms. As developed countries are motivated by ageing societies, they face 
the need to adjust their too generous pension schemes to grim reality. There are no universal 
solutions to the complex array of pension issues nor there a simple reform model that can be 
applied in all settings. On all those aspects are much of academic researches. The focus of this 
thesis lies on the institutional design of pension systems. According to Ernest Alexander 
(Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, specializing in the theory of 
planning and institutional analysis), “institutional design means designing institutions: the 
devising and realization of rules, procedures, and organizational structures that will enable 
and constrain behaviour and action so as to accord with held values, achieve desired 
                                                          
52
 Orszag, P. R., Stiglitz, J. E. (2001). Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths About Social Security Systems. In 
Holzmann, R., Stiglitz, J. E. (eds.). New Ideas about Old Age Security: Toward Sustainable Pension Systems in 
the 21st Century. Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 17-56. 
53
 World Social Security Report 2010/11: Providing coverage in times of crisis and beyond. International Labour 
Office – Geneva: ILO, 2010, p.45. 
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objectives, or execute given tasks”54. Alexander distinguishes three levels of institutional 
design: at the highest level institutional design is applied to whole societies or addresses 
significant macro-societal processes and institutions; the meso-level involves the institutional 
design of planning and implementation structures and processes. This includes establishing 
and operating inter-organisational networks, creating new organizations and transforming 
existing ones, and devising and deploying incentives and constraints in the form of laws, 
regulations, and resources to develop and implement policies, programs, projects and plans. 
The lowest level of institutional design involves intra-organizational design, addressing 
organizational sub-units and small semi-formal or informal social units, processes and 
interactions, such as committees, teams, task forces, work groups etc. Pension systems with 
their formal structural elements mostly relate to the medium level. 
1.1.1. Objectives of pension systems 
Rational policy design starts with agreeing on objectives and then proceeds to discussion of 
instruments for achieving them. Globally speaking, the objectives of all pension systems can 
be described in the following way: 
From an individual viewpoint pension is 
- (1) a mechanism for consumption smoothing – a process which enables a person to 
transfer consumption from his productive years to his retired years, thus achieving 
status maintenance in declining years; and 
- (2) a means of insurance - a form of longevity risk pooling (to insure the risk of 
outliving personal pension savings). 
Additionally, pension is an instrument of public policy, and as such is aimed to  
- (3) poverty relief – the elderly people are a particular group of poverty risk, especially 
those who have been poor on a lifetime basis and therefore unable to save enough, 
both through voluntary savings and through mandatory pension schemes; and 
- (4) income redistribution – the basic security entails a transfer between income 
groups. The work-based old-age pension redistributes income across the individual’s 
lifetime. Redistribution takes place between groups at risk in an insured population. In 
a public old-age pension scheme this entails a transfer from those who live for a 
shorter time than average to those who live longer than average – typically a transfer 
                                                          
54
 Alexander, E. R. (2011). Institutional Transformation and Planning: From Institutionalization Theory to 
Institutional Design. Planning Theory, Vol. 4/3, p. 213. 
 18 
from men to women. A pension system may also entail re-distribution between 
generations. 
Pension policy may also contribute to overall economic growth and market 
development, though badly designed schemes can create adverse effect. 
Relative weights assigned to the above objectives may vary significantly amongst 
countries, different policy makers within one country, and with the course of time. 
1.1.2. Pillars and tiers in pension systems 
Pension systems can be organized in different ways, but in terms of these generally 
recognized objectives a concept of distinct pension pillars have been developed. The three-
pillar model first delineated by the WB Policy Research Report ‘Adverting the Old Age 
Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth’ in 1994 (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 1994), where its components were categorized into:   
  (a) a mandated, unfunded, and publicly managed defined benefit system,  
(b) a mandated, funded, and privately managed defined-contribution scheme, and  
(c) voluntary retirement savings, 
— has been later extended to include two additional pillars:  
(d) a basic (zero) pillar to deal more explicitly with the poverty objective and   
(e) a nonfinancial (fourth) pillar to include the broader context of social policy, such as 
family support, access to health care, and housing.
55
 
Experience with low-income countries has brought into focus the need for a basic or 
zero (or non-contributory) pillar that is distinguished from the first pillar in its primary focus 
on poverty alleviation in order to extend old-age security to all of the elderly. Experience in 
low- to middle income countries has heightened awareness of the importance of the design 
and implementation of the third and voluntary pillar, which can effectively supplement the 
basic elements of a pension system to provide reasonable replacement rates for higher-income 
groups, while constraining the fiscal costs of the basic components. Last, but not least, is 
recognition of the importance of a fourth pillar for retirement consumption, which consists of 
a mixture of access to informal support (such as family support), other formal social programs 
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(such as health care), and other individual financial and nonfinancial assets (such as 
homeownership) and the need to incorporate their existence or absence explicitly into the 
design of the pension system. 
The experience in implementing pension reforms in numerous countries since the early 
90-s has also motivated Bank staff to review and “soften” their position by appreciation of the 
diversity of effective approaches in response to particular circumstances or needs (the number 
of pillars in use, the appropriate balance among the various pillars, and the way in which each 
pillar is formulated). Some pension systems may function effectively with only a zero pillar 
(in the form of a universal social pension) and a third pillar of voluntary savings. In some 
countries, the introduction of a mandatory second pillar is required to gain popular acceptance 
for a reform of the first pillar, while the political economy of other countries makes a 
reformed (first-pillar) public system in conjunction with voluntary schemes the only realistic 
alternative. 
Table 1.1. Multipillar Pension Taxonomy (World Bank approach) 
Source: Holzmann, R., Hinz, R.P. Old Age Income Support in the 21st Century 
Thus, the current taxonomy suggested by the WB experts is as shown in the Table 1.1.       
 20 
 a non-contributory or “zero pillar” (e.g. in the form of a universal flat benefit, social 
pension, or general social assistance typically financed by the local, regional or national 
government), fiscal conditions permitting, to deal explicitly with the poverty alleviation 
objective in order to provide all of the elderly with a minimal level of protection. This 
insures that people with low lifetime incomes are provided with basic protection in old 
age, including those who only participate marginally in the formal economy; 
 a mandatory “first pillar” with contributions linked to earnings (to varying degrees) with 
the objective of replacing some portion of lifetime pre-retirement income. First pillars 
address, among others, the risks of individual myopia, low earnings, and inappropriate 
planning horizons due to the uncertainty of life expectancies, and the lack or risks of 
financial markets.  They are typically financed on a pay-as-you-go basis and thus are, in 
particular, subject to demographic and political risks;  
 a mandatory “second pillar” that is typically an individual savings account (i.e. defined 
contribution plan) with a wide  set of design options including  active or passive 
investment management, choice parameters for selecting  investments and investment 
managers, and options for the withdrawal phase.  Defined contribution plans establish a 
clear linkage between contributions, investment performance and benefits; support 
enforceable property rights; and may be supportive of financial market development.  
When compared to defined benefit plans they can subject participants to financial and 
agency risks as a result of private asset management, the risk of high transaction and 
administrative costs, and longevity risks unless they require mandatory annuitization;  
 a voluntary “third-pillar” taking many forms (e.g. individual savings for retirement, 
disability or death; employer sponsored; defined benefit or defined contribution) but is 
essentially flexible and discretionary in nature. Third pillars compensate for rigidities in 
the design of other systems but include similar risks as second pillars; and  
 a non-financial fourth pillar which includes access to informal support (such as family 
support), other formal social programs (such as health care and/or housing), and other 
individual financial and non-financial assets (such as home ownership and reverse 
mortgages where available). The availability and type of such support for the aged has a 
                                                          
 
 21 
major bearing on the design and implementation of the other pillars, including target 
benefit levels.
56
 
In the further chapters the above categorization will be used. However, it’s worth to 
mention that different authors read other meaning into the term “pillar” and do differentiate 
“pillars” and “tiers”. According to Bernhardt Ebbinghaus of the University of Manheim, 
pension policy analysis should “distinguish pillars, that is, the question: ‘who provides a 
pension?’, from tiers, that is, the question: ‘what function does a pension serve in old age 
income security?’ […] the concept of ‘pillars’ provides an analytical tool to delineate the 
different institutionalized providers (or sponsors) responsible for the production of welfare: 
the state, a single employer, the social partners, and/or the individual. In addition to pillars, 
pension systems assume different functions with respect to income security or maintenance 
which is referred to with the concept of ‘tiers’ – different layers of income protection.  
Table 1.2. Pillars and tiers in pension systems (according to B.Ebbinghaus) 
 
Source:  Ebbinghaus B., Studying Pension Privatization in Europe.  In “The Varieties of Pension Governance” 
OUP, 2011, p. 10. 
The first, basic social security aim is either a guaranteed minimum to all in need (e.g. 
social assistance) with a means test or a basic pension for all residents independent of any 
means test, what T.H.Marshall referred to as a ‘social citizenship right’. The second tier aims 
at status maintenance through earnings-related benefits, following the ‘equivalence’ principle 
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of paid contribution record and expected benefits […] The final tier is only a ‘topping-up’ of 
retirement income thanks to the expected returns on invested savings, for instance a fringe 
benefit offered by an employer to high-skilled employees or a voluntary personal saving 
schemes offered by financial institutes.”57  The taxonomy offered by this model is shown in 
the Table 1.2. The author’s intention was not to immerse in retrospective analysis of roots and 
historical development of pension systems, however, to clarify the above citation some short 
notes should be made. The term “Bismarckian pension” is named after Otto van Bismarck, the 
first Chancellor of the German Empire and the founder of Prussian welfare state, and is used 
to characterize the continental approach to old-age pension as a kind of social insurance, 
resulting in earnings-related pension benefits. The term “Beveridge pension” is named after 
William Henry Beveridge, a British economist and social reformer, known as one of the 
authors of post-World War II welfare state in Great Britain, and is used to depict universal 
basic flat-rate pension benefits set at low level. Bismarckian systems on the one hand and 
Beveridgean systems on the other imply specific institutional and administrative arrangements 
which cannot be overturned in the short run. In countries like France and Germany, the 
Bismarckian system is solidly anchored in the tradition and concerns not only the benefit rule 
of social insurance but also the working of the labour market. In the UK, on the other hand, 
the Beveridgean tradition is also a strong part of the political and social life
58
. 
Since pension schemes pursue two different (and often contradictory) goals, namely, 
poverty alleviation and status maintenance, the former leading to broader development of flat-
rate pensions and the latter – to wider expansion of social insurance model, it’s quite hard to 
find nowadays a pure “Bismarckian” or pure “Beveridge” system, as they are interacting 
actively. 
OECD experts note that “retirement-income systems are diverse and often involve a 
number of different programmes. Classifying pension systems and different retirement-
income schemes is consequently difficult”59. They offer a combined taxonomy of tiers and 
types of pension systems – see Figure 1.1. Pension systems, worldwide, include one or more 
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of the various constituent elements, in different degrees of importance and size that are 
integrated parts of the pillars and tiers. 
 
Figure 1.1. Different types of retirement income provision 
Source:  OECD (2013), Architecture of national pension systems, in OECD. Pensions at a Glance 2013: OECD 
and G20 Indicators, OECD Publishing. Table 3.2 on page 121.     
Pension systems in different countries are made of different sets of these building 
blocks. The number of blocks varies significantly among countries, either (from one to five or 
six). The next section looks closer at the characteristics of certain system ‘bricks’.  
1.1.3. Elements of pension systems 
Non-contributory pensions, minimum-income and minimum-pension guarantees. 
In many ways the simplest option is a tax-financed pension available to everyone beyond a 
given age, commonly referred to as a citizen’s pension. As a variant, a tax-financed citizen’s 
pension can be affluence tested. Alternatively, there can be a guaranteed minimum income 
available to all poor elderly people on the basis of an income test. The test might look only at 
income from mandatory pensions, or at total income, or at income and assets. A country can 
combine a minimum-income guarantee with a higher minimum-pension guarantee. 
A non-contributory pension that is tested against the benefit from a contributory pension 
is mathematically equivalent to a guaranteed minimum pension that is similarly phased out 
against the contributory pension. The choice of vocabulary is likely to affect the politics of the 
design of details and may affect the perceptions of workers. 
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Funded Defined Contribution (DC, FDC) Plans. With funded individual accounts, 
pensions are paid from a fund built over the years from members’ contributions. The 
contribution rate is fixed, so that a person’s pension is an annuity whose size is determined by 
the size of his lifetime pension accumulation, life expectancy and the rate of interest. 
Countries with DC systems can use publicly organised investment or private, regulated 
financial intermediaries. 
Defined Benefit (DB) Plans. In a national DB plan, a worker receives a pension based 
on his history of covered wages and his age at the time he first receives benefits. The pension 
may be based on the worker’s wages in his final few years of work, or on a longer period, up 
to his entire career. There may be a taxpayer subsidy from general revenues. Most national 
DB plans are primarily PAYG, with pensions paid out of current revenues with little or no 
funding, but some have partial funding, well in excess of a minimum reserve, through a build-
up of assets held in a trust fund. Some partially funded DB systems hold only government 
debt. Others hold diversified portfolios (diversified both across assets and across countries). 
These portfolios can be managed either by government agencies or by private firms hired to 
handle investment transactions or even to make investment decisions. 
There are two important mechanisms in earnings-related schemes that greatly influence 
the level of benefits that pensioners will eventually receive. The first is the measure of 
individual earnings used in the benefit formula. Entitlements in these schemes are calculated 
in relation to the past earnings of the individual worker but the way in which these are 
measured differs among countries. The measure might be, for example, a period of final 
earnings, the lifetime average or a number of best years of earnings. When individual earnings 
increase over a worker’s career, as is often the case, using only final or a few last years of 
earnings will result in a higher benefit than when taking into account early years of the career 
when earnings were much lower. 
The second mechanism is valorisation, which is often over-looked in pension-policy analysis, 
but has a large effect on pension entitlements. Past earnings are “valorised” to take account of 
changes in living standards between the time pension rights accrued and the time they are 
claimed. In final-salary schemes there is obviously no need for valorisation but it is common 
in schemes where benefits are based on earnings over a longer period. 
 25 
A simple, generic defined-benefit scheme pays a constant accrual rate, a, for each year of 
service. It is based on lifetime average revalued earnings. The pension benefit can therefore 
be written
60
 as: 
𝐷𝐵 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖(1 + 𝑢)
𝑅−𝑖𝑎
𝑅
𝑖=0
    (1) 
where wi is individual earnings in a particular year, R is the year of retirement and u is the 
factor by which earlier years’ earnings are revalued. In most OECD countries, this is the 
growth of economy-wide average earnings. 
 
 
Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) Systems. A fairly recent innovation 
internationally, pure NDC systems (sometimes also called non-financial defined-contribution 
systems) are hybrid individual account systems, with elements both of DC and DB. They are 
conceptually similar to pure DC pensions in that risks are shared by making all adjustments 
on the benefits side. But they are similar to DB pensions in that they are not fully funded and 
may be entirely PAYG and determine benefits using formulas in place of market rates of 
return and mortality projections. NDC systems parallel DC pensions in the approach to 
pension design: 
 Each worker pays a contribution of x% of his earnings, which is credited to a notional 
individual account. The contribution rate can be different for workers of different ages 
and can be changed from time to time; 
 The cumulative contents of the account are credited periodically with a notional interest 
rate, specified by the government in advance, and chosen to reflect what can be afforded; 
 At retirement, the value of the person’s notional accumulation is converted into an 
annuity, based on rules for measuring life expectancy and the rules in force for adjusting 
benefits in payment (for example, for inflation) and using the notional interest rate as the 
discount rate; 
 The account balance is for record keeping only, because the plan does not own matching 
funds invested in the financial market. This explains the term ‘notional’. 
At retirement, the pension benefit can therefore be written as  
𝑁𝐴 = ∑
𝑤𝑖𝑐
𝐴
𝑅
𝑖=0
(1 + 𝑛)𝑅−𝑖    (2) 
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where, wi is individual earnings in a particular year, R is the year of retirement, c is notional 
accounts contribution rate, n is notional interest rate, and A is notional annuity factor, also 
called the g-value. 
More formally, the NDC principles can be expressed by the formula (3) below
61
 
𝑝𝑡 =
(∑ 𝛽𝑅𝑘=𝑎 𝑤𝑘𝐼𝑘)
𝐺𝐴,𝑅,𝑟
𝐽𝑡  ;   𝑡 ≥ 𝑅    (3) 
where pt  is the pension at time t;   is the contribution rate; wk  is the imposable salary at time 
k; a is the time when the individual joins the social security system; R is the time of 
retirement; GA,R,r is the “g-factor” (annuity factor) at age A, in time R, given an interest rate r; 
Ik is the revalorization factor that affects contributions at preretirement time k; and Jt is the 
index that affects the pension at the time of retirement R (post-retirement benefit indexation). 
Not necessarily all members of the equation (3) must be present in each NDC-system.  
Parameters used for defining notional account interest rate (or, in other words, 
revalorisation factor) vary from country to country. Thus, in Latvia, notional interest rate is 
set equal to annual growth in wage-bill (i.e. the nationwide total amount of insured wages), 
valorisation of notional capital in Poland is linked not only to the wage-bill index, but also to 
consumer price index (and in no case can be lower than inflation), in Sweden, valorisation 
ratio is linked to average wage growth (3-year sliding average), in Italy – to GDP growth (5-
year sliding average). 
Despite being developed only recently, NDC pensions have been included as part of the 
pension system in a number of countries. The very concept of NDC was elaborated by 
Swedish experts in the beginning of 1990s. This concept was very warmly welcomed by the 
World Bank, so the Bank counsellors started to recommend NDC to the countries that used 
the Bank loans (inter alia, to post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe and CIS). Latvia was 
the first in that list. The country accepted NDC in 1995 and extended it to all working 
population: everyone retired after 1st of January 1996 (under the normal procedure, not taking 
into account military and civil servants, etc.) received old-age pension benefit calculated 
according to the new formula, irrespectively of the age, service record, etc.  
Italy also introduced NDC from the 1st of January 1996, but only in respect to those 
who just was starting their career (in full) and those having service record less than 18 years 
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(partially). Thus, until now nobody in Italy did retire with benefit calculated by that formula. 
Poland introduced NDC in 1999, and extended it only to persons aged at that time 50 years or 
younger, so pay-out stage only started there. Sweden launched NDC in 1999, and it fully 
covers persons born in 1954 and later, (i.e. those who were 45 years old or younger), those 
between 46 and 60 had part of the pension calculated by old rules, and rest by new formula, 
persons who were older than 60 in 1999 remained fully in old scheme. The system was also 
adopted in Russia in 2002 (but quite soon abolished), in Kyrgyzstan (in 1997, only for new 
entrants to labour markets) and Mongolia (in 2000), some features of NDC can be found in 
reformed Norwegian pension system and in Brazil. 
One of the first extended analyses of the NDC system was made by American 
researchers John B. Williamson and Matthew Williams (Williamson & Williams, 2003). As 
they point out, “NDC systems could actually end up redistributing money from the poor to the 
rich. Pensions are calculated using a uniform actuarial formula that does not take into account 
lifetime income or longevity risk classes; however, the rich tend to live longer than the poor, 
which means that the rich will often end up reaping disproportionately more from the 
system.”62 The authors have also noted that another negative effect of an NDC scheme is that, 
in the absence of a generous guaranteed minimum pension, there will generally be greater 
income inequality among retirees. 
During the last 10-15 years a number of interesting publications came out. The World 
Bank and the Swedish National Social Insurance Board organised two international 
conferences on NDC - the Bank wanted to know under what conditions and with what 
limitations NDC approach can be proposed to its international clients. The first conference in 
2003 was devoted to the early experience in pension reforms and to conceptual issues, the 
second conference took place in 2009 and discussed the lessons learnt during the first decade 
of NDC practice, including the early effects of financial and economic crises. Both 
conferences were followed by publishing of collected books based on the papers presented by 
conference participants. The first book, Pension Reform: Issues and Prospects for Non-
Financial Defined Contribution (NDC) Schemes, was published in 2006. In the book, 
prominent pension expert Nicholas Barr stresses that NDC is not the best solution for poor 
countries: “If the country is poor, the poverty line […] is relatively close to average earnings. 
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Hence there is little gain from an earnings-related pension in general, and NDC pensions in 
particular”63. Other researchers add that the most effective mechanism to achieve 
redistribution in an NDC system “is a complementary non-contributory pension that is 
reduced as the contributory pension increases”64.   
Annika Sunden
65
 wrote that shift NDC increased the need for general financial literacy. 
Studies of what people know indicate that they have poor knowledge about the conditions that 
determine their benefits, and that learning about pensions is difficult. However, six years 
later
66
 she identified sufficient progress in Swedish respondents’ knowledge and 
understanding and attributes it to persistent educational campaign. 
In 2012-2013 the WB published another two volumes devoted to summing up the 
lessons from the countries that had implemented the NDC model: NDC pension schemes in a 
changing pension world: Volume 1 - progress, lessons, and implementation and Volume 2 - 
gender, politics, and financial stability. Again, the authors noted that “NDC schemes must be 
supplemented with special provisions for low-income groups to prevent old-age poverty”67. 
Gender dimension is also very important in any pension system, since men and women are 
affected differently by the same pension policy because of the more limited labour force 
attachment of women, their lower earnings when they work, their higher life expectancy, and 
the likelihood that they will eventually become widows and live alone in very old age. Thus, 
women face a greater risk of running out of money in their later years. The gender income 
disparities are also not evened out (and are even amplified) in old age: “fiscal sustainability 
was achieved in NDC schemes largely by cutbacks on the benefits that were least connected 
to contributions - disproportionately benefits for women.”68  
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Finalising their findings, the authors of the books have identified the following research 
tasks for the next stage of reflections on NDC: 
 Assessing the outcomes of NDC schemes in view of the primary goals of pension 
systems (coverage, adequacy, sustainability) and in comparison with alternative 
scheme designs 
  Developing better measurements of pension assets and liabilities to guide the 
introduction, adjustment, and sustainability of NDC schemes 
 Clarifying the interaction of NDC (as a central consumption-smoothing pillar) with 
other pillars and benefits 
 Addressing the design and implementation issues of NDC schemes in low- and 
middle-income countries
69
. 
This thesis contributes to some of the above tasks.  
Points system (PP – pension points). Workers earn pension points based on their 
earnings each year. At retirement, the sum of pension points is multiplied by a pension-point 
value to convert them into a regular pension payment. Pension points are calculated by 
dividing earnings by the cost of the pension point (k), which can be equal, for example to an 
average nationwide wage. The pension benefit then depends on the value of a point at the time 
of retirement, v. Thus, the pension benefit can be written as: 
𝑃𝑃 =  ∑
𝑤𝑖𝑣𝑅
𝑘𝑖
𝑅
𝑖=0
     (4) 
where (as in the previous formulae) wi is individual earnings in a particular year and R is the 
year of retirement. A significant public-policy variable is the policy for uprating the value of 
the pension point, shown by the parameter x. By writing the pension-point value at the time of 
retirement as a function of its contemporaneous value, 𝑣𝑅 =  𝑣𝑖(1 + 𝑥)
𝑅−𝑖, the equation 
becomes: 
𝑃𝑃 =  ∑
𝑤𝑖𝑣𝑖
𝑘𝑖
𝑅
𝑖=0
(1 + 𝑥)𝑅−𝑖𝑎    (5) 
where wi is individual earnings in a particular year, R is the year of retirement, a is constant 
accrual rate, k is the cost of the pension point, and v is the value of a point at the time of 
retirement. 
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The last three schemes (DB, NDC and PP) are clearly earnings-related, since their value 
depends deterministically on individual earnings, w. Furthermore, if the policy for valorising 
earlier years’ earnings is the same as the uprating procedure for the pension point and the 
notional interest rate, then the structure of the three equations is very similar. In this case, the 
defined-benefit accrual rate is equal to the ratio of the pension-point value to its cost and to 
the ratio of the notional accounts contribution rate to the annuity factor, or algebraically: 
𝑎 =
𝑣𝑖
𝑘𝑖
=
𝑐
𝐴
      (6) 
where a is constant accrual rate, k is the cost of the pension point, v is the value of a point at 
the time of retirement, c is notional accounts contribution rate, and A is notional annuity factor 
(the g-value). 
The equation (6) has two important implications for the comparison of these different 
types of pension schemes. First, the effective accrual rate can be calculated for pension-point 
schemes (the ratio of point value to cost) and notional-accounts schemes (the ratio of the 
contribution rate to the annuity factor). Secondly, the valorisation procedure in defined-
benefit schemes, the uprating policy for the pension-point value and setting the notional 
interest rate are exactly parallel policies. Different choices of variables have the same effect in 
the different types of systems. 
Although defined-benefit, points and notional-accounts systems can appear very 
different, they are in fact closely related variants of earnings-related pension schemes. 
Public employee pensions. Pension systems set up by government for public 
employees (civil servants) are widespread. Most are defined benefit systems, although some 
have been defined contribution or have offered defined contributions as an option. Some 
public employees are included in the national mandatory system, with the public employee 
pension being supplementary, as is done for employees of large corporations. Other countries 
exempt some or all public employees from the mandatory national system. 
 
Voluntary pensions. These are separate from mandatory arrangements, and arise in two 
ways. An employer may establish a pension fund which is voluntary to the employer, in that it 
is not mandated by government, although a worker may not have a choice if he joins a firm 
with a pension that is mandatory for the firm’s employees. For workers covered by the 
mandatory national system, such voluntary pensions can be thought of as supplementary. In 
addition, in many countries, workers can choose to make contributions to a voluntary 
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individual plan. Voluntary pensions of both types typically receive favoured treatment for the 
purposes of income tax. 
Countries vary widely in the size of their mandatory systems, and hence in the amount 
of room for voluntary arrangements. This can be seen in the variation in the rates of 
mandatory pension contributions. This naturally results in different average replacement rates. 
Apart from the major elements shown in the Figure 1.1 and described above, the 
institutional design of pension systems includes also a set of specific policies, regulating 
pensionable age and possibilities of early and deferred retirement, taxation and indexation of 
pension benefits, parental pensions and other policies for smoothing gender disparities,  
measures for control over private pension funds, etc. In respect of the Baltic States, these 
peculiarities are covered in details in further chapters. In general, the most essential policies 
relate to the following aspects:   
Ceilings on pensionable earnings. Most countries do not require high-income workers 
to contribute to the pension system on their entire earnings. Usually, a limit is set on the 
earnings used both to calculate contribution liability and pension benefits. This ceiling on the 
earnings covered by the pension system has an important effect on the structure, size and cost 
of the second-tier systems. The rationale behind such ceilings is the view that higher-income 
workers can save individually if they want to reach a high replacement rate. High ceilings or 
the absence of a ceiling means that high-income workers receive a high replacement rate and 
there is little need for take-up of voluntary private pensions.  
Adjusting benefits after retirement (indexation). Once a person has retired, pensions 
based on a nominal annuity are vulnerable to inflation. A major question, therefore, is whether 
pensions are protected against inflation, and by what mechanism. Countries vary: some index 
benefits to prices, others to wages, and others to a weighted average of the two. 
Early / deferred retirement. Many countries offer a flexible approach to the time of 
retirement, allowing persons to choose it within a certain period, stimulating them to retire 
later with special financial incentives or, contrariwise, imposing a ‘fine’ on those who opt to 
go on pension earlier.  
These various pension elements vary in design and are assembled in very different ways 
and with different relative importance of certain components across countries.  
1.2. Political economy of pensions 
Canadian professor Robert Brown defines a pension system as “a social contract that 
sets out a process to decide what proportion of a country’s gross national product its elderly 
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residents can consume without any need for them to be in the active workforce. That is its 
essence on a macroeconomic level. On a microeconomic level it is a process to decide what 
proportion of each worker’s output will be transferred to its non-active elderly population for 
their consumption”70. 
There are numerous discussions of what kinds of financial portfolios are safest or most 
profitable, whether government promises are more secure than assets owned or held in the 
names of individuals, and what share of the total present public pension expenditures should 
be covered by each generation. But the key factor is the production and consumption of 
goods.  Individuals must exchange current production for a claim on future production. They 
may either save part of their earnings to buy goods and services later from younger workers; 
or they may rely on a promise from children, an employer, or the government to provide 
adequate goods and services in their retirement years. 
Both funded and pay-as-you-go plans are claims on future output, and they are of no use 
to retirees if the country is not producing enough goods and services to meet those claims. 
Pensioners are not interested in currency as such, but in consumption - food, heating, medical 
services, seats at cinemas, and so on. Money is irrelevant unless the goods and services are 
there for pensioners to buy. 
From the point of view of sustainability, the central variable is the level of national 
output, not the specific methods by which pensions are financed.  
With PAYG
71
 once can express average pension benefit, p, as 
           𝑝 =
𝜏𝑤
𝑑
      (7) 
where τ is the social security contribution rate, w – the average real wage level and d – the 
effective dependency rate (number of pensioners divided by the number of workers).  
In other words, 
          𝜏𝑤𝐿 = 𝑝𝑁                 (8) 
where L is the number of workers and N is the number of pensioners.
72
 
The effective dependency rate d differs from the old-age dependency rate (i.e. number 
of persons in pensionable age to the working age population), as it takes into account both the 
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unemployment rate and effective retirement age (which normally is lower than the official 
pensionable age). 
To meet the above constraint when the old age dependency ratio increases, some of the 
other variables must adjust: 
 the contribution rate, τ 
 labour participation of the young and of the old, L (and/or N) 
 the wage rate, w, that is, the productivity 
 the level of pension, p  
The last variable, in its turn, can be adjusted by tuning numerous parameters in formulae (1) - 
(5) discussed above. 
As Pierre Pestieau points out, “the heavily reliance on the pay-as-you-go pensions 
provisions has been justified during decades of rapid growth in population and productivity. 
However, with the prospect of an unprecedented ageing of the population, combined with a 
decline in productivity growth, one has the feeling that shifting to fully funded schemes would 
contribute to avoiding unbearable pressure on public finance.”73  The escape, he believes (and 
many other economists and social researches share the opinion, among them the already cited 
above Robert Holzmann and Richard Paul Hinz
74
), is in moving to funded financing and 
privatization of pensions.  He contradistinguishes two polar cases: an ideal system from the 
‘Continental’ (Bischmarckian) viewpoint widely accepted just after World War II, and an 
extreme form of privatized social security as in Chile (see Table 1.3).  
In most proposed reforms of social security systems, the key issue is that of shifting 
from the pay-as-you-go method to fully funding in order to allegedly foster savings and meet 
financial difficulties. It is also anticipated that this shift would bring along a move towards 
less Intragenerational redistribution, higher rate of return under individual accounts and better 
labour market incentives. 
International organizations such as the World Bank and OECD, and national policy-
makers and their economic advisers advocated the above shift, especially fostering the 
implementation of the second pillar – mandatory, privately managed, funded, defined 
contribution - pension schemes in many countries.  
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Table 1.3. Two polar typical social security regimes 
Characteristics  Bismarckian           Chilean 
Financing principle  PAYG          funding 
Financing sources  mostly contributions        wage related contributions 
Intergenerational redistribution to the benefit of older generations       nil 
Universality   universal coverage        restricted coverage 
Intragenerational redistribution earnings-linked benefits        actuarial fairness  
Organization   unions & management        private   
Accounts   collective         individualized 
Efficiency   strong distortions         few distortions 
What is defined   defined benefits         defined contributions 
Annuisation   mandatory         optional 
Trust    low          high in the beginning 
Source: Pestieau, P. (2006). The Welfare State in the European Union: Economic and Social Prospectives. 
OUP, Table 10.6 on p. 114. 
However, a number of prominent scholars were not so enthusiastic about shifting to 
funded pensions as panacea. Take an illustration, in 1999 a Nobel laureate in Economic 
Sciences Joseph Stiglitz (and then Senior Vice President and Chief Economist at the WB) and 
Peter R. Orszag presented paper called “Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths About Social 
Security Systems”75, where they disproved the arguments of mandatory funded schemes 
proponents - not putting in question the very need for reforming pension systems. 
The ten myths examined in the paper were: 
Macroeconomic myths 
• Myth #1: Individual accounts raise national saving 
• Myth #2: Rates of return are higher under individual accounts 
• Myth #3: Declining rates of return on pay-as-you-go systems reflect fundamental problems 
• Myth #4: Investment of public trust funds in equities has no macroeconomic effects 
Microeconomic myths 
• Myth #5: Labor market incentives are better under individual accounts 
• Myth #6: Defined benefit plans necessarily provide more of an incentive to retire early 
• Myth #7: Competition ensures low administrative costs under individual accounts 
Political economy myths 
• Myth #8: Corrupt and inefficient governments provide a rationale for individual accounts 
• Myth #9: Bailout politics are worse under public defined benefit plans 
• Myth #10: Investment of public trust funds is always squandered and mismanaged 
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The paper consistently debunked these myths, implying that the arguments most 
frequently used to promote individual retirement accounts are often not substantiated in either 
theory or practice.  It therefore concludes that policy-makers must adopt a much more 
nuanced approach to pension reform. It is worthy of note that debunking does not mean that 
the respective contrary statements are true instead, it means that the mere introducing of the 
mandatory funded private pillar does not lead to the promised effects, that are rooted in other 
reasons and can be achieved by different means.  
Debunking the myths about funded pensions became “popular” among the scholars, and 
in 2000 Nicholas Barr presented his paper ‘Reforming Pensions: Myths, Truths, and Policy 
Choices’76. He also chose ten myths, divided into three sets:  
Macroeconomics of pension 
• Myth #1: Funding resolves adverse demographic 
• Myth #2: The only way to pre-fund is through pension accumulation 
• Myth #3: There is a direct link between funding and growth 
• Myth #4: Funding reduces public pension spending 
• Myth #5: Paying off debt is always a good policy 
 
Pension design 
• Myth #6: Funded schemes have better labour market related incentives 
• Myth #7: Funded pensions diversify risks 
• Myth #8: Increased choice is welfare improving 
• Myth #9: Funding does better if real returns exceed real wage growth 
 
Role of government 
• Myth #10: Private pensions get governments out of pensions business. 
 
Likewise, Barr admits that those may have an element of truth, but are not strong 
arguments for a shift towards funding.  
After more than a decade, in 2013, Eelco Zandberg and Laura Spierdijk of the 
University of Groningen, having examined whether changes in the degree of pension funding 
affect economic growth on the sample of 54 countries  during 2001–2010, did not find any 
effect of changes in the degree of funding on growth in the short-run. For the long-run the 
evidence is mixed. Although a growth model with overlapping observations suggests that 
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there is a positive effect of funding changes on economic growth, they found no effect in a 
simple cross-sectional model
77
.  
Similarly, Robert Brown, have re-assessed those myths in 2014 on the premise that the 
financing of pension system should be effected in a manner that absolutely minimises the 
expense burden on the participants and the risks that the participants must assume. He 
concluded that “the least desirable design for a social security system is an individual account 
defined contribution system.”78 
Nicholas Barr continued to vindicate his judgment in his later works, some of those co-
authored by Peter Diamond, another Nobel laureate in Economic Sciences. To say, in their 
2006 paper “The Economics of Pensions” they demonstrate that both private funded plans and 
government pay-as-you-go systems are subject to risk and uncertainty, which, according to 
their classification, may be grouped as: 
 Macroeconomic shocks affect output, prices or both.   
 Demographic shocks affect all pension schemes, by affecting market prices and 
quantities and pension claims.  
 Political risks affect all pension schemes because all depend critically on effective 
government.  
 Management risk can arise through incompetence or fraud, which imperfectly-informed 
consumers generally cannot monitor effectively.   
 Investment risk: private and public pension accumulations held in the stock market until 
retirement are vulnerable to market fluctuations.    
 Annuities market risk: for a given pension accumulation, the value of an annuity 
depends on remaining life expectancy and on the rate of return the insurance company 
can expect over those years (and is thus also a form of investment risk). 
79
  
While governments may renege on pension promises, their pay-as-you-go systems are 
largely protected from inflation because the inflated pensions they pay are covered by the 
inflated currencies they take in through taxes.  
Funded schemes, whether public or private, are more exposed to inflation risk. And 
private funded schemes face additional risks, including the incompetence or fraud of fund 
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managers, market fluctuations in the value of pension accumulations held in equity markets, 
and the value of annuities, which depend on life expectancies and the validity of actuarial 
projections
80
.  
NDC pensions avoid some of the risks that private pensions face, notably management 
risk and investment risk. They may also reduce annuities market risk, if only because with a 
single, nationwide annuities pool, the law of large numbers will reduce the variance facing the 
insurer (that is, the state). This is an unambiguous advantage. However, the advantage is 
inherent in state-run PAYG schemes generally, rather than NDC schemes specifically.
81
 
Since nobody can be well informed about the future, government pension 
administrators, private fund managers, and individuals all face the issue of imperfect 
information. For individuals dependent on defined contribution plans, however, the problem 
is worse because private pensions are complex and based on an array of financial institutions 
and instruments.  
People can be myopic and/or imperfectly informed, giving a justification for 
compulsion. The problem is nontrivial, and means that the simple assumption of rational 
utility maximization may not hold. There is a distinction between an information problem and 
an information-processing problem. An information problem can be resolved by providing the 
necessary information, such as the capacity of different computers, after which the individual 
can make his or her own choices. With an information-processing  problem,  in  contrast,  the  
problem  is  too  complex  for  agents  to  make  rational choices, even if the necessary 
information is provided. The problem can arise where the time  horizon  is  long,  as  with  
pensions;  or  where  the  good  or  service  involves  complex probabilities, including, for 
example, life expectancy (the failure in this case is an inability to process probabilities); or 
where the information is inherently complex, as with complicated pension products. 
The workings of financial markets are poorly understood, even in the industrial 
countries with the most sophisticated systems and options.   
A funded system makes “a number of assumptions that are patently false. 
1. Workers are capable of optimal investing and asset management. 
2. If workers are not capable themselves, then they can purchase asset management at a 
very low expense ratio. 
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3. Workers, if given investment fund options, will choose wisely and will also follow a 
life-cycle model of investing where they slowly move from a high equity portfolio to more 
fixed income as they near retirement (or, even better, they buy deferred annuities as they near 
retirement). 
4. Workers can buy individual life annuities as a fair actuarial price.
82” 
Each of these assumptions is false. 
As demonstrated by Annika Sundén, a senior economist at the Swedish National Social 
Insurance Agency, “previous research has documented that individuals often have limited 
financial knowledge and know little about the characteristics of their public and occupational 
pension plans or how much to expect in retirement benefits. This could mean that many 
workers reach retirement with inadequate resources and as a consequence will need to 
postpone retirement or lower consumption in retirement.”83 The formulae used in defined 
benefit schemes are, normally, quite straightforward, making it easy for a worker to estimate 
the expected benefit and to compare the replacement rate with the advice provided by 
financial planners about how much of preretirement earnings should be replaced to maintain 
living standards in retirement. Even when more complicated formulae are applied, it is easy 
for pension administrators to calculate replacement rates and communicate this information to 
beneficiaries. 
Sundén stresses, that, “in contrast, in a DC plan, benefits depend on the total amount 
contributed to the plan and the rate of return on those contributions. At retirement, the account 
balance is converted to an annuity or, in some cases, paid out as a lump sum. Because benefits 
are not defined but depend on contributions, it is difficult to express the expected benefit in 
terms of a replacement rate. It is also difficult to estimate benefits because they vary with the 
rate of return.”84   
Yet when the state does its best to translate the formulae into “understandable” figures, 
the people seem not to be fully aware of their meaning. She instances a Swedish experience 
with so-called “orange envelopes” – annual account statements sent out to all participants of 
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public NDC and FDC schemes starting from 1998, since the new pension system had been 
implemented. These statements include information on the account balance; pension credits 
earned during the year, and the indexation of the account balance—that is, the rate of return. 
The orange envelope also includes account information on the Premium Pension (FDC). In 
addition to providing information about expected (projections for three different retirement 
ages – early, normal and deferred retirement), the orange envelope summarizes how the 
reformed pension system works and promotes the main message that lifetime earnings 
determine benefits.  Five years later, in 2003, only about 10 percent of respondents looked at 
all of the information in the envelope and less than half of all participants look at the benefit 
projection. The results do not reveal any major differences between demographic groups, 
although women tend to read the materials to a larger extent than men, and low-income and 
younger individuals are less likely to examine the materials. 
Sundén concludes that “it is clear that a large share of participants does not know the 
details about their pension schemes and that this has negative effects on savings and 
retirement decisions. […]The level of complexity of the schemes implies that the costs 
associated with understanding the pension scheme could appear greater than the benefits, even 
if information is available. Furthermore, the retirement process is something individuals only 
go through once, so they do not have the benefit of learning by doing. For many individuals, 
retirement is seen as something unpleasant and a cause for worry, which means that thinking 
and planning for retirement can also involve psychological costs. Workers may also fail to 
learn more about their public and private pensions because they expect that public pension 
system will provide adequate benefits. As a result of the high costs of learning about pensions, 
workers often procrastinate about savings and retirement decisions. […] Information and 
education leading to improved financial literacy clearly is important, but perhaps equally 
important is to design pension plans that make it easy for participants to make decisions.”85 
Any method of arranging for future consumption has administrative costs. These 
include the costs of record-keeping and the costs of transactions insofar as there are 
accumulations of assets or purchases of benefit streams. Different ways of organizing future 
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consumption have very different costs and thus provide very different levels of future 
consumption
86
.  
Funded individual accounts, where there is a choice of the provider of investment 
services or a choice of the individual portfolio directly from the market, have significant 
transactions costs. 
Individual accounts with a government-selected portfolio or limited set of alternative 
investments can have lower transactions costs, but can easily have a poor rate of return if the 
government selects investments poorly or in pursuit of some goal other than the accumulation 
of assets for the provision of retirement income. 
The high administrative costs of funded individual accounts with wide choice are 
largely a fixed overhead per account together with a large fixed cost to set up the network. 
The charges by private providers of accounts of mutual funds do not typically match the 
pattern of costs and cover costs in attracting customers as well as profits. Administrative costs 
erode the rate of return on pension accumulations, and the problem is particularly acute for 
smaller accumulations, i.e. those of people with lower earnings and, even more so, in 
countries where most people have low earnings. For example, a charge of 1% of the balance 
in an account per year would reduce the balance at the end of a 40-year career by roughly 
20% because of the reduction in the net compound interest.
87
 
Many arguments over pension design or reform can be simplified by separating issues 
requiring policy makers to make important choices from those where all pensions systems are 
subject to core prerequisites. 
A variety of policies are available for containing the ageing population pressure. The 
most vital is increasing output, which is the only way of assuring that the financial claims on 
future output can be converted into enough goods and services to meet pensioner needs. The 
point is fundamental - the central variable is output; how the finance of pensions is organized 
is secondary. The argument that funding by itself resolves adverse demographics is a myth.
88
  
Demographic changes entail a reduction in production that has a negative effect on 
PAYG pension systems through the narrowing of the base for collecting contributions and a 
respective reduction in available resources for paying out pension benefits. In funded pension 
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systems, this dependence is also inevitable, though more complicated. It manifests itself 
through the mechanism of supply and demand either on the commodity market, or the 
securities market. 
If a working-age generation X in one time period is replaced in the next time period(s) 
by a working-age generation(s) of less numerical strength, there will be a significant 
accumulation of pension assets held by the older generations, while the labor force will 
decline. A large number of older people will seek to use their savings to finance the desired 
level of consumption after retirement. The level of expenditure of this generation X will 
exceed the level of pension contribution rate of the younger and smaller generations of 
workers. 
Provided that production does not grow, two types of imbalance will occur. 
(A) Should pensioners (for a claim on future production) accumulate cash assets such as 
government bonds, the desired consumption of pensioners will exceed the potential savings of 
workers. Excess demand in the commodity market will lead to higher prices and reduced 
purchasing power of retired annuitant. 
(B) Should pensioners (for a claim on future production) accumulate cash assets such as 
shares, the desired volume of the assets sale by pensioners will exceed the desired volume of 
purchase of these assets by workers. Excess supply in the securities market will reduce prices 
of pension assets, reduce pension savings and therefore affect the amount of annuity. 
In both cases retirees shall not really get the pension they were expecting.
89
 
Policies are needed to raise the productivity of each worker, as well as to increase the 
number of workers. Promoting investment in more and better capital equipment and in 
training and education for workers can increase their productivity. Labor supply can be 
enlarged through tax policies that do not penalize part-time employment, by raising the age of 
retirement, by importing labor directly, and through importing labor indirectly by exporting 
capital to countries with a young population.  
Policies also are required to address the fiscal burdens governments face with a rising 
proportion of retirees. One approach to reducing future spending is to cut average pensions; 
another is to reduce the number of pensioners. Cutting pensions, however, may worsen 
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pensioner poverty as well as create political pressures. A more desirable approach is to reduce 
the number of pensioners by raising the age of retirement—a policy that helps for both fiscal 
and social policy reasons, particularly where longevity is rising generally. 
Many governments still have the programs encouraging people to take early retirement. 
And the explanation for existence of such programs lies in feature of the labour market itself. 
As P.Pestieau pinpoints, “the life-cycle fluctuations in wages do not correspond to 
fluctuations in productivity. As the start of a person’s working life productivity will tend to 
exceed wages, whereas at the end the opposite is the case. […] Employers encourage early 
retirement programs in order to get rid themselves of expensive labour – costly, above all, in 
relation to its productivity. Furthermore, in some countries, there is a widespread belief […] 
that any early retirement of older workers creates vacancies for younger workers.”90 However, 
it is now widely recognized that apart from temporary, short-run effects, that view is 
erroneous in a market economy, where it is incorrect to think about the labour market in terms 
of a fixed number of jobs. The number of jobs in the economy is responsive to the availability 
of labour. 
For government pay-as-you-go-plans, what really matters is total public spending, not 
pension spending specifically. A second way to contain fiscal pressures, therefore, is to cut 
other public spending to increase funds available for paying pensions. 
A third approach is to set aside resources now to meet future pension spending. 
Building up pensions funds is one way - but not the only way. 
As repeatedly stressed by the scholars, before a country can establish or reform a 
pension scheme, whether public or private, funded or pay-as-you-go, it must have a strong 
and effective central government as well as a private sector that is mature enough for the 
chosen new system or the reform plans. The role of government is to assure both the fiscal 
and political sustainability of the pension system.  
Economic growth must be strong enough to provide for a central goal of government 
policy everywhere: to increase general living standards. 
Public pensions require that the government must be able to collect contributions 
effectively, to maintain records over the years for workers who will be mobile both 
geographically and across firms, to make actuarial calculations to adjust benefit levels for the 
age at which they start, and to pay pensions in an accurate and timely way. Government needs 
to project future contributions and benefits in order to adapt the system slowly, and with 
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significant lead times, to evolving financial capacity. Separately, pensions require effective 
coordination between central, provincial and local levels of government, if all three are to 
have a role in supporting the elderly. 
Additional technical capacity is needed for fully funded individual accounts, 
particularly in arranging for workers to select portfolios, as well as investing funds. Also 
important is the process of educating workers – both about what they have accrued at the time 
and what they can expect to have at retirement, and about how to think about the choices they 
can make. In an economy with vast numbers of workers with no experience in making such 
financial decisions, it is critical to provide education on the implications of different choices. 
Private pensions depend critically on government to set rules and to enforce them
91
. 
Government must be able to enforce compliance with contribution conditions, to protect asset 
accumulations, to maintain the macroeconomic stability which is essential for long-term 
private accumulations, and to ensure effective regulation and supervision of financial markets 
– markets that do not function well without significant government regulation and supervision 
– including the insurance and annuities markets. Such regulation is vital to protect individuals 
in areas too complex for them to protect themselves. More generally, private markets function 
best when government, in its legislative role, has put in place clear good rules (avoiding bad 
ones) and where enforcement is even-handed, non-corrupt, prompt and predictable. As noted 
by Bernhard Ebbinghaus, “while the state partially retreated from its responsibilities to 
finance adequate state pensions, the scope of public regulation and control of private pensions 
increased. […] This so called ‘paradox of privatization’ led to more state intervention.”92 
Political sustainability requires political will strong enough to support the long process 
of establishing or reforming a pension system and to maintain confidence in private plans. 
Preserving public confidence in private pension plans requires effective government 
regulation of financial markets to protect consumers in areas too complex for them to protect 
themselves. This requires tightly drawn up regulatory procedures and a body of people with 
the capacity and will to enforce those procedures. This task is particularly difficult because 
pensions are complex instruments, requiring highly skilled regulators whose abilities 
command a high price in the private sector. 
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Similar requirements hold for mandatory pensions that rely on private providers. 
Countries choosing to base their pensions systems on private financial markets and 
investments must first have well-established financial markets, as well as adequate public and 
government understanding of and trust in them. If pension funds, whether public or private, 
hold only government bonds, these schemes are, in reality, pay-as-you-go, since both the 
interest payments and subsequent redemption depend on future taxpayers. Private pensions 
that only use government bonds provide no real budgetary gain, no channeling of resources 
into productive investment, and considerable extra administrative cost. 
Another apparent solution is to use the pension savings of a poorer country to buy 
Western financial assets. The argument against this approach is that it forgoes the growth of 
domestic investment and domestic employment. 
Private sector capacity is also essential, given the heavy administrative demands of 
private pensions. A lack of capacity runs the risk that excessive administrative costs will 
erode the investment return to pensioners. Since there is a fixed cost to running an individual 
account, the issue is of particular concern for small pensions. 
A further prerequisite in private financial markets is transparency. It is vital both for 
political reasons, to ensure the legitimacy and hence political sustainability of reform, and for 
economic reasons, as a necessary ingredient if pensions are to steer savings into their most 
productive use
93
. Private pensions require transparency about the costs of tax relief, and 
through annual statements giving details of a person's pension accumulation, predicted 
pension, and administrative charges. Statements, furthermore, must be on uniform standards 
so consumers can make comparisons easily and accurately. 
Although the basic requirements for all sound pension systems are extensive, countries 
must make a range of difficult, often controversial, choices to meet their varied capacities and 
needs. 
A central question is whether the first pillar should be a guarantee, available only (or 
mainly) to those who need it, or a base on which other pension income builds. The first-pillar 
pension could be flat-rate (hence going to all pensioners): it could be a flat-rate below the 
poverty line, equal to the poverty line, or above the poverty line. Whatever the design of the 
first-pillar pension, a minimum income in old age can be guaranteed through tax-funded 
social assistance for those whose income from all other sources leaves them in poverty. 
                                                          
93
 Barr, N. (2002). The Pension Puzzle: Prerequisites and Policy Choices in Pension Design, IMF, Economic 
Issues No. 29. 
 45 
The smaller the pension and the greater the proportionality between contribution and 
benefit, the less redistribution there is. Pensions strictly proportional to contributions bring 
about no redistribution between rich and poor except to the extent that the rich may live 
longer. A flat-rate pension financed by a proportional contribution will be more redistributive. 
The second-pillar pension provides for spreading consumption more equally between 
working and retirement years. The argument for a mandatory second-pillar pension can be 
couched in a number of ways: as justifiable paternalism; because imperfectly informed 
younger people will make poor choices from the perspective of their lifetime needs; to ensure 
insurance against unknowable events; or to avoid moral hazard in the presence of a generous 
first-pillar pension - if there is a minimum guarantee, low-income people will have little 
incentive to make voluntary provision. 
Individual funded accounts leave the individual facing most of the risk, in particular 
from differences in pension fund performance. The individual may also face inflation risk, 
though this can be shared partly or wholly with the taxpayer if the state provides indexation. 
A major design question, therefore, is the extent to which government offers pensioners 
protection against inflation and through what mechanism. 
From an economic perspective, the difference between pay-as-you-go and funding is 
secondary
94
.  The key variable is effective government, a prerequisite for well-run pensions, 
however they are organized. It is not possible to get government out of the pensions business. 
Most fundamentally, government must manage the economy so as to facilitate the growth of 
output. Then, if pension systems are public, government must inspire confidence that the 
promises it makes will be kept. To the extent systems are private, government must sustain a 
regulatory framework that ensures high industry standards and transparency in private capital 
markets. 
1.3. Major criteria for assessment of pension systems and their interdependence 
The conceptual framework for assessing the existing pension systems and the degree of 
the necessity of a reform was developing with time. In 2005, a group of the World Bank 
experts prepared the report that incorporated the lessons learnt from the Bank’s experience 
and research and was intended to conceptualize and explain the current policy within the 
Bank and provide a guide to the criteria and the standards applied to the provision of 
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pensions
95
. The authors have formulated four primary goals of any successful pension system: 
it should be adequate, affordable, sustainable and robust: 
 An adequate system is one that provides benefits to the full breadth of the 
population, the benefits are sufficient for preventing old-age poverty on a country-
specific absolute level in addition to providing reliable means to smooth down the 
lifetime consumption for the majority of the population. 
 An affordable system is one that is within the financing capacity of individuals 
and the society and does not unduly displace other social or economic imperatives 
or have untenable fiscal consequences. 
 A sustainable system is one that is financially sound and can be maintained over a 
foreseeable horizon under a broad set of reasonable assumptions. 
 A robust system is one that has the capacity to withstand major shocks, including 
those coming from economic, demographic, and political volatility. 
This concept underwent further development in 2008: the primary evaluation criteria 
were expanded to include two new parameters: equity and predictability, and they were not 
merely added at the end of the list, but rather notably ranged prior to the criterion of 
robustness. The wording of the previously mentioned criteria was not changed, while the 
criteria of equity and predictability have been formulated as follows:  
 An equitable system is one that provides the income redistribution from the 
lifetime rich to the lifetime poor, it is consistent with the societal preferences in a 
way that does not tax the rest of society external to the system; and one that 
provides the same benefit for the same contribution. 
 A predictable benefit is provided by a system where (i) the benefit formula is 
specified by law and not subject to the discretion of policymakers or 
administrators, (ii) the defined benefit formula is designed to insulate the 
individual from inflation and wage adjustments prior to retirement or the defined 
contribution investment policy can insulate the beneficiary from material effects 
on benefits from asset price adjustments prior to retirement; and (iii) the benefit is 
automatically indexed during retirement so as to shield the worker from the effects 
of price adjustments
96
. 
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In his very recent paper, Robert Holzmann explains that the reassessment of what 
constitutes a good target for a pension system reform is influenced, inter alia, by the refocus 
on the basic income protection for the elderly, as reforms of earning-related schemes towards 
a tighter contribution-benefit link limit the capability to redistribute income towards low-
income groups within the schemes
97
. 
A similar set of criteria has been developed also by the EU
98
. Member States agreed on 
a set of objectives for their pension systems:  
“Member States are committed to providing adequate and sustainable pensions by 
ensuring: 
(1) adequate retirement incomes for all and access to pensions which allow people to 
maintain, to a reasonable degree, their living standard after retirement, in the spirit of 
solidarity and fairness between and within generations; 
(2) the financial sustainability of public and private pension schemes, bearing in mind 
pressures on public finances and the ageing of populations, and in the context of the three-
pronged strategy for tackling the budgetary implications of ageing, notably by: supporting 
longer working lives and active ageing; by balancing contributions and benefits in an 
appropriate and socially fair manner; and by promoting the affordability and the security of 
funded and private schemes; 
(3) that pension systems are transparent, well adapted to the needs and aspirations of 
women and men and the requirements of modern societies, demographic ageing and structural 
change; that people receive the information they need to plan their retirement and that reforms 
are conducted on the basis of the broadest possible consensus”. 
When compared to the above-cited definitions, in the EU list, ‘adequacy’, 
‘sustainability’ and ‘affordability’ are named directly (the last one as a precondition of 
‘sustainability’); the notion of ‘equity’ appears twice: firstly as a part of ‘adequacy’ (“spirit of 
solidarity and fairness”), and, secondly, as a part of ‘sustainability’ (“socially fair manner”); 
‘predictability’ is expressed in the terms of ‘transparency’ and ‘security’; and ‘robust’ systems 
are qualified as ‘well adapted’.  
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International financial investment groups have also elaborated their sets of criteria for 
evaluating and comparing pension systems of different countries. For instance, Allianz Global 
Investors research group are computing what they call a “Pension Sustainability Index” (PSI). 
Three such reports edited by Dr Renate Finke have been published: in 2009, 2011 and 2014. 
The authors of the PSI are awarding Latvia and Estonia with the best scores not only among 
Eastern Europe: Latvia takes the first place and Estonia the second one, then follows Russia 
(that would lose such high score should the very recent pension reform be taken into account 
by Allianz experts), and Lithuania takes the fourth place in the region, - but also compared to 
many developed countries - better than United Kingdom, Canada, Finland Germany, Austria, 
France, Luxembourg and many others.  
For the purpose of this chapter, though, the fundamental issue is not the high scoring, 
but the meaning of “sustainability” that the above experts are attributing: what factors are 
taken into account. In the methodology description, the Allianz are providing the “overview 
of sub- indicators that would weight results positively: 
• The national pension system has been designed to meet the needs of an aging society, e.g.: 
- the first pillar PAYG system offers moderate benefits and covers a large percentage 
of the workforce; 
- the legal retirement age is high and/or is linked to life expectancies; 
- funded pillars are in place to provide additional old-age income. 
• National demographics do not put much pressure on reform, e.g.: 
- the old-age dependency ratio is favourable; 
- any changes in the work-to-retirement balance are expected to be moderate. 
• The government is in a position to cushion reform pressures, e.g.: 
- public pension payments are low; 
- the state has deep pockets so that it can either take on more debt or increase the 
burden on the economy to finance rising pension payments.”99 
Another think tank of pension financial experts, Australian Centre for Financial Studies, 
starting from 2009, are annually calculating another index: Melbourne Mercer Global Pension 
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Index
100
. The team of the researchers includes professors from Oxford University, University 
of Toronto, University of Melbourne, and other institutions. In 2014, it has been calculated for 
the 6th time, and covered 25 countries across the world (the Baltic States are not included in 
this short list). The overall index value for each country represents the weighted average of 
the three sub-indices. The weightings used are: 40% for the adequacy sub-index + 35% for the 
sustainability sub-index + 25% for the integrity sub-index. Each sub-index is based on a set of 
indicators (see Figure 1.2. below).  
 
Figure 1.2.  Composition of Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 
Source: Australian Center for Financial Studies 
http://www.mercer.com/content/mercer/global/all/en/insights/focus/melbourne-mercer-global-pension-
index.html  
The adequacy sub-index considers the benefits provided to both the poor and the 
median-income earner as well as several design features and characteristics which enhance 
the efficacy of the overall retirement income system. The net household saving rate and home 
ownership rate are also included as non-pension savings can represent an important source of 
financial security during retirement. The sustainability sub-index considers a number of 
indicators that include: economic importance of the private pension system, its level of 
funding, the length of expected retirement both now and in the future, the labour force 
participation rate of the older population and the current level of government debt. Thus, one 
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can find practically the same set of parameters of sustainability as are used by Allianz Group. 
The integrity sub-index considers three broad areas of the pension system, namely regulation 
and governance; protection and communication for members; and costs. This sub-index asks a 
range of questions about the requirements that apply to the private sector pension plans in 
each country. After all, well operated and successful private sector plans are critical because 
without them the government becomes the only provider, which is not a desirable or 
sustainable long-term outcome. Hence they represent a critical component of a well-governed 
and trusted pension system, which has the long term confidence of the community.  
The same logic can be found in the indicator of financial sustainability gap S2, devised 
by the European Commission’s Working Group on Ageing, with a focus on how population 
ageing contributes to the fiscal sustainability gap
101
. The S2 indicator approximates the gap
(as % of GDP) that must be closed permanently in order to ensure that governments will be 
able to finance all future public budget obligations. The indicator provides a compact measure 
to approximate the size of risks to public finance sustainability when a long-term perspective 
is taken. The S2 indicator can be decomposed into two components so as to also point to the 
sources of the risks and appropriate policy response required. Firstly, there is the gap arising 
due to the starting fiscal position, referred to as the Initial Budgetary Position. Secondly, there 
are the additional costs related to population ageing and expenditures on pensions, healthcare 
and long-term care. This component is referred to as the Long Term Changes. While Estonia 
demonstrated low values (lower than EU average), both Lithuania and Latvia were classified 
into the group of the countries with high sustainability gap, thus having higher risks of 
underfinancing future obligations. 
Aaron George Grech of London School of Economics argues that “there appear to be 
four concerns in terms of ensuring pension system sustainability. From a political economy 
perspective, the adequacy of the system for the average voter needs to be ensured. If a system 
is not seen as beneficial by the electoral majority, namely by not helping them maintain their 
pre-retirement living standards, it could be voted out. Similarly, if a system is not seen as able 
to alleviate poverty, the political pressures that led to the setting up of social assistance to 
elderly people during the early part of the twentieth century might re-emerge. In the process 
of achieving these two goals, policymakers need, however, to take into consideration the 
balance of transfers between different generations. Political pressures for reform can arise 
101
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either because systems are not achieving the goals that individuals expect of them or because 
individuals are unhappy about the deal they are getting compared to previous generations. 
Individuals can be concerned about the level of taxes they pay to finance the system but also 
by the level of their pension transfers compared to previous generations. Social sustainability 
can only be achieved if policymakers understand these tradeoffs and optimise pension 
systems in this light.”102  
According to OECD definition
103
, fiscal sustainability (including the one of any pension 
system) implies four main characteristics: 
• solvency or governments’ ability to finance existing and probable future liabilities/ 
obligations; 
• growth, or the capacity of government to sustain economic growth over an extended 
period; 
• fairness, or governments’ ability to provide net financial benefits to future generations 
that are not less than the net benefits provided to current generations; and 
• stable taxes, or the capacity of governments to finance future obligations without 
increasing the tax burden. 
ILO experts Krzysztof Hagemejer and John Woodall note that the understanding of the 
“fairness” is likely to differ significantly as between different societies, at different times, and 
in differing economic conditions: 
“The designs and shapes of pension systems are usually the result of social contracts, 
which may be more or less explicit in character. Societies define their objectives through an 
ongoing debate around a following set of questions: 
‐ What should “retirement” (as a status) represent: simply the condition of a person who is no 
longer able to work, or rather a well- deserved period of rest after working life? 
‐ At what age or after how many years of a working career should retirement (as an event) 
typically take place? 
‐ What level of benefits is seen as appropriate by the society as representing an adequate 
guarantee to its elderly members – should this comprise only the alleviation of poverty for 
those unable to support themselves, a (defined) minimum income for all residents in old-age, 
or a guaranteed level of replacement rates (as a proportion of pre-retirement income)? 
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‐ What is the desired degree of solidarity in financing the incomes of retired persons; should 
individuals save for themselves, should the younger generation(s) support the elderly as a 
matter of principle; or should support be restricted to a minimal level for those unable to save 
enough for their own needs)?”104. 
The term “solidarity” is also very important in pension system characteristics. In the 
domain of pensions, solidarity can take place at different levels. “A distinction can be made 
between risk solidarity, subsidizing solidarity and income solidarity. Risk solidarity is a 
consequence of risk sharing, and it implies that ex post the lucky support the unlucky. 
Subsidizing solidarity involves ex-ante value transfers from one group to another – as is the 
case, for example, when longevity risk is expected to be larger for one group (women) than 
for another (men). Income solidarity usually implies that income is redistributed from the rich 
to the poor – as is the case, for instance, where contributions are income-dependent, while 
benefits are not”105 (like in basic pensions). Many people do in fact have social preferences, a 
genuine concern for the welfare of others and a preference for a just and fair distribution of 
incomes and risks, and this thesis is supported by a number of empirical evidence
106
. 
Furthermore, the EU documents stress that the performance of pensions “ultimately 
depends on the strength of the underlying economy, such as fewer people working and paying 
contributions, lower economic growth and depending also on institutional arrangements on 
national public debt”107. Therefore, pension systems cannot be assessed in isolation from 
other parameters of economic life: productivity, competitive ability, embeddedness into 
global chains, infrastructure, and many others. 
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Chapter 2. Pension systems of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania 
In the second chapter, the author is analysing pension legislation in three Baltic 
countries: laws on state pensions, mandatory and voluntary funded pensions, laws on state 
social insurance, relevant subordinate acts (Cabinet regulations). A detailed review of 
legislative sources and legal codes is provided in the beginning of Section 2.2. A very 
valuable source of information on recent development of pension systems are ASISP annual 
national reports for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, that have been prepared for the years 2009-
2014 and written by country experts:  Andres Võrk, Lauri Leppik, Steven Segaert and Gerli 
Paat-Ahi (Estonia). Ināra Bite and Ruta Zilvere (Latvia) and Peter B. Gross, Teodoras 
Medaiskis and Danguole Jankauskiene (Lithuania). The earlier stages of Baltic pension 
systems evolution are widely described in a voluminous book “Pension Reform in the Baltic 
States”, especially, the detailed chapters devoted to Estonia108, Latvia109 and Lithuania110. The 
first stages of pension reforms in 90-s are explicitly characterized in Laima Zilīte’s paper111 
and in the number of articles by Katarina Muller
112,113
 (now Professor of Social Policy at 
Mannheim University of Applied Science). It is an interesting fact, however, that while 
Estonian and Lithuanian authors are representatives of academic circles, all Latvian authors 
are Welfare Ministry and State Social Security Agency officials. The transition period is also 
covered in a series of articles by Jolanta Aidukaite
114,115,116,117,118
 and in the book of Italian 
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researcher, then Research Associate at Centre d'Études Européennes (Paris),  Alfio Cerami119. 
The latter, together with Senior Researcher and Policy Analyst of the European Centre for 
Social Welfare Policy and Research Pieter Vanhuysse were the editors of one more book 
„Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central 
and Eastern Europe”, containing a chapter on Baltic countries by Jolanta Aidukaite120, „The 
Transformation of Welfare Systems in the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania”. A 
valuable source of information, especially on the funded pillars, was also the article by 
Marcin Kawinski, Dariusz Stanko and Johanna Rutecka (all from Warsaw School of 
Economics), providing a broader context for comparison
121
. Multi-authored „Handbook of 
European Welfare Systems”122 gives the floor for both theoretical and conceptual reflections 
and factual information. The introductory chapter summarizes the actual debate about welfare 
states and welfare (state) regimes, gives an overview on current welfare (state) research and 
analyses the main recent developments necessitating a new focus on European Welfare 
Systems. The twenty-seven chapters on the welfare systems of the member states are written 
by experts from the individual states. Concluding chapters analyse the current social and 
welfare policies of the EU, the interplay and limits between European and national social 
policies; provide a comparative analysis of all European Welfare Systems and a theoretical 
reflections on pluralism in European welfare politics. 
2.1. Implementation of modern multi-pillar structures 
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania entered their new eras of independence with identical old-age 
security systems, inherited from the Soviet period. They also faced very similar transition-
related challenges: the severe economic turmoil surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
leading to extremely high inflation rates and deep recession in all three countries. Today, after 
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more than 20 years of sovereign pension policy, the three Baltic States show a convergence of 
approaches:  in terms of their overall pension design, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania shifted 
from single-tiered PAYG schemes to mixed systems, containing a prefunded second tier. 
2.1.1. Soviet Heritage and Early Reforms 
Social protection system in the USSR was based on the existing political and economic 
system with state ownership on land and enterprises. The Law on State Pensions of 1956 
regulated the situation of employees, while the Law on Kolkhoz Members (1964) covered the 
farmers.  
The Soviet pension system was rather generous and included the following features
123
 
124
 
125
: 
 low general pensionable age – 55 for women and 60 for men with minimum working 
record of 20 or 25 years respectively; 
 privileged retirement rules for several occupational groups, including lower 
pensionable ages (e.g., teachers, workers in public transportation, artists, pilots, those 
working under hazardous conditions);  
 entitlement to a pension based on previous work, benefits linked to the former wage 
during the last years of working career;  
 a relatively high replacement rate ranging from 100 percent for low-income earners 
down to 50 percent for higher-income earners;  
 financing from the general state budget, no individual contributions by workers. The 
cost of social insurance was included into production cost, the rates varied among the 
sectors of national economy. 
The processes of radical economic and political reforms were accompanied by reforming the 
old soviet social security system. Some reforms have been commenced already in 1990.The 
countries were motivated to escape from the legacy of the communist period and to build up 
new pension systems to suit new political and economic realities. 
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However, the features of the Soviet pension system influenced people’s image of the 
optimal pension arrangement, including such features as the pensionable age, benefit rates, 
and the willingness to pay contributions (or rather the lack thereof). New laws regulating 
social protection were formulated and enacted. Although these laws provided for guarantees 
of incomes they neither had the respective financial covering, nor were they economically 
justified. As the economic situation grew worse, it became clear that, in view of the 
demographic situation, it was not possible to implement many norms of the newly accepted 
laws. 
Estonia. Early transformation of the pension system in Estonia may be characterised by the 
following stages: 
 1) Financial separation of the benefit system (1990) 
The adoption of the Social Tax Act in 1990 introduced a social tax of 20 percent of 
gross payroll to be paid by employers as the financing instrument of the state pension 
system. Revenues collected by the Social Fund were earmarked for this purpose, and 
pension expenditures were separated from other budgetary expenditures.   
2) Failed attempt to liberalise benefit rules (1991); 
The new Pension Act of Estonia, adopted 15 April 1991, had two main objectives – to 
separate the benefit side of the Estonian pension system from the Soviet system and to 
increase coverage and the level of benefits. The act prescribed a mixed pension 
formula – a flat rate base amount supplemented by an earnings-related component. 
The calculation of pensions was based on two factors: the minimum wage and the 
worker’s former earnings. However, high expectations soon collided with economic 
reality and the act had a very short life, being implemented for only few months. 
Because of the total neglect of financial calculations, implementation of the act turned 
out to be unaffordable. 
3) Benefit retrenchment with introduction of flat-rate pensions (1992); 
Parliament suspended the Pension Act in February 1992, and pensions were replaced 
by flat-rate state living allowances. The levels of pensions were linked to the minimum 
wage. 
 57 
  4) Benefit restructuring with the State Allowances Act (1993). 
The 1993 State Allowances Act introduced a gradual increase of the pensionable age 
by 6 months each year with the target of reaching 65 for men and 60 for women by 
2003. The qualification period for old-age pension was equalised for men and women: 
it was reduced from 25 for men and 20 for women to 15 years for both sexes. The 
pension formula comprised two elements: a flat-rate base amount and a component 
depending on the years of pensionable service. Pension amounts still related to the 
minimum wage, with the individual variable being the length of service. 
The pension formula in the 1993 State Allowance Act was broadly considered as a 
temporary solution for a period of economic transition. The political aim was to reintroduce 
earnings-related pensions in a period of few years. However, the benefit rules which were 
established as temporary survived a period of 7 years – from April 1993 to April 2000 – and 
exerted a heavy influence on subsequent pension rules for the first pillar. Despite the longer-
than-expected duration of these rules, the period of their existence was also marked by some 
important parametric changes.
126
 As will be shown further, the traces of this period reforms 
are still clearly seen in the today design of Estonian pension system, while the relatively low 
social tax rate (20%) and imposing this tax on the employer only - in contrast to other two 
Baltic countries - remains unchanged for more than twenty years. 
 
Latvia. The first wave of reforms in Latvia included the Law on State Pensions and the Law 
on Social Tax that came into force in January 1991. The social security system was made 
independent from the state budget and was financed by employee and employer contributions. 
The retirement age and required length of service were not changed. The replacement ratio 
was about 55 percent of average monthly earnings, calculated on the basis of any consecutive 
5-year period selected by the pensioner during the last 15 years of work, including 
interruptions of employment, or any 10 consecutive years during the person’s working life. 
For each full year of work in excess of the qualifying period, the old-age pension was 
increased by 2 percent of covered earnings. 
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Although since January 1991 all pensions were calculated according to that law, the 
financial balance of the newly adopted pension system was upset by the liberalization of 
prices and the skyrocketing inflation and the government had introduced a price compensation 
supplement to all pensions. In January 1992, the price compensation payment was replaced by 
a new basic pension linked to the minimum standard of living. Pensions then consisted of a 
flat rate (basic) pension and an earnings-related pension. However, as the year progressed, 
hyperinflation caused the earnings factor to lose its significance; and the flat-rate part of the 
pension became dominant. In reality, the 1991 pension law ceased to operate.  
In November 1993, the newly elected Parliament introduced a set of “Temporary 
Regulations for Calculating Pensions”, which revised the Law on State Pensions. The 
calculation based pension amounts on the number of working years, disregarding the 
individual earnings record. The benefit formula included a guaranteed minimum flat-rate 
pension of 30 percent of the national average wage, with an increase of 0.4 percent for each 
year of service. The replacement rate of pensions granted according to “The Temporary 
Regulations” was 43% of gross national average rate.127 128. Evidently, the approach of 
Latvian legislators seems to be very similar to the one of their Estonian fellows. 
 
 
Lithuania. Even prior to the declaration of independence, as early as on 13 February 1990, 
the Supreme Council (the then parliament of Lithuanian SSR) adopted a Resolution 
Concerning the Transformation of the Social Insurance System of the Lithuanian SSR. The 
Resolution provided for the transfer of social insurance from the Soviet trade unions to the 
Lithuanian authorities.  
On 13 March 1990, the third day after the declaration of independence, the State Social 
Insurance Fund (SODRA) was established under the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 
and was charged with the administration of social insurance. SODRA and its local divisions 
began registering workers and employers, collecting contributions, and paying benefits. 
On 23 October 1990, the Parliament adopted the Law on the Basis for the Social 
Welfare System, which differentiated social insurance from social care and social assistance 
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and provided for an independent social insurance budget. In May 1991, the Law on the State 
Social Insurance of the Republic of Lithuania was enacted. This law provided for independent 
financing and administration of social insurance. 
In contrast with these early changes in pension administration and financing, pension 
benefits were not reformed comprehensively for some years.  
In 1991, flat-rate supplementary amounts were added to all pensions several times on an 
ad hoc basis; later, pensions were indexed by a percentage or other formula. Due to the 1991 
increases of all pensions by equal absolute sums, the disparity among pension levels was 
greatly reduced. In fact, pensions were flattened. In addition, the formula for calculating 
pensions compounded this effect. According to the law, pensions were related to wages and to 
the length of the insured period but with a benefit ceiling. Because of inflation, all employees 
had already reached this ceiling by 1992. Therefore, all new pensioners claiming pensions 
from that time received the maximum pension.
129
 
130
  
Thus, the situation in all three countries by 1993-1994 looked very similar – practically 
flat pensions, not linked to lifetime earnings, but only to the length of service record. 
2.1.2. The second wave of reforms – a move to three-pillar model 
Estonia. Starting in 1994, i.e., the year after adoption of the State Allowances Act, pension 
reform was promised by different political groups. There seemed to be an implicit political 
consensus that a pension reform was necessary but rather different views on what the reform 
should accomplish. In 1994–1997, every Minister of Social Affairs – there were 4 different 
ministers over the period – promised to present a new draft pension law and did so. Two more 
draft laws were presented by members of Parliament. In total, over the period of 4 years, six 
different pension bills were presented to Parliament. the main obstacles to reform in the early 
and mid-1990s were the existence of multiple competing ideas, a lack of political consensus 
on the aims of pension reform (including conflicts inside the ruling coalition), the short life 
span of governments, and the absence of background analysis on various proposals. Together 
these factors created a stalemate that extended to 1997. 
                                                          
129
 Lazutka, R. (2006). Pension Reform in Lithuania. In Fultz, E. (ed.). Pension Reform in the Baltic States, 
Budapest, International Labour Oﬃce,  pp. 267-350. 
130
 Zilite, L. (2001). Pension Reform in the Baltic States. In: OECD (ed.): OECD Private Pensions Conference 
2000. Private Pensions Series No. 3. Paris: OECD, pp. 139-181. 
 60 
Prime Minister Mart Siimann, who headed the minority government that took power in 
March 1997, quickly took steps to overcome this stalemate
131
. By a decree issued on 5 May 
1997, the government appointed a Social Security Reform Commission (SSRC) with the 
mandate to prepare an outline for pension reform. In less than a month, this expert 
commission elaborated a reform proposal – a policy paper entitled Conceptual Framework for 
Pension Reform. It proposed to introduce the following features: 
 I pillar: a state-managed compulsory pension scheme, operating on the pay-as-you-go 
principle, financed by the employer-paid social tax, and offering earnings-related 
benefits; 
 II pillar: a privately-managed, compulsory, and fully-funded pension scheme, financed 
by employees’ individual contributions; 
 III pillar: privately-managed voluntary pension schemes, in the form of pension funds 
or insurance policies offered by insurance companies. 
The first pillar was to be created by reforming the existing state pension scheme, while 
the second and the third pillars were to be introduced as new schemes. 
The concept paper was strongly backed by the Prime Minister and the leading Coalition 
Party. Approved by the government on 3 June 1997, it served as a basis for drafting new 
pension legislation. 
The reform of the state pension scheme was initiated by a new Social Tax Act, adopted 
on 15 April 1998 and implemented from 1 January 1999. Most crucial changes were enacted 
with the State Pension Insurance Act, adopted on 26 June 1998, with gradual implementation 
foreseen during 1999–2000. The legal framework for the third pillar was also enacted in 1998 
in the Pension Funds Act, adopted on 10 June 1998 and entering into force on 1 August 1998. 
It required much more time to elaborate legislation on the second pillar, satisfactory for 
all parties. The draft Funded Pensions Act was presented to Parliament in April 2001. The 
Estonian Parliament adopted the Funded Pensions Act on 12 September 2001.  
 
Latvia. In 1993, Jānis Ritenis became the Minister of Welfare. While in exile in Australia, he 
had worked for private insurance companies. The new Minister began to draft a policy 
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document based on a private insurance model. These new ideas met with strong resistance, 
however, and were opposed by the Latvian Association of Free Trade Unions, the Pensioners 
Federation, and the left-oriented parties. They were also criticized by German pension 
specialists and visiting specialists from the WB. However, the notion of moving towards a 
capitalized system gradually gained acceptance in political circles. The ruling coalition 
supported the idea of an individualized pension system that would relate benefits more closely 
to each worker’s own past contributions. It also supported the formation of mandatory 
individual savings schemes (provident funds) to encourage savings and growth. 
In order to develop the proposals, and as part of a much larger project to reform social 
protection as a whole, in 1993 the Latvian Government negotiated with the WB for a loan to 
set up a Welfare Reform Project. As part of the preparation for this, a Pension Reform 
Concept document was drafted within the Ministry of Welfare. In the early stages of this 
process, some ideas were provided by Robert Holzmann of the WB. The final Concept 
document laid out a comprehensive set of proposals for restructuring the pension system. It 
was submitted to the Saeima late in 1994. The Concept was formally agreed by the Saiema in 
February 1995. 
However, by that time ideas had moved on. Although the Concept was never formally 
withdrawn by the Government, the legislation which followed took a rather different shape.  
In the autumn of 1994, the WB contacted the Government of Sweden to ask for 
assistance in developing the new pension system for Latvia. The Swedish experts visited Riga 
in December 1994, in January 1995 Swedish and Latvian teams of experts met together in 
Stockholm and as a result, the Latvian delegates became fully convinced that the first-pillar 
scheme proposed in the Concept would not fulfil its stated goal of providing income security. 
Work continued at a 1-week joint meeting of the Latvian and Swedish teams in 
Stockholm in March 1995. At this point, a joint paper was given presenting a notional 
defined-contribution (NDC) alternative to the proposals in the Concept for the first tier, 
modelled on the new Swedish system. Ministers Berzins and Makarovs decided that a new 
law would be prepared and presented to Saeima in June, following the principles of the 
alternative NDC proposal
132
.  
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The Swedish team, now expanded to include legal expertise, worked with the Latvians 
throughout the spring. Large banking crisis took place in Latvia in spring 1995 and stimulated 
the removal of 4th (transitional) pillar from the Concept of Pension reform. In the context of 
banking crisis and national pre-election atmosphere, the government was insisting on the 
soonest possible elaboration of new legislation, so the Law on State Pensions was submitted 
to the Saeima in July 1995 and approved in November 1995, with implementation to begin in 
January 1996 without any wider debates even among politicians in the parliament. 
In contrast to Estonia, whose policymakers specifically stated that their system was 
developed independently and did not copy any existing systems place in other countries, 
Latvia implemented a pension system developed for Sweden. From the very beginning, the 
working group established for the preparation of the pension reform consisted only of two 
experts from the Ministry of Welfare and three Swedish experts. Despite that, all political 
parties in the Saeima supported the principles of pension reform. The Swedish pensions 
experts had been working on reforms to their own system already for years. However, the 
implementation process in Sweden was planned to take place gradually over many years, 
making Latvia the "laboratory" for Swedish pension reform
133
. 
Introduction of the two funded pillars was a more complex task. Launch of the second 
pillar, originally planned for 1998, was postponed. Instead, the working group dealing with 
pensions decided to make the development work on the regulatory and institutional 
framework necessary for the third pillar into the pilot stage for the second pillar. This would 
also allow time for the development of capital markets and the accumulation of a reserve in 
the first pillar to offset the loss of contribution revenues. The Law on Private Pension Funds 
was accepted by Saeima in June 1997 and came into force from July 1998. The Law on State 
Funded Pensions was finally approved by the Saeima in February 2000 and came into force 
on 1 July 2001. 
  
Lithuania. In 1995, the Law on Social Insurance Pensions enacted by the Parliament on July 
18, 1994, came into force. Responding to changes that had taken place in the first part of the 
decade, this law provided for strict conditions of pension entitlement based on contributions 
paid. The new law confirmed mandatory participation in the pension insurance scheme for all 
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residents employed under labour contracts and for the self-employed. The 1995 law also 
introduced a new pension formula. It included two parts, a basic pension and an earnings-
related supplement. Basic pensions were almost flat, depending slightly on the length of a 
person’s insurance record. The supplementary pension reflected each individual’s work 
history and earnings.  
In 1999, following long discussions, the Government prepared the Pension Funds Law. 
It was adopted later that same year and came into force on 1 January 2000. The law provided 
a legal framework for the establishment of funded pensions. Not a word was mentioned 
concerning compulsory participation in these funds, nor was anything said about the use of 
social insurance resources to finance them. In fact, the title of the law did not even include the 
word private. It authorized public institutions, as well as private ones, to establish fully funded 
pension funds. According to the law, pension funds would operate as financial institutions 
managing and investing contributions accumulated in personal accounts. However, after the 
adoption of this law, not a single institution came forward to establish a pension fund. Perhaps 
this was because of the rigid rules imposed by the law. For example, it required pension funds 
to provide participants with a minimum yearly investment return (this requirement was lifted 
in early 2001). Most likely, though, the key obstacle was related to an unfavourable tax 
structure if compared with the one applied to life insurance.  
On 6 February 2001, the Government approved an Action Plan for the Preparation of 
the Pension Reform for 2001–2002.This was followed by the preparation of a draft Law on 
the Pension Reform, which was presented to Parliament in late May 2001. Upon submitting 
the draft law to Parliament, the Government nominated the Social Affairs Committee as the 
key committee of jurisdiction and the Finance and Budget Committee as secondary. The latter 
backed the draft law; however, after long discussions, the former did not. 
For the next time the draft Law on Pension Reform was submitted it to the Parliament in 
September 2001. Parliamentary readings of the draft law continued for 9 months. In May 
2002, Parliament finally returned the draft to the Government. In doing so, it suggested that 
compulsory participation in the second tier be abandoned in favour of further incentives for 
voluntary savings in supplementary pensions. 
In August 2002, the Strategy Committee decided to present a new draft of the Law on 
Pension Reform to the Government. In this proposal, participation in the second pillar was 
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voluntary. The Government in turn submitted this draft to Parliament in November 2002.  On 
3 December 2002 the law was enacted by Parliament.  
2.2. Evolution of pension legislation over the recent decade and status quo 
The Laws named in the previous section have been subjects to numerous amendments. For 
instance, the Latvian law “On State Pensions” has been amended more than 30 times since its 
adoption in 1995. Therefore, the below review of the current regulations is noting mainly the 
most recent changes that have been made in the years of crisis and afterwards. This section is 
the author’s compilation of data from a wide range of sources, namely: 
1. ASISP (Analytical Support on the Socio-Economic Impact of Social Protection Reforms) 
annual national reports on pensions, health and long-term care for Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania for the years 2009-2014 and have been written in different years by country experts:  
Andres Võrk, Lauri Leppik, Steven Segaert and Gerli Paat-Ahi (Estonia). Ināra Bite and Ruta 
Zilvere (Latvia) and Peter B. Gross, Teodoras Medaiskis and Danguole Jankauskiene 
(Lithuania) (available also in http://socialprotection.eu/). 
2. Information from the specialised web-sites: 
- www.pensionikeskus.ee (held by the Central Depository of Estonia) – numerous pages 
within this site, visited on repeated occasions in 2012-2015; 
- www.manapensija.lv (held by the Central Depository of Latvia ) - numerous pages 
within this site, visited on repeated occasions in 2012-2015; 
- www.pensijusistema.lt (held by the Ministry of Social Security and Labour of Lithuania) 
- numerous pages within this site, visited on repeated occasions in 2012-2015, 
regretfully, this web-site is being updated very seldom (especially, its English and 
Russian versions); 
- www.sotsiaalkindlustusamet.ee (formerly - www.ensib.ee)  (held by Social Insurance 
Board of Estonia) - numerous pages within this site, visited on repeated occasions in 
2012-2015; 
- www.vsaa.lv (held by State Social Insurance Agency of Latvia) - numerous pages within 
this site, visited on repeated occasions in 2012-2015; 
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- www.sodra.lt (held by State Social Insurance Fund Board of Lithuania) - numerous 
pages within this site, visited on repeated occasions in 2012-2015, regretfully, the 
English and Russian versions of this web-site have not been updated for several years; 
- www.socmin.lt (web-site of the Ministry of Social Security and Labour of Lithuania) - 
numerous pages within this site, visited on repeated occasions in 2012-2015. 
3. Laws 
- State Pension Insurance Act (Republic of Estonia), RT I 2001, 100, 648;  
- Social Tax Act (Republic of Estonia), RT I 2000, 102, 675;  
- Funded Pensions Act (Republic of Estonia), RT I 2004, 37, 252; 
- Income Tax Act (Republic of Estonia), RT I 1999, 101, 903; 
- Law on State Pensions (Republic of Latvia), adopted on 02/11/1995; 
- Law on State Social Insurance (Republic of Latvia), adopted on 01/10/1997;  
- Law on State Funded Pensions (Republic of Latvia), adopted on 17/02/2000;  
- Law on Personal Income Tax (Republic of Latvia), adopted on 11/05/1993; 
- Republic of Lithuania Law on State Social Pension Insurance Pensions, No. I-549 
adopted on 18/07/1994;  
- Republic of Lithuania State Social Insurance Law, No. I-1336 adopted on 21/05/1991;  
- Republic of Lithuania Law on Personal Income Tax, No. IX-1007 adopted on 
02/07/2002. 
4. In-depth interviews with European Social Policy Network (ESPN) experts professor 
Feliciana Rajevska (Latvia) and professor Romas Lazutka (Lithuania). 
The institutional design of old-age pension systems and their elements regulated by 
national pension legislation are summarised in the Figure 2.1. The detailed analysis of all the 
elements is set out herebelow in the following sub-sections 2.2.1 – 2.2.10.   
2.2.1. Pensionable age  
All three Baltic States have started with the same pre-reform retirement age - 60 years for 
men and 55 years for women – inherited from the previous Soviet scheme. In the mid 1990-s 
all three countries have started to increase the statutory pension age, although at a different 
pace (with the most rapid increase for women in Latvia).  
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Table 2.1. Changes in the official pensionable age in the Baltic States in 1994-2026 
 1
st
 increase 
Year of 
completion of 
change (M/W) 
Final 
retirement age  
(M/W) 
2
nd
 increase 
Year of 
completion of 
change (M/W) 
Final 
retirement 
age 
Estonia 1994 - 2016 2001/2016 63 / 63 2017 - 2026 2026 65 
Latvia 1996 - 2008 2003/2008 62 / 62 2014 – 2025 2025 65 
Lithuania 1995 - 2006 2003/2006 62.5 / 60 2012 – 2026 2026 65 
Source: 1
st
 increase figures – Zilite, L. “Pension Reform in the Baltic States”, pp.18-19, 2nd increase - author’s 
compilation of national social insurance agencies information  
In 2010-2011 all three countries took a decision on further gradual increase of the retirement 
age. The targeted figure – 65 years for both men and women – is the same across the three 
states, but the schedules differ. 
2.2.2. Funding  
Pensions are financed from social budgets replenished by social insurance contributions made 
by insured persons and their employers. For some categories (e.g., self-employed, 
unemployed persons, those on sick-leave or maternity or child-care leave, working 
pensioners, etc., the contributions are made in accordance with special rules). Generic rates 
for persons participating / not participating in the 2
nd
 mandatory funded pillar are given in the 
below two tables. 
Table 2.2. Rates of social tax (social insurance contributions) for persons NOT 
participating in II pillar (generic case) in the Baltic States, as in July 2015  
 Social insurance contributions (% of gross earnings) 
paid by 
total 
of them to 
pensions insured person employer 
Estonia - 33 33 20 
Latvia 10.5 23.59 34.09 20 
Lithuania 9 30.8 39.8 26.3 
Source: author’s compilation from national social insurance agencies data 
The highest rate of social insurance contributions is observed in Lithuania, but at the 
same time this country has the lowest income tax on employees’ salaries, so the total tax 
burden on wages is the heaviest in Latvia. 
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Table 2.3. Rates of social tax (social insurance contributions) for persons participating in 
II pillar (generic case) in the Baltic States, as in July 2015  
 Social insurance contributions (% of gross earnings) 
paid by 
total 
of them to pensions 
insured 
person 
employer total 1
st
 pillar 2
nd
 pillar 
Estonia 2 33 35 22 16 6 
Latvia 10.5 23.59 34.09 20 15 5 
Lithuania 10 30.8 40.8 27.6 24.6 3 
Source: author’s compilation from national social insurance agencies data 
In Estonia and Lithuania, 2
nd
 pillar participants make additional contributions. Besides 
that, in Lithuania the state makes extra payments to II pillar pension fund from general budget 
(financed by other taxes). The division of contributions between employees and employers is 
the least beneficial to Latvian employees. 
More specific cases and chronological variations (the proportion between 1
st
 and 2
nd
 
pillar contributions was changing and today rates are scheduled for future alterations) are 
considered in further sections – in the detailed description of the II pillar. 
2.2.3. Minimal old-age pension benefit 
The eligibility for an old-age pension is restricted by minimum mandatory period of work 
experience. This period now equals 15 years in all three countries (before 2014, this period 
made 10 years in Latvia, and is planned for further increase 20 years in 2025). In Latvia, the 
minimum guaranteed amount of pension depends on the length of service, increasing with the 
years of working career.    
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Table 2.4. Minimal amounts of old-age pension benefit in the Baltic States (July 2015)  
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Length of service Amount 
158.37 EUR 
15-20 years 70.43 EUR 
97.20 EUR 
21-30 years 83.24 EUR 
31-40 years 96.05 EUR 
>40 years 108.85 EUR 
Source: the author’s compilation of the national social insurance agencies data 
Minimum pensions are below subsistence levels in all three countries, with Latvia 
demonstrating the lowest minimums, especially for persons with short records. 
2.2.4. Zero pillar pensions 
These are the benefits for persons of pensionable age who do not qualify for a social 
insurance old-age pension. In Latvia age restrictions are stronger – only those whose age 
exceeds the pensionable age by 5 years are eligible for social security state benefit. 
Table 2.5. Zero pillar benefits in the Baltic States (July 2015)  
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
national pension 
158.37 EUR 
social security state benefit 
64.03 EUR 
social assistance pension 
97.20 EUR 
Must have resided in Estonia 
for at least 5 years before 
applying for the benefit 
Must have resided in Latvia for 
at least 5 years, 1 year of which 
directly before applying for the 
benefit 
No qualification requirement 
respecting the period of 
residence 
Source: author’s compilation from national social insurance agencies data 
Again, such amounts can hardly prevent anybody from absolute poverty in none of the 
three countries, and Latvia exhibits the figure that is absolutely remote from reality. 
In Estonia, the amount of national pension is indexed annually in line with all pensions 
in payment (see next section for more details). In Latvia, there are no rules prescribing any 
uprating of the amount of social security state benefit (at it has not been revised since 2006). 
In Lithuania, the amount of social assistance pension is linked to the basic pension (namely, 
90 percent of the basic pension). 
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2.2.5. First pillar – PAYG schemes 
The first-pillar benefit in Estonia and Lithuania comprises two main components: a 
basic non-contributory (i.e. not depending on the actual amount of the contributions paid from 
a person’s earnings) component and insurance component (related to paid contributions). 
Latvia lacks the first member of sum and has only insurance pension. 
2.2.5.1. Basic non-contributory component 
In Estonia the basic pension is absolutely flat and presently (July 2015) equals 144.2585 
EUR. This amount is indexed annually (see the section devoted to indexation rules below).  
In Lithuania the non-contributory component is not flat for everybody, but depends on 
the length of service record. The “basic pension” amount set by the government (presently – 
July 2015 – it is 108 EUR) is used as a basis for further calculations: persons with 30 years of 
work experience receive 110% of the basic, those with less than 30 years record are 
“punished” by reducing this amount by 3.3% for each ‘missing’ year below 30 (15 years 
being the mandatory minimum, nevertheless); those having working experience more than 30 
years get extra 3% of the basic for each full additional year. Thus, the non-contributory 
component may vary from 55% of the basic (59.40 EUR) for a person with 15 years 
qualifying period to 155% of the basic (167.40 EUR) for a person with 45 years of service 
record. It is worth to mention, that if a person’s earnings in a certain calendar year were below 
the official minimum wage, the record for that year shall be proportionally shorter (e.g., if a 
person’s yearly earnings in year t were equal to one half of the sum of twelve official 
minimum wages – s/he gets only half-year to his service record). 
2.2.5.2. Insurance component 
The insurance component of the first-pillar pension depends on how much social tax has 
been paid on the salary of the pensioner throughout his/her working life, but is also calculated 
in different manners: Estonia and Lithuania are using pension points schemes (see Section 
2.1), while Latvia has NDC system. As was discussed earlier, in a PP system each insured 
person is annually awarded with a number of points (also called annual factors, or 
coefficients) that are equal to the ratio between his/her salary and nationwide average insured 
wage
134
 in the respective year (average insured wage differs from average wage, since the first 
                                                          
134
 To be more precise, the ratio between the amount of social tax directed to state social insurance budget from 
person’s earnings and average nationwide amount of social tax among all tax-payers in the respective period. For 
instance, if a part of social insurance contributions is directed to a II pillar pension fund the number of 
accumulated points is lower than for a person with the same salary but participating only in I pillar scheme. 
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is taking into account those unemployed, on sick-leave, on maternity or child-care leave, etc.). 
Thus, if one’s salary was equal to the average insured wage – s/he gets one point, if it was 
twice higher than average – two points, if twice lower – 0.5 points, and so on. The points 
earned throughout the working career are then summarized, and the sum multiplied by the 
monetary value of one point. 
In Estonia, the monetary value is presently (July 2015) set at 5.245 EUR (this means 
that one year of employment with average salary adds 5.245 euro to future monthly pension 
benefit).  
In Lithuania, the points are calculated by dividing individual’s salary by the so called 
“insured income”. When the pension calculation formula was introduced in 1994, the value of 
insured income was calculated according to the social insurance average contribution base 
data. Later, the government decided to discretionarily approve both components – basic 
pension and insured income. Due to this decision, the weight of one point is “devaluating” 
with the time going, while the salaries are growing. The monetary value of one point is 
presently (July 2015) set at 2.17 EUR (0.5% of the so called “insured income” amount - 434 
EUR). A person may not be granted with more than 5 points per year in average (e.g., more 
than 150 points for 30 years of service), that means that persons with average lifetime 
earnings higher than 5-fold “insured income” are treated as if their earnings were exactly 5 
times higher.  
In both countries, if a person has opted or was mandated to join a second-pillar funded 
pension scheme, the amount of his/her first pillar pension benefit is reduced respectively: the 
points earned for each year of participation in a second pillar scheme are proportionally 
reduced. 
In Latvia the insurance pension component is calculated according to a variation of 
NDC formula (see formulae (2) and (3) in Chapter 1.1 above). It is depending on the insured's 
contributions, notional interest rate, and average life expectancy at retirement age (G). The 
benefit is earned by insured individuals by “directing” part of their social insurance 
contributions to the personalized notional pension capital account. No actual money transfer 
takes place; this capital exists only as a record in State Social Insurance Agency database. The 
pension value is the sum of notional capital at retirement divided by the projected life 
expectancy at retirement age.  The accrued notional capital is annually valorised (uprated) in 
line with increase in the covered wage bill. These annual indices imitate the role of interest 
rates. When the total amount of wages on a nationwide scale drops below the last year figure 
– the interest rate is negative, and all prospective pensioners will suffer lower pensions. This 
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mechanism was incorporated into the system in order to maintain financial sustainability in 
the times when the cardinality of cohorts entering the labour market is lower than the 
cardinality of cohorts retiring from the labour market, and it was anticipated that the constant 
growth in wage rates and labour productivity would neutralise the effect of decreasing 
working population and the index therefore would manage to remain above 1. Massive 
emigration, accompanied by wage-cuts and sharp rise in unemployment in the crisis years 
resulted in negative pension capital indexation in three successive years 2009-2011.  
When this chapter was practically written, on 27/06/2015 the Latvian parliament 
adopted amendments to the Law on State Pensions, introducing additional rules for 
calculation of annual indices – the index will not be allowed to fall below one (but, on the 
other hand, will not be allowed to rise above 1.15). Should the result of calculation for a 
certain year t be below one, exactly one would be used for pension capital indexation. 
Balancing would be achieved in the years following year t: should the result of calculation for 
year t+1 be above one, for pension capital indexation would be used not this figure, but the 
product of calculated indices for both years. If the product is still below one – the capital in 
year t+1 is again indexed with 1.00 and the next year t+2 shall also be included into 
balancing, and so on, until all negative indices are compensated by positive indices. This rule 
has retroactive effect, and shall be applied to valorisation indices from 2009 and further, and 
all pensions granted in 2010-2015 shall be recalculated (the terms are not defined yet and 
shall depend on state fiscal situation). By now, although three negative indices in 2009-2011 
were followed by three positive indices in 2012-2014, their total product is still below 1, 
which means that all six figures will be replaced with 1. To get pension capital growing at 
long last, the index for 2015 should be higher than 1.065 (and this will most likely be the 
case). 
2.2.5.3. Pensionable service period component for the pre-reform period 
While all three countries have implemented special mechanisms of translating the pre-
reform earnings into post-reform pension benefits, their design is very different. 
In Estonia the pre-reform service component depends only on the length of employment 
up until December 31, 1998 (i.e. years of employment and years deemed equal to 
employment, e.g. raising of children, compulsory military service, etc.). For one full year a 
person receives one pension point, irrespectively of actual earnings s/he had. These pension 
points are summarized with ‘normal’ pension points, earned after 1998 in accordance with the 
rules described above (insurance component), and have the same monetary value.    
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In Latvia the pensionable service period component depends on the length of 
employment (and years deemed equal to employment; only full years count) up until 
December 31, 1995 and average earnings of the individual during the period January 1, 1996 
till December 12,1999 from which social tax had been paid.  The individual’s average insured 
wage in 1996-1999 then is used for calculations and treated as if it were the person’s wage 
during all pre-reform years taxed with 20% ‘pension tax’. That is, 20% of the ‘theoretical’ 
cumulative pre-reform wage form the so called ‘initial pension capital’, which is each year 
up-rated with the same valorisation indices as the ‘normal’ notional pension capital.   
An individual’s average insured wage is calculated by dividing the total sum of his/her 
insured earnings (salary, unemployment benefit, sickness pay, etc.) in this four year period by 
48. That means that if a person had interruptions in employment and was receiving no insured 
earnings during some period within these four years, the average insured wage would be 
lower. In a point of fact, those years 1996-1999 were quite hard to Latvian economy and to 
many Latvian individuals who suffered from low wages, long-term unemployment without 
benefits, grey under-the-table salaries, being unaware of the importance of this period for the 
amount of their future pension. Therefore, the rules were complemented with two 
amendments: 
1) For persons, whose average insured wage used for calculation of initial pension capital 
was lower than the average countrywide insured wage, this countrywide average is 
used instead of individual one, provided that such persons have accumulated at least 
30 year-long service record. If their service record is shorter, and the average insured 
wage used for calculation of initial pension capital uprated by valorisation indices is 
lower that 40% of the average countrywide insured wage in the year preceding the 
year of retirement,  then the latter figure is used for calculating the initial capital. 
2) In 2006, the supplements for each pre-reform year of service amounting to 1 EUR per 
year were introduced. Initially, they were granted only to persons with low pensions 
and long service record, but later, as a result of organized mass protests of pensioners 
in 2008, the government - just before the break out of the crisis - has decided to extend 
the supplements to all pensioners starting from 2009. This was the only example of 
egalitarian approach in the Latvian pension system. However, since 2012 the 
assignment of those supplements has been cancelled: those who retired before 2012 
are still receiving the supplements, but posterior pensioners are not. In 2014, the 
payment of the supplements is effected not from the special (social insurance) budget, 
but from the general state budget. 
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In Lithuania there are two options for calculation of the pre-reform component: 
1) for each year of pre-reform employment (until December 31, 1993) an individual gets 
as many pension points (called annual earnings coefficient- a ratio between the 
individual wage and average nationwide insured wage in a given year) as is his 
average annual number of pension points in the period from January 1, 1994 until the 
date of retirement; or 
2) for each year of pre-reform employment an individual gets as many pension points as 
were his/her best  5 best consecutive years between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 
1993 (but not more than 5 points per year), provided there are reliable data on the 
individual’s earnings in that time.  
The first (simplified) option has been introduced in 2013, because the second option 
required much paper work in archives, since the data for 1984-1993 was often not so easy to 
be found. Initially, the legislators planned to substitute five best consecutive years before 
1994 with five best consecutive years after 1994, such law-in-draft was prepared in 2008, but 
due to crisis has not materialised.  The simplified rule, adopted instead, is criticised by 
experts
135
 for discouraging people in their pre-retirement age from working on jobs with low 
salaries, since it the becomes more ‘profitable’ not to work at all (contrary to Latvian case, 
periods with zero earnings are not counted). Secondly, since pension benefits are recalculated 
also for the persons who continue to work after retirement, the same effect can manifest itself 
for a person whose post-retirement salary is lower than average pre-retirement one.  
Thus, Estonia has chosen the most egalitarian approach, which is at the same time the 
most simple, transparent and understandable for population. The Lithuanian method seems to 
be the most fair, but quite laborious and time consuming. Latvian way of translation pre-
reform service record is the most biased and discriminatory. 
2.2.5.4. Indexation of first pillar pensions 
Estonian pension law prescribes yearly indexation of basic pension and monetary value 
of one year of employment. Benefits are adjusted annually in April according to changes in 
the consumer price index and the annual increase in social tax contributions. The yearly CPI 
increase is multiplied by 0.2, the yearly increase in receipt of the pension insurance part of 
social tax is multiplied by 0.8 and the results are be added together (before 2008 the 
proportion was 0.5 to 0.5). The obtained figure K is then used for indexing the main 
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parameters of first pillar pension. Should K be lower than 1, no indexation takes place. 
Otherwise: 
 national pension is multiplied by K; 
 basic pension is multiplied by K x 1.1 
 monetary value of one pension point is multiplied by K x 0.9. 
Thus, the basic pension is increasing relatively higher in order to strengthen redistribution in 
favour of less paid employees. During the crisis and early post-crisis years in 2009-2014, the 
Estonian government made ad hoc amendments to indexation rules (a smaller increase than 
prescribed by formula in 2009 and in 2012-2014, but no decline in 2010 and 2011).   
Pension indexation rules have been recently amended in Latvia. The pre-crisis formula 
was prescribing annual indexation according to changes in the consumer price index, but it 
was revoked in 2009, and since then the government has only made ad hoc indexation of 
small pensions (not exceeding 285 euros) in 2013. It actually led to confusing cases when a 
person with a benefit equal to, to say, 284 euro after indexation started to receive a higher 
pension than his fellow with 286 euro benefit whose pension was not indexed at all.  In 2014, 
another ad hoc indexation took place: indexation applied to all pensions, but only to the part 
under 285 euros. Further on, the threshold amount for indexation will be set at 50% of 
average insured wage and the indexation ratio is to be based on both the consumer price index 
(75%) and increase in the covered wage bill (25%).  
The underlying idea is similar to Estonian principle: to provide better price increase 
compensation for people with smaller pensions. However, the lack of any indexation of the 
amounts above a certain threshold makes pension benefits to erode significantly with the time. 
In Lithuania, no rules for pension indexation exist. The levels of basic pension, insured 
income and other multipliers are revised and approved on discretionary basis.  
2.2.6. Second pillar – mandatory privately managed funded pensions 
Participation in the second pillar is mandatory in Estonia to the persons born in 1983 
and later and in Latvia for the persons born on July 1, 1971 and later. This means that funded 
pensions’ significance is much higher in Latvia, because those persons born in between 1971 
and 1983 have been automatically included here into financing the compulsory funded tier. 
Participation is voluntary (or, rather, quasi-mandatory) in Lithuania (irrespective of age), 
voluntary for those born between July 2, 1951 and June 30, 1971 in Latvia, and was open for 
voluntary subscription until October 31, 2010 for those born in 1942-1983 in Estonia. Those 
who have joined the 2
nd
 pillar voluntarily do not have right to “change their mind” and leave 
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the pillar in all three countries (except for the Lithuanian case, where II pillar plans 
participants had a “window” in 2013 to decide whether they stay in the scheme, or stop their 
participation). 
2.2.6.1. Contribution rates 
The proportion of social insurance contributions that go to the 2
nd
 pillars were altering and 
respective schedules are shown in the below tables. 
Estonia has the most diversified structure of contributions split (see Table 2.6).  
Table 2.6. 2nd pillar contributions in Estonia and partition between employee (augend) 
and employer (addend) in 2001-2018 
Choice in 2009 Continued contributions 
Suspended contributions  
(default option) 
Year of birth 1942-1954 1955 - … 1942 - 1954 1955 - … 
2001 - 05.2009 2 + 4 
06.2009 - 12.2009 0 + 0 
2010 2 + 4 2 + 0 0 + 0 
2011 2 + 4 2 + 2 1 + 2 
2012 - 2013 2 + 4 
2014-
2017 
Default case 2 + 4 2 + 6 2 + 4 
Optional case N / A 3 + 6 
2018 2+4 
Source: Central Depository of Estonia  
The initial scheme in Estonia provided the 6% rate (2+4) to be constant, however the 
financial situation worsened and it was decided to stop all payments to the 2
nd
 pillar in June – 
December 2009 and offer the participants two options: to make or not to make contributions 
in 2010 with different compensation proportions in the subsequent periods. In 2013, 
participants were offered one more choice – to increase personal contributions from 2% to 3% 
in 2014-2017 in return for the state reciprocal increase of its part to 6%. 
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Latvian legislators did not offer any choice to II pillar participants (see Table 2.7). 
Table 2.7. 2nd pillar contributions in Latvia in 2001-2016 
2001-2006 2007 2008 2009-2012 2013-2014 2015 2016 
2% 4% 8% 2% 4% 5% 6% 
Source: State Social Insurance Agency of Latvia 
It was envisaged initially that the contributions in Latvia will make 9% in 2009, and 
become 10 % starting from 2010 (the highest target proportion among the three countries). 
However, the crisis caused dramatic shortage of the social budget and the rates in 2010-2012 
returned to 2%. It is planned to raise the rate to 6% in 2016 without further increase. 
 
The initial plan in Lithuania was to keep the contributions to the 2
nd
 pillar at 5.5% rate 
from 2007 onwards, but, similarly to Estonia and Latvia, the crisis has resulted in gradual  
reduction of the rate to as low as 1.5% in 2012. 
Table 2.8. 2nd pillar contributions in Lithuania in 2004-2013 
2004 2005 2006 2007-2008 01-06.2009 07-12.2009 2010-2011 2012 2013 
2.5% 3.5% 4.5% 5.5% 3% 2% 2% 1.5% 2.5% 
Source: Ministry of Social Security and Labour of Lithuania 
In the end of 2012 the system in Lithuania has undergone substantial reform. It was 
decided, that from the year 2014, the second pillar would be financed by three sources: in 
addition to the part of person's obligatory social insurance contributions, personal 
contributions should be made by workers (like in Estonia), and that the state would also 
subsidize pension funds from state budget (the amount of state subsidy is the same for all, 
irrespectively of the actual personal wage, it is calculated from average wage in the country 
and in 2015 it is 6.61 EUR per month per person). The contribution rates are presented in the 
Tables 2.8 – 2.9.  It was intended to reduce the part taken away from the current PAYG 
system on the one hand, but to make contributions big enough to enable saving an amount 
which would be an essential supplement to the general PAYG pension on the other hand. The 
new rules are fully applicable for the persons who join(ed) the system in 2013 and later. 
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Table 2.9. 2nd pillar contributions in Lithuania after 2013  
 2014-
2015 
2016-
2019 
2020-
… 
Percentage points of obligatory pension insurance contributions 2% 2% 3.5% 
Additional personal contributions as percentage of  person's wage 1% 2% 2% 
State subsidy as percentage of average wage in the country of the year 
before last  ( paid to the pension fund from the state budget)  
1% 2% 2% 
Source: Ministry of Social Security and Labour of Lithuania, ASISP 
Participation is voluntary – every person insured for full pension may decide to join the 
system or to stay only in the general social insurance (PAYG) system. In this case, no part of 
his/her contributions is directed to the personal account, but also no personal contribution is 
required and no state subsidy granted. Second-pillar participants who joined the system before 
2013 were additionally allowed to choose other options. They might decide to stop their 
participation in the second pillar at all. In this case, their accumulated accounts remain in II 
pillar schemes until the former participant reaches retirement age (no further contributions are 
being paid, but no immediate money withdrawal) - this option was chosen by 2.3% of those 
who had this right (ca. 24 thous. persons have made this choice). Another option (the default 
one) - was to continue participation in the second pillar under old rules, i.e. with no additional 
personal contribution (and with no state subsidy), it was chosen by 64.5% (684 thous.). 33.2% 
of pre-reform participants (352.5 thousands) of the second pillar have joined new scheme: 
increased personal contribution in return for additional state subsidy.
136
 
One can see, that Estonian and Lithuanian legislators allowed much more flexibility to 
II pillar participants, offering more than one scenario to the participants. 
2.2.6.2. Payments from the funded pension 
Upon reaching the pension age the 2
nd
 pillar pension benefit can be received in several ways. 
The most elaborated system is observed in Estonia. 
A person in Estonia is entitled to receive payments from the funded pension after he/she 
has attained the old-age pension age. It is not possible to receive the funded pension before 
the state pension. However, if one has accepted that to be provided with the state pension, but 
still continues his/her employment, he/she may postpone withdrawal of the funded pension. 
The amount of the funded pension depends, on one hand, on the contributions (i.e. the 
amount of the salary and on how long the contributions have been made). On the other hand, 
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the amount of such pension depends on the rate of return of the chosen pension fund or on the 
amount of interest that the contributions have borne. The payment options depend on the total 
value of the units belonging to the owner of the units: 
Table 2.10. Redemption of II pillar pension in Estonia 
Total value of 
the units 
Available options 
≤10 NP* 
- Entire sum at once 
- Regular payments from the Pension Fund 
- Lifetime payments from an Insurance Company** 
10 NP  - 50 NP 
- Entire sum at once is not allowed 
- Regular payments from the Pension Fund 
- Lifetime payments from an Insurance Company 
≥50 NP 
- Entire sum at once is not allowed  
- Regular payments from the Pension Fund is not allowed  
- Lifetime payments from an Insurance Company 
≥700 NP 
- Lifetime payments from an Insurance Company for the full amount 
- Lifetime payments from an Insurance Company up to 700 NP; the 
remaining amount: regular payments from the Pension Fund, or entire sum 
at once if the conditions are met, or second lifetime payment contract from 
an insurance Company 
* NP – national pension, in April 2015 NP amount is set at 158.37 EUR 
** - however, if the accrued sum is less than 50 times the rate of the national pension, the insurer has the right to 
refuse to conclude the pension contract. 
Source: Central Depository of Estonia  
As can be seen from the Table 2.10, there are four available options of converting the 
accumulated fund units to money:  
1. Entire sum at once (bulk payment). 
2. Regular payments from pension fund (funded pension contract). 
A pensioner should choose a suitable schedule in respect of the overall duration on the 
contract and frequency of payments. The older the person, the shorter the period across which 
the payments can be distributed (see Table 2.11 below). The payments can be arranged 
monthly, quarterly or annually.  
Table 2.11. Minimum calculated total duration of the fund pension in Estonia 
Age (years) 60 61-62 63-64 65-66 67-68 69-70 71-72 73-74 75-76 77-78 79+ 
Min period, 
years 
12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Source: Central Depository of Estonia  
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3. Lifetime payments from insurance company. 
As a rule, a person concludes a funded pension insurance contract with an insurer for payment 
of the amounts contributed to a pension fund, and after the conclusion of the contract the fund 
transfers the amount contributed by the person to the insurer selected by such person. If the 
accrued sum is not sufficient (is less than 50 times the rate of the national pension), the 
insurer has the right to refuse to conclude the pension contract. The payments are made on the 
basis of the pension contract as lifetime annuities, i.e. until the death of the person receiving 
the pension or the policyholder. The payments made until the death of the policyholder are 
calculated by the insurer, using the annuity formula. The payments can be taken as monthly or 
quarterly payments. The sums may be in equal or increasing amounts and the payments can 
be received at least once in a quarter. 
4. Lifetime payments from insurance company AND from pension fund. 
If the total value of the units accrued to a pension account is 700 times the rate of the national 
pension, upon concluding a pension contract with an insurance premium corresponding to at 
least the 700-time rate of the national pension, the owner of the units has the right to keep the 
remaining units at their pension account. The remaining units may be: 
 taken out as a single payment if the sum remaining on the pension account is less than 
10 times the rate of the national pension, 
 taken out as periodical payments from the pension fund (fund pension), 
 used for concluding another pension contract, 
 or paid as an additional insurance premium later. 
If the fund pension agreed on for additional payments, the minimum calculated duration of the 
fund pension will be shorter. 
Table 2.12. Minimum calculated duration of the additional fund pension in Estonia 
Owner of the unit is 60-64 years old 5 years 
65-69 years old 4 years 
70-74 years old 3 years 
75 years old or older 2 years 
Source: Central Depository of Estonia  
Although the active pay-out phase has not yet started at full capacity, and personal 
accumulations are quite modest yet because of short experience of II pillar, the regulatory 
system is elaborated thoroughly in detail. 
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In Latvia, a person is entitled to receive payments from the funded pension after he/she 
has attained the old-age pension age, but it is not possible to receive the funded pension 
before the state pension. 
Similarly to Estonian rules, the pension benefit is based on the insured's contributions 
plus accrued interest. At retirement, the insured can purchase an annuity or have the funds 
credited to his or her NDC account, adding them to the first-pillar pension capital – in the 
latter case the general benefit formula reviewed above shall be applied to the both parts of the 
capital. However, the first option is practically not in use yet, since the only three insurance 
companies offering those policies require the applicant to have at least 4,500-5,000 EUR 
accumulated in a second pillar pension fund. Starting from 15/04/2015, one of these 
companies (Compensa Life) reduced the threshold from 5,000 to 3,000 euro
137
. Only 1.65% 
of those who retired in 2014 and who were participating in II pillar did use the option to buy 
an insurance in exchange of the pension accumulations
138
. Very few Latvian residents have 
managed to accumulate the sufficient amount of money: on 31/12/2014 the average 
accumulated capital was 1,607.88 EUR and even those with the longest possible record (13 
years of participation) had on average 2,505.62 EUR
139
.  
In general, Latvian legislation regulates payments of funded pensions to a much lesser 
degree than Estonian one. 
 
Similarly, in Lithuania, the benefit from a II pillar pension fund will be paid only when 
a person reaches his/her old-age pension age, the same as for the social insurance pension. 
Regulation of payments is similar to that in Estonia, and also offers three ways of 
capital redemption: entire sum at once, periodical payments from pension fund, or lifetime 
payments from insurance company. Alternatively to NP-scale in Estonia, the reference frame 
is defined in terms of the “basic pension annuity” - an indicator of the preliminary amount of 
pension benefit payable every month for term of life. This indicator is calculated according to 
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the procedure laid down by the regulatory authority. Then the result is compared to the ‘basic 
pension’, which is presently (July 2015) equal to 108 EUR. Depending on the comparison, the 
pension company determines how savings, in full or in part, can be paid out to the pension 
system member. If calculated amount of basic pension annuity is lower than ½ of the basic 
pension (in July 2015 it means 54 EUR and corresponds to personal  accumulations in II pillar 
pension funds of 10,874 EUR or less
140
), then a person can take the money as a one-time 
lumpsum benefit, or split it into drawdown payments. Participants with larger savings in the II 
pillar are obliged to by a lifetime annuity from an insurance company with at least quarterly 
payments. On the opposite side of the savings scale, if the calculated amount of basic pension 
annuity is three times higher than the basic pension (315 EUR, or, respectively, more than 
63,434 EUR
141
 accumulated on pension fund accounts), the share of assets in excess of the 
lump-sum payment for the basic pension annuity which is triple the amount of the basic state 
social insurance pension can be paid out as a lump-sum pension benefit or in periodic 
instalments. 
2.2.6.3. Succession of funded pensions 
In Estonia, if a participant dies before reaching the pension age and starting receiving 
payments from the 2
nd
 pillar fund units of mandatory funded pensions are inheritable. An 
application for inheriting units must be submitted to a relevant bank office. In case of 
inheritance, the inherited units may be transferred to the heir’s pension account (when the heir 
has joined the mandatory funded pension) or cashed out. Income tax must be paid on cashed 
out units.  
The same applies also to when the pensioner opted to receive payments from the 
pension fund without entering into an insurance contract and dies before “depletion” of his 
fund units. 
Since 01.01.2014, legal entities have the right to inherit the units of the mandatory 
funded pension. In case of succession, the legal entity may take the inherited units out in cash. 
As a rule, when the pensioner opted to receive payments on the basis of an insurance 
contract, those annuities are not inheritable. However, there are joint insurance contracts and 
insurance contracts with fixed duration of guaranty that can be, to some extent, considered as 
inheritable. 
                                                          
140
 Central Bank of the Republic of Lithuania (2015). http://www.lb.lt/pensiju_anuitetas [retrieved on 
27/07/2015] 
141
 AB SEB Bankas (2015). https://www.seb.lt/eng/private/pension/building-pension-savings/second-pension-
pillar/payment-pension-benefits [retrieved on 27/05/2015] 
 83 
In contrast, in Latvia, neither fund units (shares) of mandatory funded pensions nor the 
benefits are hereditable. On a contributor’s death, funds are returned to the first pillar ‘pool’ 
and subsumed in the overall pensions budget
142
. For example, in 2014 the budget received 
4,858,619 EUR for 4,768 deceased participants (i.e. slightly more than one thousand euro per 
person). This amount made almost a quarter (23.9%) of all pension capital payments from 
pension funds.
143
  
Should a person opt not to append the second pillar capital to the one accumulated in 
NDC scheme, but to buy an annuity – joint insurance contracts are possible with fixed 
duration of guaranty that can be considered as hereditable.  
 
In Lithuania, if a participant dies before reaching the pension age and starting receiving 
payments from the 2
nd
 pillar fund, units of mandatory funded pensions are inheritable. 
If a participant dies after reaching the pension age whether the sum left after the 
person’s death can be inherited will depend on the type of annuity he/she chose – with or 
without succession rights. 
2.2.6.4. Investment strategies 
Each II pillar pension fund may offer one or several pension plans fitting under certain 
classification: the plans are divided into three or four groups in accordance with the 
investment strategy they use: 
- conservative (not investing in stocks) 
- balanced or small equity funds 
- active or medium equity funds 
- aggressive (investing in stocks mainly) 
The borderlines among groups vary, e.g., in Estonia the proportion of stocks in fund 
portfolios is set in increments of 25% for the four groups (zero; < 25; 25–50; 50–75), while in 
Lithuania the limits are settled as follows: zero; < 30%; 30%–70%; > 70%. In Latvia up to 
2007 the permitted share of stocks was defined as < 15% for the balanced plans and 15%–
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30% for the active plans; however, since 2008 the rules have been the same as in Estonia: < 
25% for balanced plans and <50% for active plans. Therefore, for instance, a plan having 35% 
of its assets as stocks in 2007 was considered “balanced” in Lithuania, “active” – in Estonia 
and not-permissible at all – in Latvia, making the terminology misleading.  
The group of “aggressive” plans has been added in Estonia since 2010, earlier three first 
groups existed only (as they still are remaining in Latvia). Conservative plans have lower 
administrative costs than more active ones. 
The Baltic States are not providing any protection to funded pillar participants in the 
way of setting minimum guaranteed rates of return, unlike other CEE countries. Such 
guaranteed yield may be expressed in relative value – when minimum required rate is 
calculated on the basis of industry’s average (as in Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland and Romania); 
or in the form of absolute return guarantee of protection of nominal rate of return („at least 
zero” – Czech Republic, Romania, Slovak Republic) or real rate of return („at least real value 
of accumulated assets” - Hungary)144. During financial crisis negative yields were observed in 
all three countries. 
2.2.6.5. Administrative costs 
The administrative costs of asset managers in Estonia are included into the net value of 
a share: the management fee is deducted from the market value of the assets of the fund daily 
and the net asset value of a unit or the value of the investment made by the owner of the unit 
into the pension fund is decreased by it. The management fee varies from 0.7% to 2% 
(conservative plans being the ‘cheapest’ while active and aggressive – the most ‘expensive’ 
for their participants). There is also a special redemption fee – 1%, but Estonian legislation in 
contrast to Latvia and Lithuania allows a person to participate in several funds simultaneously 
to diversify his/her risks. 
In Latvia in 2014 (as well as in 2013) the average management fee was equal to 1.52% 
(average for conservative plans – 1.21%, average for active plans – 1.65%)145. Starting from 
2015, the fee is linked to the actual performance of the fund and now consists of two parts: a 
fixed part being 1% plus a variable part depending on rate of return, but the total fee should be 
not more than 1.5% for conservative pension plans and 2% for other plans. 
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In Lithuania the management fee is consisting of two parts: 1) assets fee (like in Estonia 
and Latvia described above) capped at 1% for all pensions plans except for conservative ones 
(for them the limit is lower: 0.65%), and 2) contribution fee – charged on contributions: in 
2013 the upper limit was reduced from enormously high 10% (although real market fees were 
significantly lower - about 3% ) to 2% with further annual decrease by 0.5% (thus, today, in 
2015, it equals 1%), totally disappearing by 2017.   
Latvia has one more administrative fee levied on contributions – taken not by fund 
manager, but by State Social Insurance Agency! The maximum amount is set at 2.5%, but 
so high rate was applied only once – in 2004. In the last 5 years it reached its peak in 2011 
(0.79%) with the lowest rate in 2014 – 0.32%. These rates are extremely high. For example, in 
the case of pension fees for the latest available data, the average in the sample of 53 countries 
is 1.14%
146
. The highest rates are observed in Latin America, Eastern Europe and other 
emerging economies. At the other end are countries such as Norway, Italy and The 
Netherlands, where average fees in the whole studied period 1990-2011 were under 0.2%. 
Another research shows, that while pension fund fees in Sweden, UK, Denmark and USA 
range from 0.1% to 0.5%, funds in Latin America and Eastern Europe charge 1.6% and 1.3% 
(respectively) as average
147
. Reasonable fees, in the opinion of H. Rudolph, lie in the interval 
from 0.16% to 0.70%.  
Edward Whitehouse has demonstrated, that quite low charges on assets build up over 
the long period of a pension investment to reduce the pension value substantially (see Fig. 
2.1): e.g., 1% of administrative fees may result in 20% decrease in final pension benefit after 
40 years of contributions
148
 (the baseline assumptions for this simulations are that individual 
earnings grow by 3% a year and annual investment returns are 5%). Similarly, Creighton and 
Piggott ascertained that a fee of 1% of the assets under management may reduce pension 
returns by between 19% and 22%
149
. 
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Figure 2.2 The relation between asset charge and charge ratio 
Source: Whitehouse, E. (2001). Administrative Charges for Funded Pensions: Comparison and Assessment of 13 
Countries. Fig.1 on p.9. 
Meanwhile, Latvian legislation allows the administrative fee up to 4.5% (actual average 
historical figures being about twice lower), Lithuanian legislation today allows 2.5%, and 
Estonian – 2%. Small countries have limited options for economies of scale, and even more so 
in countries where most people have low earnings. 
2.2.7. Third pillar – voluntary funded pensions and pension insurance 
Voluntary funded pension schemes function almost uniformly in all three countries. In Latvia, 
contributors are eligible to start receiving a III pillar pension benefit as early as from 55 years, 
in Estonia and Lithuania – at any age, but tax exemptions are not applied before 55. 
Legislations are designed to motivate people to save in the third pillar, what differs are the 
rates and bases for return of income tax on the contributions paid to private pension funds. 
Table 2.13. Tax incentives for 3rd pillar contributions in the Baltic States (rates in 2015) 
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
For contributions of up to 
6,000 EUR or 15% of gross 
earnings income tax (20%) is 
returned 
For contributions of up to 10% 
of gross earnings income tax 
(23%) is returned 
For contributions of up to 25% of 
gross earnings income tax (15%) 
is returned  
Source: information from III pillar pension plan providers: SEB and Swedbank web-sites in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania  
Although the figures in the above table slightly vary between countries, the overall approach 
is absolutely similar. 
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Voluntary pension funds are also providing plans with different investment strategies: 
aggressive, active, balanced and conservative. A person may accumulate savings in more than 
one fund at the same time, put contributions on hold and resume them afterwards. 
Third pillar may also take the form of pension insurance. Life insurance companies 
offer pension products with guaranteed interest rate or with investment risk. 
2.2.8. Taxation of pensions 
In Estonia all pensions are taxed by income tax (in 2015 – 20%), but there is an additional tax 
allowance for pensions. The tax-free income for pensioners is 374 EUR per month [July 
2015], so the effective tax rate on pensions is very low. 
3
rd
-pillar pension benefits are taxed at 10% or 20% rates depending on the duration of 
the participation in the scheme, age of retirement and way of taking out the benefit. Lifetime 
payments from an insurance company (annuity) are not taxed with income tax if more than 5 
years have passed since the conclusion of the contract or first acquisition of units redeemable 
on the basis of the sum transferred to the insurance contract.    
In Latvia state pensions are subject to income tax – 23%. The tax-free income for 
pensioners is higher than for those in working age and amounts to 235 EUR. Benefits, 
received in the 3
rd
-pillar pension plans are taxed with income tax at 10% rate. Pensions, 
assigned before 1996 (i.e. in accordance with the former Law on State Pensions) are not taxed 
irrespectively of the amount. 
In Lithuania no income tax is levied on pension benefits paid from statutory schemes. 
Benefits from III pillar voluntary funds are levied with 15% income tax, but become tax-free 
if a person: 
- holds savings in a third-pillar pension fund for at least 5 years and reaches the age of 
55 at the time of payment of the benefit (and the pension savings agreement was 
concluded before 31 December 2012); or  
- holds savings in a third-pillar pension fund for at least 5 years and reaches the age 
which is five years earlier than the threshold for the old-age pension at the time of 
payment of the benefit (if the pension savings agreement was concluded after 1 
January 2013). 
2.2.9. Early / deferred retirement 
In Estonia a person can retire with the early-retirement pension up to three years before the 
legally stipulated retirement age, but in such case the amount of pension is reduced by 0.4% 
for each month falling short of the legally stipulated retirement age (4.8% per year, total 
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maximum reduction is therefore 14.4%). As to the postponed retirement pension, the pension 
is increased by 0.9% for each month by which a person postpones his or her application for 
the pension (that is 10.8% per year). 
In Latvia a person having the insurance period of minimum 30 years can request 
premature pension benefit 2 years before reaching retirement age. Early retirement benefit is 
calculated using the same NDC formula and dividing the obtained result (called “granted 
pension”) by 2, leaving 50% of the amount (the proportion was 80% before July 1, 2009). 
This benefit does not depend on the actual number of month remained until statutory pension 
age. It is worth to mention that the real proportion is even lower due to the influence of the G-
factor (average remaining life expectancy), which, naturally, is greater for those retiring 
earlier. When a person reaches statutory pension age, the “granted amount” is automatically 
becoming his/her ‘normal’ old-age pension. As for stimulating the late retirement, there are no 
any additional incentives, since the factor of average life expectancy (G) is already a part of 
general formula, and the benefit is automatically increased with decrease of G (which happens 
if a person opts to retire later than the official pensionable age).  Before 2013, G-value was 
defined by the Government on the basis of the conceptual approach of male and female life 
expectancy and long-term trends elaborated by the leading Latvian demographic experts. 
Starting from 2014, this order was changed, and now the G-value is linked to actual historical 
data: namely, the average life expectancy (aggregate ratios for both sexes) at ages 40-90 
observed in Latvia in the calendar year 2 years before computation (or re-computation) of 
person’s pension. That is, for computation a pension in 2015, the corresponding age average 
life expectancy in 2013 is used.
150
 
In Lithuania early retirement is possible five years before the official retirement age for 
a person who was registered as unemployed during the entire previous year and had acquired 
a minimum of 30 contributory years. The pension is decreased by 0.4% for every month of 
retirement before the official pensionable age (4.8% per year, total maximum available 
reduction is therefore 24%). It is also possible to postpone the beginning of pension payment, 
with an increase of pension value by 8% for each full year of postponement. If an application 
for the pension is deferred for more than five years, the pension shall be increased only for 
five years of deferment. In Lithuania, a person may even start to receive old-age pension, but 
at a later stage decide to suspend receiving a pension and request a deferred payment. In this 
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case, his pension shall be calculated anew according to the data at the moment of the 
application and shall be increased by 4 percent of the calculated amount for each full year 
lapsed after the deferment of payment. 
So, Latvian pensioners are the most severely “punished” for earlier retirement, and least 
“remunerated” for postponing the pension. The legislation in Latvia is less flexible and less 
friendly to persons. Pension regulation of all three Baltic countries allows pensioners to 
continue employment after retirement and combine full or partial wage with full pension 
benefit, therefore, deferred retirement incentives are practically insufficient and do not 
encourage people to defer their retirement.   
2.2.10. Treatment of non-productive periods   
The three Baltic states are distinguished by the manner of treating the unproductive periods, 
when a person is not employed: is a military conscript, or having maternity/paternity and 
child-care leave, sick-leave, receives unemployment benefit. 
As of today, Estonia is the only Baltic country having compulsory military service, 
Latvia and Lithuania abandoned conscript armies. When the latter two countries had 
conscripts, the state was paying social insurance contributions to I pillar for them from 
minimum wage. In Estonia, the state is paying social tax for soldiers not from minimum, but 
from countrywide average insured wage (this amount is revised once a year based on the 
previous year statistics). 
Likewise, Estonians are the most generous in granting pension points to the parents of 
young children. In 2013, this country has introduced a whole system of parental pensions.  
The State makes contributions (pays social tax) for one parent of a child under three 
years from the countrywide average insured wage (this figure is calculated by the Estonian 
National Social Insurance Board annually on the basis of the social tax information of the 
previous calendar year). At the time of writing these lines (July 2015), this yardstick equals 
€792.75. That means, that a person gets one pension point per year to his/her I pillar account. 
The State makes additional contributions from the general budget to II pillar pension 
funds for one parent (either a mother or a father, and also a guardian or a caregiver) of a child 
born on 01/01/2013 and later. The amount of the contribution is set 4% of the countrywide 
average insured wage (presently - €31.71), this is the amount that the state transfers to pension 
funds for one parent. Such additional contribution is paid from the date of childbirth until the 
child becomes three years old, regardless of the fact whether the parent has returned to work 
or not.  
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If a child’s parent was born before 1983 and is not therefore participating in the II pillar 
(unless s/he had joined it voluntarily), s/he will get a supplement to the I pillar pension – by 
adding three pension points to a monthly pension benefit, provided this parent would have 
been raising the child for at least 8 years. 
Before 2013, parents received less than one pension point per year: the state did pay 
social tax for parents only from minimum tax base that was considerably lower than the 
average taxable earnings. In order to remunerate the parents who raised children in those 
years, they are now granted with additional pension points: one parent (spouse of a parent, 
guardian or foster parent) for each child born during the period 31.12.1980-31.12.2012, whom 
they have been raising for at least eight years gets a supplement in the value of two pension 
points (from 2018 will become one pension point). 
In addition to the pension points, for the parent who received parental benefits, 1% of 
the value of parental benefit was additionally transferred to the funded pension scheme in 
2004-2012. It was estimated that on average a parent with two children may receive an 
increase of their pensions of around 4-10%
151
. Accordingly, this would decrease the gender 
pension difference, as in most cases it is a mother who is eligible to the pension supplement. 
Latvian mothers/fathers are accumulating notional pension capital during receiving 
maternity/paternity benefit – social insurance contributions (including pension contributions) 
are paid from these benefits (the maximum length of receiving maternity benefit is 140 days, 
paternity benefit – 10 days). Then, a parent may start to receive a child-care benefit or a 
parental benefit until the child becomes 1.5 year old – during this period social insurance 
contributions are paid for the benefit recipient only from the amount of 142.29 EUR (formerly 
100 lats) irrespectively of the actual amount of the benefit. No transfers to II pillar funds are 
made, pension rights are accumulated only in I pillar. 
In Lithuania, maternity/paternity and child-care benefits are treated like wages for 
pension point calculation (i.e. full amount counts).  No transfers to II pillar funds are made, 
pension rights are accumulated only in I pillar. 
In all three countries, during the period of unemployment a person gets as many pension 
points / notional capital as if his unemployment benefit were his/her wage. If a person retains 
the status of unemployed but is not any more entitled to receive the benefit – no pension rights 
are accumulated.    
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2.3. Lessons of crisis and development trends 
Any system robustness is better tested when the system is put into a critical situation: 
bottlenecks, imbalances, latent stress points become detectable. The recent global financial 
and economic crisis 2008-2010 was the first serious test for reformed pension systems in the 
Baltic States, which brought along various consequences for various elements of those 
systems. Pension systems in the Baltic States have three major participants: 
1. State (legislative and executive bodies) 
2. Private pension funds (mandatory and voluntary) 
3. Population covered by social insurance schemes 
As a rule, the first two are viewed when studying the effects of crisis on pension system 
(e.g., rise of budget expenditures, drops in assets values). The author of this thesis is paying 
the main attention to the third participant: what price the crisis years did take and still are 
taking from “a-man-in-the-street” pension.  For the purpose of the analysis, it is instructive to 
distinguish three subgroups within this group: 1) those retired before the beginning of crisis; 
2) those went on pension during the crisis years; 3) future pensioners that are now in 
preretirement age. The effect of crisis shows up in different ways, as the role of certain socio-
economic factors varies between those subgroups significantly. Thus, the next step is to 
determine those factors and look how they were influenced by crisis. 
2.3.1. Socio-economic environment of pension system in the Baltic States  
Pension systems exist in a constantly changing environment of social and economic 
realities. Like in natural environments, some factors are much more constant over time 
creating a sort of terrain, while others are changing, cyclically or following other patterns; 
some factors can suddenly descend like a hurricane and cause numerous, but quite quickly 
neutralisable consequences, while others operate stealthily, and their effect is detected after a 
long time, when it is already difficult to fight with. Governments can influence some factors, 
but can only adapt to others. As natural systems, pension systems are not isolated from each 
other and explicitly or indirectly interact with neighbouring counterparts. Pension systems are 
a relatively young variant of people’s efforts tailored to address specified social risks of 
modern societies.  There are plenty of interesting papers published in scientific journals 
focusing on private pension funds’ performance, models and strategies - see, for example a 
recent article by Latvian authors
152
 on market model for private pension savings elaborated 
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for 5 countries – Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. However, very few are 
devoted to pay-as-you-go public pension systems. In the Baltic States, however, private 
funded II and III pillar pensions are not yet playing any significant roles, and will not play in 
the nearest decade, as people’s accumulations in these funds are very low yet as was shown 
above. Thus, the below proposed list of major factors influencing our pension systems is 
compiled by the author based on the different sources and is not pretending to omnitude. 
Wolfgang Scholz, an expert from International Labour Organization already in 2001 
had warned social policy-makers in Latvia that “social protection systems, while being nested 
into the structures and dynamics of societies, are exposed to adverse “exogenous” impacts 
and, not at all surprising, may themselves metamorphose into reasons for societal problems”. 
He outlined two fundamental factors on which social policy (and pension policy as its integral 
part) is conditional: ageing – which is characteristic to whole Europe, as well as to other 
developed countries, - and income gap between Eastern and Western Europe, which is of 
extreme importance to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and other post-communist countries
153
.  
With the accession to the EU, “national welfare state is confronted with a European economy 
and increasingly European labour market. The frequently highlighted focus of European 
deepening in social processes challenges the traditional welfare state policies”154. Pension 
system is financed from the contributions of insured population, and is, therefore, closely 
linked to changes in the numbers of taxpayers not relating to pure demographical ones, but 
having structural nature, like employment and shadow economy levels. Social trust is a very 
important factor for pensions either, and international comparison (between OECD countries) 
performed by American economists Raj Aggarwal and John W. Goodell proves, that social 
trust really matters
155
, Hagemejer and Woodal warn about possible sustainability trap in the 
longer term: “when promised benefits start to be seen as inadequate, the willingness of 
members of the schemes to contribute may reduce correspondingly”156. 
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The factors are listed in the order of their importance: the most influencing first. One 
may argue that it is a bad idea to put the political factor in the very end of the list, the author’s 
reason is that the uninterrupted rule of right-wing parties during the last 20 years, that did not 
waver even in crisis years, makes Latvian social policy course remaining very stable and not 
subject to serious changes. 
2.3.1.1. Demographical factors: depopulation due to emigration and ageing leading to 
increase of old dependency ratio. 
A steady increase in life expectancy accompanied with the falling fertility rates impact 
upon demographic ageing, as the absolute number and the relative importance of the 
population of older persons continues to grow. The process of ageing is characteristic to all 
European countries, and today the Baltic States figures (see below in Table 2.14) are very 
close than EU averages, but the speed of ageing is increasing.  
Table 2.14. Ageing of Baltic population in 2005 – 2014 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Median age of population 
Estonia 39.2 39.4 39.6 39.8 39.9 40.1 40.4 40.7 41.0 41.3 
Latvia 39.3 39.5 39.8 39.9 40.2 40.8 41.4 41.8 42.1 42.4 
Lithuania 38.2 38.8 39.2 39.6 39.9 40.3 41.1 41.7 42.1 42.4 
Proportion of population aged 60 years and more 
Estonia 21.8 21.8 22.1 22.4 22.7 23.1 23.4 23.9 24.3 24.6 
Latvia 22.2 22.4 22.5 22.6 23.0 23.6 24.1 24.6 24.9 25.2 
Lithuania 21.0 21.4 21.6 21.8 22.0 22.4 23.2 23.7 24.0 24.3 
Old dependency ratio (population 60 and over to population 20-59 years) 
Estonia 39.4 39.3 39.7 40.2 40.7 41.4 42.1 43.0 43.9 44.8 
Latvia 40.9 40.7 40.5 40.5 41.0 42.2 43.2 44.0 44.6 45.3 
Lithuania 38.7 39.4 39.4 39.4 39.7 40.6 42.3 43.2 43.7 44.0 
Source: Eurostat 2014a [demo_pjanind] 
The natural decrease of population is aggravated by emigration. According to Eurostat 
data ([migr_imm1ctz], [migr_emi1ctz]), only during the ten-year period after joining the EU 
(i.e., in 2004 - 2013) migration saldo in Estonia equals to -21,751 persons, in Latvia -181,711 
persons, in Lithuania -332,305 persons. There was no any single year with positive migration 
balance in any Baltic country, during the crisis years the pace of emigration picked up 
significantly and even in 2013 did not drop to pre-crisis figures. What is even more important, 
 94 
majority of these emigrants were aged 20 – 39 years, on the peak of their fertility and 
productivity. The crisis brought sharp growth of unemployment and massive wage-cuts, 
spurring economically active people seek for jobs in other countries. As this age group is not 
only economically, but also reproductively active, the countries lost not only present but also 
future taxpayers. 
The increased speed of ageing caused legislators in all three countries to raise the 
official pensionable age from 62 to 65 years, as mentioned in the previous section.   
2.3.1.2. Income gap between the Baltic States and Western Europe 
Although the relative well-being of Baltic people is steadily increasing (except for 
2009-2010) and nowadays it is significantly better than 10 years ago, it is still below 2/3 of 
average Western European level (except for Lithuania, which is performing better than other 
two countries), that makes those countries very attractive destinations of emigration. The 
Table 2.15 below provides comparative figures of living standards in ‘Old Europe’ (average 
EU-15) and three Baltic countries (bold figures mark the years with reverse dynamics). 
Table 2.15. GDP per capita in the Baltic States compared to EU-15 in 2004-2013 (in 
thousands PPS - purchasing power standard units) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
EU-15 19.6 20.4 21.2 21.9 22.0 21.3 22.0 22.3 22.7 22.7 
Estonia 9.0 9.9 11.0 12.3 12.8 11.3 11.6 12.3 13.1 13.7 
EE/EU-15 45.9% 48.5% 51.9% 56.2% 58.2% 53.1% 52.7% 55.2% 57.7% 60.4% 
Latvia 8.7 9.4 11.2 12.2 12.3 10.3 11.0 11.9 12.5 13.4 
LV/EU-15 44.4% 46.1% 52.8% 55.7% 55.9% 48.4% 50.0% 53.4% 55.1% 59.0% 
Lithuania 9.4 10.2 11.3 12.6 13.6 12.2 12.8 13.7 14.6 15.5 
LT/EU-15 48.0% 50.0% 53.3% 57.5% 61.8% 57.3% 58.2% 61.4% 64.3% 68.3% 
Source: Eurostat [nama_10_pc], author’s calculations 
Crisis years with dramatic fall in GDP have moved the expected point of convergence 
even more away from today. Pre-accession expectations of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian 
people concerning rapid shrinking of the income gap between “new” and “old” Europe after 
joining the EU have not materialised, so they are “losing touch to their own development 
potential”157. 
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2.3.1.3. Globalisation processes 
Pension systems of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were designed in mid 1990s, when the 
countries were to a much lower extent included into global economic and financial markets. 
The systems were tailored for a country, where people do not move abroad for work and 
pension funds are investing into domestic economy. The crisis has demonstrated that the 
pension systems were not prepared enough to the risks brought by globalisation:  
 Globalisation of labour market allows Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians to use job 
opportunities abroad, and quite often their choice is motivated also by the reasons of 
better social guarantees in host countries: the emigrants are leaving their home country 
not only because of better job opportunities and living conditions, but also to 
indemnify themselves against poverty in old age by subscribing to Western pension 
schemes. 
 Globalisation of financial market and volatility of financial instruments make the 
assets accumulated in 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 pillar private pension funds very vulnerable to the 
risk of devaluation. The majority of pension funds’ assets are investing abroad and are 
highly dependent on foreign market fluctuations and during the crisis years suffered 
drastic contractions of share values. Before crisis the nominal share values were 
growing, but consumer prices were growing even faster, leading to factual devaluation 
of assets. 
Small national economies are very vulnerable to global economic and financial crises, 
while the ability of nation states to intervene in the market processes is decreasing and the 
room for manoeuvre to regulate pension systems is shrinking.   
2.3.1.4. (Un)Employment 
High unemployment rates affect pension systems in three ways – firstly, paying out 
unemployment benefits to larger numbers of recipients depletes social budget thus 
complicating discharging obligations to existing pensioners; secondly, the unemployed 
persons make small or none contributions to their own future pensions; thirdly, Latvian 
pension formula automatically reduces future pensions for all future pensioners (even those 
having full employment and paying all taxes) through the mechanism of pension capital 
valorisation (indexation). Indexation rules in Estonia, as was shown in the previous section, 
also include nationwide wage bill increase/decrease in computation. Thus, the rise of 
unemployment in crisis years affected pension perspectives of all groups of population. 
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In the 2008–09 crisis millions of workers around the world were losing their income 
opportunities in both the formal and the informal economies. Unemployment levels in the 
Baltic region, that were lower than EU averages before crisis, sharply increased in 2009 and, 
especially, in 2010. In 2011, unemployment rates started their way down, but pre-crisis levels 
still have not been reached. In the Table 2.16 below the bold figures mark the years when 
unemployment levels were going up and employment rates were decreasing. 
Table 2.16. Annual average unemployment and employment rates in the Baltic States, 
2005-2014 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Unemployment rate, % 
Estonia 8.0 5.9 4.6 5.5 13.5 16.7 12.3 10.0 8.6 7.4 
Latvia 10.0 7.0 6.1 7.7 17.5 19.5 16.2 15.0 11.9 10.8 
Lithuania 8.3 5.8 4.3 5.8 13.8 17.8 15.4 13.4 11.8 10.7 
Employment rate (15-64 years), % 
Estonia 64.8 68.4 69.8 70.1 63.8 61.2 65.3 67.1 68.5 69.6 
Latvia 62.1 65.9 68.1 68.2 60.3 58.5 60.8 63.0 65.0 66.3 
Lithuania 62.9 63.6 65.0 64.4 59.9 57.6 60.2 62.0 63.7 65.7 
Source: Eurostat  [une_rt_a] [lfsi_emp_a]  
However, the specialists stress that the unemployment rate “is a poor indicator of the 
problem. Unemployment is an artificially defined, bureaucratic term, often a plaything for 
politics and/or statistics. It may be shown to be improving when employment is actually 
decreasing or vice versa. The true indicator is the employment ratio, the proportion of 
employed in the working-age generation”158. The unemployment rate tends to minimize the 
true underutilization of the workforce, especially during economic downturn: first, more jobs 
become part-time or temporary; second, many people become discouraged and drop out of the 
labour force (e.g., by taking early retirement or disability pension, or by becoming ‘full-time-
mothers’, or by emigrating to other countries).  According to Eurostat data, employment rates 
in the population of ages 15-64 years in 2014 equalled to 65.7-69.6%. Turning the figure 
inside out, it could be said that approximately 30-35 percent (or, roughly, one third) of the 
active-age population is presently not employed. Some of them are still at school, some 
already in retirement, but these two groups combined can certainly be not responsible for the 
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large proportion of those without employment. Some are actually working in the shadow 
labour market.  
One should also bear in mind that despite of improving employment rates, in the 
absolute number the situation may not demonstrate the same pace of progress, if not even 
deteriorate. When the total population number is going down, which is the case in all three 
Baltic States, the better relative levels sometimes mean worse absolute numbers: in Latvia, the 
employment rate increased from 65.0% in 2013 to 66.3% in 2014 (as shown in the table 
above), meanwhile in absolute figures the number of employed decreased from 866.5 
thousands in 2013 to 858.6 thousands in 2014
159
. 
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) urges to distinguish the 
“demographic dependency ratio” and the “economic dependency ratio”, and not to 
overestimate the former at the expense of the latter. “For pay-as-you-go systems, only the 
“economic” ratio is decisive, namely the number of people who are working, and who are 
therefore financing such a system, but also the increase in productivity and generated GDP, 
which must have positive repercussions on the quality of employment and wages. This 
ultimately means that faced with this challenge, it is vital to concentrate on the struggle for 
“more and better jobs” and more widely on increasing the rate of employment”160. There 
should be more possibilities provided for part-time or partial employment, especially for the 
youngest and the oldest groups of labour market participants. 
2.3.1.5. Shadow economy 
The shadow economy is a part of everyday life almost everywhere, and can be divided 
into two parts. Estimations show that about two-thirds is undeclared work — where workers 
and businesses do not declare their wages to the government to avoid taxes or documentation. 
The other one-third comes from underreporting - most underreporting occurs in cash-based 
businesses, such as small shops, bars and taxicabs that only report part of their income in 
order to avoid some of the tax burden. 
The pension systems are affected mainly by the first type – the undeclared work 
resulting in lower contributions gathered from the working population, which in its turn 
causes both less funds available for paying out benefits to current pensioners and lower future 
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defined-contribution pension benefits to these undeclared workers when they retire.   Saving 
money draws people into this other economy, especially during an economic downturn
161
. 
Table 2.17. Size of the shadow economy in the Baltic States compared to EU-28, 2005 – 
2014 (in % of GDP) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Estonia 30.2 29.6 29.5 29.0 29.6 29.3 28.6 28.2 27.6 27.1 
Latvia 29.5 29.0 27.5 26.5 27.1 27.3 26.5 26.1 25.5 24.7 
Lithuania 31.1 30.6 29.7 29.1 29.6 29.7 29.0 28.5 28.0 27.1 
EU-28 21.8 21.1 20.3 19.6 20.1 19.9 19.6 19.3 18.8 18.6 
Source: Schneider F. et al. (2015), table III on p. 45. 
The share of shadow economy in the Baltic States is generally decreasing even faster 
than average European indicator, in 2009 all EU member states faced increase of shadow 
economy proportion. The Baltic States suffered further increase in 2010, as well (in bold).   
The undeclared work results in lower contributions gathered from the working 
population, and affects both present and future pensioners in the same manner as high 
unemployment discussed above. 
2.3.2. Major changes in pension legislation in response to crisis   
  
In Estonia, austerity packages did not cause major changes in the pension system. It is 
accepted that deficit of the PAYG scheme during the next decade or even longer, need to be 
covered from the central state budget, i.e. from other tax revenues. 
There were several policy measures implemented during the crisis years. First, there 
were ad hoc changes in the pension indexation rule, which kept pensions not declining and 
smoothed the nominal value of pensions and the total pension expenditure over the cycle 
2009-2014. As a result of the indexation, the at-risk-of-poverty rate of elderly actually 
decreased during the crisis, as compared to labour earnings pensions did not decline, and 
hence the relative position of elderly in the income distribution increased. 
Second, transfers to the funded pension scheme were temporary suspended by the state 
in 2009-2011, but these are compensated in 2014-2017, when extra transfers are made to the 
funded pension scheme. The long-term effect of these temporary suspensions is small. 
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Finally, the government approved an increase of the pension age for the period 2017-
2026, when the pension age increases from 63 to 65 years. 
In the compulsory funded pension scheme, the crisis has resulted in stricter control and 
clearer rules over the management of the private pension funds and more flexibility for 
employees and employers. 
 
During the crisis years, the politicians in Latvia put the screw on social budget 
expenditures: indexation of pensions was frozen for four years in 2009-2012. Early retirement 
benefit was set as 50% of ‘normal’ pension instead of 80%. Supplements for pre-reform years 
of service cancelled for newly awarded pensions from 2012. The government has also tried to 
cut all pensions by 10% (and even by 70% - those of working pensioners) in 2009, but the 
Constitutional Court abrogated this law, and the already withheld money was returned to 
pensioners. Minimum pension amount has not been revised since 2006 and is set as low as 
70.43 EUR. The split of social insurance contributions between the first and the second 
pillars, as already mentioned above, was reassessed in favour of the former, in order to ensure 
payments to existing pensioners. The minimum vesting period was increased from 10 to 15 
years (with further increase to 20 years in 2020) accompanied by the described above increase 
of pensionable age up to 65 years by 2025. 
The majority of the examined crisis consequences relate mainly to future pensioners that 
are now in preretirement age at the stage of accumulation their pension capital in both NDC 
and funded pillars. Those who were already on retirement - suffered less, since their benefits 
remained the same. Even freezing of indexation did not matter too much: the pre-crisis 
indexation formula was based on inflation rate and increase in insured wages, but during the 
crisis years the prices almost did not grow while the wages even went down. As concerns the 
second group – those taking retirement during 2009-2012 – the observed trend was “the later 
the worse”. The luckiest were those who retired in the first half of 2009, when high 
valorisation indices for notional pension capital were in force. In the next three consecutive 
years valorisation indices fell below one, so newly retired pensioners started to receive lower 
remunerations for the same amount of contributions. In June 2015, the Parliament passed the 
amendments to the Law on State Pensions, prescribing recalculation of all pensions granted in 
2010-2015, but the exact terms of compensation are not yet developed at the time of writing 
these words.  
ILO experts point out, that “it was expected that the introduction of automatic 
adjustment mechanisms, within NDC schemes or otherwise, would reduce the need for 
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political intervention, along with that for any associated process of social dialogue, which has, 
again too often, been seen as a factor delaying necessary decisions. The recent financial and 
economic crisis has shown very clearly the limitations as to the extent to which reliance can 
be placed on such automatic adjustment mechanisms in the short term. There is, and there 
always will be, a tension between long-term concerns and shorter-term needs, and there must 
be a compromise between the two”162. The recent revision of valorisation index computation 
method is a good example of soundness of the above citation. 
Funded pillar suffered severely during the crisis, both because of substantial devaluation 
of assets and decrease of the share of contributions directed to private pension funds from 
social insurance budget. The targeted proportion 10:10 was revised in favour of I pillar and 
replaced with 14:6. Also, since 2015 the administrative fees of fund managers have been 
linked to the profitability achieved (although still remaining caps are quite high). 
  
Actions in Lithuania aimed to reduce pensions’ expenditures were implemented as 
consequences of economic crisis. One of the most important measures was the temporary 
reduction of pensions for a period of two years (2010-2011). The temporary Law on Social 
Benefits Recalculation and Payment was adopted at the end of 2009. According to the Law 
the social insurance pensions above LTL 650 (EUR 188) were reduced by 4.5 percent on 
average from 1 January 2010. It was decided slightly to increase the flat rate component and 
proportionally to decrease the earnings-related component. Thus, all pensions were flattened, 
and progressive reduction was achieved in order to protect people getting lower pensions.  
State pensions were also progressively reduced from 5 percent to 20 percent. The social 
insurance pensions of working pensioners were reduced by 13 percent for minimal wage 
earners, 40-45 percent for average wage earners, and up to 70 percent for well-paid working 
pensioners. 
In the beginning of 2012 the Constitutional Court decided that in an extremely difficult 
economic situation it is reasonable and it is not against the Constitution temporary to reduce 
pension amounts. At the same time the Court declared that pensions should be reduced 
proportionally, so higher scale of reduction for working pensioners was illegal. The Court also 
reminded that reduction should be only temporary in the sense that non-paid amounts of 
reduced pensions should be reimbursed later.  
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So, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania required to restore the 
previous amount of pensions and to pay back full debt to pensioners during a “reasonable 
time”. In order to fulfil this requirement the government decided to restore the amounts of 
pensions since beginning of 2012. The difference between the full and the reduced pensions 
of 2010 and 2011 should be repaid to pensioners in several years. Total amount is around 
EUR 2.6 billion or about 10 percent of the annual expenditures on social insurance pensions. 
Repayments were started at the end of 2014 and will be continued several next years. Because 
of obligation to pay back debt, there are no resources for pension’s adjustment in line with 
growth of wages and prices in post crises period. Therefore, the absence of obligatory rules on 
pension’s indexation will raise the gap between living standard of working and retired 
generations in post crisis period.    
Before the crisis Lithuania had the lowest official retirement age among the Baltic 
States. However, like in Estonia and in Latvia, financial crisis and huge financial deficit of 
social insurance scheme was a strong factor to increase retirement age. From January 2012 it 
has been increasing by 2 month per year for men and by 4 months per year for women aiming 
to be 65 years for both sexes by 2026. The decision to increase retirement age was softened 
by loosening the rules on early retirement. Former requirement for long-term unemployment 
of applicants was abolishes.   
In order to improve financial viability of the social insurance pension system in 
Lithuania the contribution rate transferred into the II pillar funds reduced it from 5.5% to 
1.5%. So, the economic crisis slowed down development of the second pillar pension scheme. 
The crisis provoked new reform of contributions to private pension funds since beginning of 
2014, financing of second pillar private pensions scheme was slightly moved from Social 
insurance fund to private contribution of participants and State budget (the details have been 
characterized in the previous section). Some amendments concerning the fees allowing to be 
charged by pension funds were also adopted. The fee allowing to be charged on contribution 
was decreased from 10 percent to 2 percent and a further decrease by 0.5 percent for each 
year in the following years is legislated.  
To sum up, during the economic crisis, pensions were reduced but not so much in 
comparison with the income drop of the rest of population. Due to this, the situation of 
retirees in relative terms even improved. Meanwhile, social insurance system fell into a huge 
indebtness and there are no resources for increase of pensions in the post crisis period.   
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2.3.3. Threats to future pension system sustainability   
The crisis years served as a ‘field calibration’ to pension systems, revealing their 
bottlenecks and imperfections. The challenges faced by Latvian pension system have been 
discussed in the recent national Human Development Report
163
. As evidenced by the 
statistical data discussed in the Section 2.3.1 above, our neighbours’ problems are much the 
same. The question about most important negative factors to pension sustainability was put to 
the experts (see Annex II for more details). The results are quite in line with the already 
discussed issues.  
The first and foremost threat to future adequacy and overall sustainability of pension 
systems in the region is population ageing: all Baltic experts demonstrated great concern on 
that factor: Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian experts gave scores from “8” to “10” (mean = 
9.0). On the second place they put the globalisation of labour markets, leading, in our 
circumstances, to emigration of working-age population and further worsening of dependency 
ratio. Mean score among Baltic experts is 8.67, Estonians are a bit less concerned (“6” and 
“7”), while Latvians and Lithuanians, whose countries face much more wide-spread ‘exodus’, 
assign “9” and “10”. The third place (mean = 8.0) in this rating is taken by shadow economy 
with a significant amount of persons’ earnings not covered by social insurance. 
With the growing importance of the funded pillars, the sustainability of future pensions 
can be undermined by poor performance of private pension funds, not able to generate 
sufficient levels of profitability (the Baltic experts scored this factor with “7” as average). 
In all the above answers, the level of concern demonstrated by the Baltic experts is 
higher than that of their colleagues from other European countries. 
And, finally, all the experts agreed that the sustainability may be threatened by 
disadvantageous labour market patterns: unemployment, part-time employment, spread of 
freelance and self-employment not properly secured by social insurance schemes.  
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Chapter 3. Comparative analysis of the pension systems in the three 
Baltic States 
The last sections of the thesis are based methodologically on the chapter from the 
“Comparative Policy Studies: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges” (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), edited by Canadian scholars Isabelle Engeli and Christine Rothmayr 
Allison. Especially valuable for the author was the chapter by Sophie Biesenbender of 
Institute for Research Information and Quality Assurance (Berlin) and Adrienne Heritier of 
European University Institute (Florence)
164
. The recent research
165
 on conceptualising the 
notion of “pension adequacy” was performed by Dr Aaron George Grech of London School 
of Economics. ILO experts Krzysztof Hagemejer and John Woodall discuss interrelations 
between adequacy and financial sustainability
166
. Methodology of assessing pension adequacy 
is also in the focus of studies of Filip Chybalski
167,168,169
 of the University of Lodz and Simon 
Brimblecombe
170,171 
of the International Social Security Association. A very fruitful 
conceptual approach
172
 of what constitutes “equity” was elaborated by Austrian professor 
August Osterle, Deputy Director of Research Institute for Economics of Aging in Wien. 
Dutch scholars Franziska Tausch, Jan Potters and Arno Riedl (members of NETSPAR – 
Network for Studies on Pensions, Ageing and Retirement, uniting researchers from nine 
Dutch universities, as well as governmental organisations and industry representatives) 
wonder what means solidarity and what are the best solutions in the redistribution issues of 
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pensions
173
. An instructive paper by international group of authors
174
 operates with wider 
connotations of ‘justice’. 
3.1. Critical review of statistical data sources 
Reliable statistical data is a fundamental prerequisite of a credible research. A 
researcher with academic interest in pension policies and economics of pensions cannot do 
without pension statistics. There are numerous indicators that can be found in variety of 
sources, both national and international (e.g., Eurostat). 
Several public bodies in each country are gathering (and publishing) statistics on pensions: 
In Estonia they are: 
1) The Social Insurance Board (Sotsiaalkindlustusamet,  
http://www.sotsiaalkindlustusamet.ee) is a government authority operating within the 
government area of the Ministry of Social Affairs, gathers and publishes statistics on 
the existing pensioners, but only in Estonian language; 
2) Central Depository of Securities (Väärtpaberikeskus)  is a subsidiary of NASDAQ 
OMX stock exchange, it holds the registry of individual second-pillar pension accounts 
and runs the web-portal devoted to mandatory pension funds - 
http://www.pensionikeskus.ee; 
3) Estonian Financial Supervision Authority, EFSA (Finantsinspektsioon, 
http://www.fi.ee) is, inter alia, supervising private pension funds and annually 
publishes EFSA Yearbooks in English and in Estonian languages; 
4) Statistics Estonia (www.stat.ee) is a government agency in the area of administration of 
the Ministry of Finance; it is the main performer and coordinator of the official 
statistical work in the country and is also providing the data to Eurostat in accordance 
with EU regulations. 
A very similar set of governmental bodies can be found in Latvia: 
1) Overall pension management, including gathering and processing of statistical data, is a 
core business of the State Social Insurance Agency, SSIA (Valsts sociālās 
apdrošināšanas aģentūra, VSAA, http://www.vsaa.gov.lv) and its Department of 
Statistics. The agency is an institution within and subordinate to the Welfare Ministry; 
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2) Central Depository of Latvia (Latvijas Centrālais depozitārijs, LCD)  is a subsidiary of 
NASDAQ OMX Riga stock exchange, it holds the registry of individual second-pillar 
pension accounts and runs the web-portal devoted to mandatory pension funds - 
http://www.manapensija.lv;  
3) Financial Capital and Market Commission, FCMC (Finanšu kapitāla un tirgus 
komisija, FKTK, http://www.fktk.lv),  an autonomous public institution which, inter 
alia, is supervising the performance of private second- and third-pillar pension funds 
and the activities of the Central Depository; 
4) Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia - CSB (Centrālā statistikas pārvalde, CSP, 
http://www.csb.gov.lv) - a body subordinate to the Ministry of Economics, it is the 
main performer and coordinator of the official statistical work in the country and is 
providing the data to Eurostat. 
In Lithuania, the division of statistical duties among public bodies slightly differs: 
1) State Social Insurance Fund Board (“Sodra”) under the Ministry of Social Security and 
Labour is a key institution engaged in administration of the public social insurance 
fund, the pensions statistics is available partially at general Sodra’s web-site 
http://www.sodra.lt/lt/situacijos/statistika/pensijos (only in Lithuanian) and partially at 
a special Sodra’s statistical data web-site:  http://atvira.sodra.lt/ (also in English); 
2)  Ministry of Social Security and Labour (Socialinės apsaugos ir darbo ministerija) also 
runs the web-portal devoted to II pillar pension funds - http://www.pensijusistema.lt, its 
Lithuanian version contains some statistical information (e.g., number of participants, 
total asset value), but no data on profitability of pension funds, that should be looked at 
the web-site of 
3) The Bank of Lithuania (Lietuvos Bankas, http://www.lb.lt), playing the role of private 
pension funds supervisor; 
4) Statistics Lithuania (Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, http://www.stat.gov.lt) is a 
government institution, assigned to the Minister of Finance, coordinating the production of 
official statistics in the country. 
It should have been admitted that the abundance of Latvian national resources is 
impressive compared to other Baltic States: Estonian and, especially, Lithuanian publicly 
available sources are much less explicit. However, the overlapping functions of the above 
listed institutions sometimes lead to discrepancies in the figures that can be found in their 
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reports. In the absence of methodology descriptions
175
, a researcher may be confused with 
‘mismatching’ indicators. This could be a particular problem when the aim of research is 
comparative analysis of two or more countries. 
Since many of the figures and/or methodology descriptions are provided in national 
languages only, this section would concentrate mainly on Latvian sources, their advantages 
and vulnerabilities, to provide a sort of directory - where to look for what kind of information, 
to reveal the discrepancies between the figures provided by different institutions, and, where 
possible, explain these discrepancies; to detect the areas not sufficiently covered by existing 
statistics. The author has limited herself to old-age pension statistics, not considering 
disability pensions, survivors’ pensions and other minor types of pension benefits. 
The author is grateful to SSIA specialists: the Head of Statistical Department Evita 
Česka, senior statistician Sabīna Rauhmane and financial statistician Ruta Avotiņa for 
explanation of difficulties and useful comments. 
3.1.1. Statistics on current pensioners 
The first group of indicators refers to existing pensioners: the total number of old-age 
pensioners, average monthly pension benefits, average newly-awarded monthly pension 
benefits, distribution of pension recipients by average size of pension granted. These figures 
can be found both on SSIA web-site: http://www.vsaa.gov.lv/lv/budzets-un-
statistika/statistika and in CSB online database: http://www.csb.gov.lv/statistikas-
temas/sociala-drosiba-datubaze-30403.html. However, while SSIA offers only monthly data, 
CSB database contains only quarterly and yearly figures, and they do not perfectly correspond 
to each other. 
To start with the absolute numbers of old-age pensioners: until II quarter of 2008 the 
quarterly figures provided by CSB were equal to the respective monthly indicators given by 
SSIA. However, starting from April 2008 the situation changed: quarterly data are always 
slightly higher. The difference is relatively small, and as average is less than 1,000 (the 
maximal observed difference was 1,564). Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia does not 
calculate quarterly figures, they take them ‘ready-made’ from SSIA quarterly reports (SSIA 
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itself does not publish these reports for wide public). The difference roots in the fact that a 
person who had reached pension age in month X may come to claim for his/her pension later: 
in month Y=X+1 or X+2, or so on. Respectively, this person has to appear as a pensioner not 
only in month Y, but also in preceding months Y-1, Y-2 and so on. Monthly reports, once 
published, are not updated, but quarterly reports are open for such backward amendments 
while the quarter still lasts. 
 
Figure 3.1. Average old-age pension benefit in Latvia in 2003 - 2012 
Source: author’s construction based SSIA and CSB statistical data.  
The next indicator is average monthly old-age pension benefit. Again, since mid-2008 
monthly SSIA figures differ from quarterly CSB ones, but here the direction is opposite: CSB 
figures are lower (see Fig. 3.1). The most significant difference was observed in III quarter 
2009: 178.62 Ls according to SSIA and 151.76 Ls according to CSB – more than 15%. The 
reason for this difference is that while SSIA reports gross pensions, CSB quotes net pensions, 
after tax and other deductions. 
One more interesting indicator, also found in SSIA/CSB of Latvia monthly/quarterly 
reports, and also demonstrating discrepancies, - is the average newly-awarded monthly 
pension benefit. Till 2008 CSB used cumulative indicators – for the first quarter of the year 
the data for the three first months were included into calculation, for the second quarter – the 
average of the first 6 months was calculated, for the third quarter – the average of 9 months, 
and for the last quarter – the whole year was taken into account. Starting from 2008 CSB 
simply uses average quarterly data. SSIA specialists also noted that starting from May 2012 
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the methodology of calculating the average newly-awarded pension has been changed: 
anticipatory pensions are now included into account in full 100% as imputed, but not 50% as 
actually paid.   
It is well known that average values do not adequately represent the situation when the 
distribution does not follow Gaussian one. In addition, there are very interesting tables 
characterising distribution of pension benefits by size. Again, such tables can be found both at 
SSIA and at CSB web-sites, but layout of the tables varies significantly. The Statistical 
Bureau of Latvia offers annual figures (for the end of each year), the lowest interval is 30-40 
Ls, then follow six intervals with 10-lat increment (40-50, 50-60, 60-70, 70-80, 80-90 and 90-
100), two intervals with 50-lat increment (100-150 and 150-200), followed by 200-400 Ls 
interval and the very last one: 400+.  SSIA splitting differs and is much more detailed (except 
for the lower side): the lowest interval is “below 50 Ls”; the diapason between 50 and 1000 
Ls is split into 5-lat intervals, and the highest interval is for pensions above 1,000 Lats. After 
introduction of euro, the borders of the intervals were not changed and now look quite odd. 
However, regular statistics is not available on SSIA web-site: older tables are removed from 
public access.  
In any case, these data show the increasing amount of persons receiving very low 
pensions. CSB in this regard comments that this is partially due to growing number of 
persons, to whom pensions are granted in accordance with the international regulatory 
enactments, i.e., when each country where a person had acquired pension rights during his/her 
working life grants the pension on the insurance periods accumulated in the respective 
country. Meanwhile, the senior statistician of SSIA Statistical Department believes that the 
number of such persons receiving their pensions from two or more countries is small and 
cannot influence statistics significantly. I wondered whether there were plans to separate this 
group of pensioners in regular reports, as they may artificially pull down average indicators 
making the picture worse than it actually is, but the answer was negative. 
One more indicator in this group should be mentioned – a relative one: number of 
pensioners per one thousand of inhabitants. This ratio can be found in CSB online database 
(SSIA does not provide such info), Starting from 2000, data are recalculated in compliance 
with the results of the Population and Housing Census 2011 (the rates have become higher 
that earlier calculations, because of lower total population numbers).   
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3.1.2. Performance of II-pillar pension plans 
The second large group of indicators is dealing with II pillar pensions. Presently, there 
are very few pensioners, whose pension benefit includes II pillar component. Thus, the vast 
majority of pension funds participants are in their accumulation stage. The registry of 
individual second-pillar pension accounts is held by the Central Depository of Latvia in 
cooperation with SSIA.  This registry keeps and updates records for more than 1.2 mln 
persons who participate in mandatory private pension funds: 40% of them are voluntary 
participants, and 60% were obliged to join the pillar. Presently there are 7 asset managers 
offering 20 pension plans divided into three groups in accordance with chosen investment 
strategy: conservative, balanced and active. Central Depository of Latvia holds the topical 
web-portal http://www.manapensija.lv where the most recent data on pension plans are 
available – each pension plan unit value, yield (cumulative yields for various periods – 3 and  
6 months, 1, 2, 3, 5 and 10 years), net assets value and the number of participants. The 
information is updated daily and the archive data is available. More detailed information, 
including  distribution of participants by age, gender,  voluntary or mandatory joining, etc., is 
available on SSIA web-site http://www.vsaa.lv/lv/pakalpojumi/stradajosajiem/2-pensiju-
limenis/statistika2limenis as downloadable excel files. And again, the figures provided by 
CSD and SSIA do not coincide. According to information provided by SSIA financial 
statistician Ruta Avotiņa, Depository’s statistics is less precise; it is of operative character, 
while the figures published by SSIA are better verified and more ‘final’. The data are fully 
reconciliated only once a year – as at the year-end, on 31 December. Quarterly reports are 
produced also by FCMC – excel files can be downloaded from 
http://www.fktk.lv/lv/statistika/pensiju-fondi/ceturksna-parskati/. These reports are providing 
also quite interesting information on geographical distribution of pension funds’ investments, 
proportions of different types of securities in investment portfolios, as well as average 
weighted yield of all II pillar pension plans in total. 
The most reliable and full data can be found in annual reports. Once again, there are two 
authorities producing those reports, and once again one can find discrepancies between the 
figures. Firstly, SSIA publishes a comprehensive report devoted exclusively to mandatory 
pension funds activities (“Pārskats par valsts fondēto pensiju shēmas darbibu”), the 2013 year 
report (the last available at the time of writing these lines) is 62 pages long. These reports can 
be downloaded from http://www.vsaa.lv/lv/pakalpojumi/stradajosajiem/2-pensiju-
limenis/parskati-par-valsts-fondeto-pensiju-shemas-darbibu as *pdf or *doc files. FCMC 
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annual reports are downloadable from http://www.fktk.lv/lv/publikacijas/gada-
parskati/2014.html but only 1-2 pages (of more than 70) relate to II pillar pension funds 
activities. However, a number of indicators mentioned both in FCMC and in SSIA reports 
return different values!   
For example, the structure of investment portfolio of pension plans. For example, for the 
year-end of 2011 FCMC reported that 25% of the portfolio was made of investments in credit 
institutions. SSIA report gave to such investments only 17.7% of total portfolio. 
Secondly, FCMC recorded 43.1% of total investments invested in Latvia at the end of 
the 2014, while SSIA found in Latvia only 36.1% of total investments at the same time point. 
The difference between these two sources exists since very first reports (see table 3.1 below). 
Table 3.1. Mandatory pension funds’ investments into domestic instruments in Latvia 
(% to total investments), 2003-2014 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
FCMC 88.6 85.1 71.6 69.4 59.4 65.2 65.6 61.1 52.4 47.2 46.5 43.1 
SSIA 88.4 84.9 71.3 69.5 55.5 62.2 64.2 57.5 44.2 41.2 43.2 36.1 
Source: FCMC and SSIA reports 2003-2014 
Both SSIA and FCMC receive the same raw information (audited reports) from pension 
funds asset managers. However, they differently treat the data, especially the figures related to 
„investments in credit institutions”. While SSIA takes into account only term deposits, FCMC 
counts all money on bank accounts. Both techniques are logical, but when a researcher is 
willing to compare two or more countries s/he should be aware of the methodology used by 
statisticians in other countries in order to choose the correct Latvian figures (either from 
FCMC or from SSIA) for accurate comparison.   
Thirdly, until 2012 FCMC and SSIA reports returned different figures on average 
weighted annual yields produced by second pillar private pension schemes (in the last three 
years 2012-2014 the figures are the same in both institutions). Table 3.2 demonstrates average 
profitability indices as calculated by SSIA and FCMC.  
Table 3.2. Annual yields of mandatory funded pension plans in Latvia in 2004-2011 (%) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
SSIA 5.25 7.88 3.50 3.48 -9.83 13.31 8.28 -2.31 
FCMC 3.76 6.74 2.82 2.50 -11.5 12.33 7.59 -1.96 
Source: FCMC and SSIA reports 2004-2011 
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Both institutions provide also separate indices for active, balanced and conservative 
investment plans, and these indices in earlier years were not congruent either. For example, 
according to SSIA average weighted profitability of balanced plans in 2011 was 
negative: -1.56 %, but according to FCMC it was positive: +0.6 %.  
The reasons root in the methodologies used by the two institutions. I used simulation 
method to try to receive the same results as SSIA and FCMC from the available raw data and 
have succeeded.  The difference lies in what variable is being “weighted” for obtaining the 
sought-for weighted average. SSIA is weighting the yields demonstrated by separate pension 
plans, but FCMC is weighting unit values and then calculating the yield that such average unit 
has brought by comparing it to last year average unit value. 
Again, both methods have their reasons. However, in my opinion, the logic of FCMC is 
sounder. It’s worth mentioning that Estonian pension statistics is operating with so called 
‘pension index’, to be more exact , with a set of such indices: one common index for all 
pension plans and 4 sub-indices for conservative, balanced, active and aggressive plans 
separately. These indices are intended for assessing the overall performance of mandatory 
pension funds, namely, their average profitability, and the formula used for computation of 
the indices is practically the same as FCMC uses for obtaining average weighted profitability. 
Therefore, if one wishes to compare average performance of Latvian and Estonian pension 
plans s/he should use the figures from FCMC reports, and not SSIA indicators. 
Another problem related to II pillar pension statistics will declare itself in several years, 
when a significant number of pension plans participants reach pensionable age. The legislator 
in Latvia provides two possibilities for a pensioner how to deal with his/her second pillar 
pension capital: at retirement, the insured can purchase an annuity or have the accumulated 
funds credited to his/her NDC account, adding them to the first-pillar pension capital. In the 
first case a pensioner would further receive his pension from two sources: I pillar benefit from 
SSIA and II pillar supplement from an insurer; in the latter case the general pension formula 
shall be applied to the both parts of the capital and our retiree will receive monthly pension 
payments from SSIA only. By now, the accumulated on individual accounts second pillar 
pension capital is too small, so almost all pensioners are choosing the second option, and 
SSIA has full information on the total benefit amount.  But when a significant part of future 
pensioners would receive pension benefits both from the state and from insurance companies, 
while the rest of future pensioners – from the state only, the statistical data on average 
amounts and distributions would become confusing.   
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3.1.3. EU Statistical data 
Eurostat - the statistical office of the European Union – is consolidating national 
indicators in order to allow a comparison of best practices to be made and also measure 
progress being made towards common objectives. The social protection committee adopted, 
in May 2006, a portfolio of overarching indicators complemented by specific indicators on 
social inclusion, pensions and health, that was further revised under the Europe 2020 
strategy
176
. Indicators that form part of the open method of coordination on social inclusion 
and social protection cover: social cohesion, interaction with the objectives of Lisbon and 
sustainable development strategies and good governance (so-called overarching indicators); 
social inclusion; pension and health and long-term care (referred to as common indicators). 
Common indicators allow a comparison of best practices to be made and also measure 
progress being made towards common objectives. The list consists of 27 indicators, 9 of 
which are still under preparation at the time of writing this text
177
. 
The growing importance of relative figures rather than absolute ones is visibly 
demonstrated by the set of indicators chosen by Eurostat for inclusion into the portfolio:  
 At-risk-of-poverty rate of elderly people (60+, 65+, 75+) 
 Dispersion around the at-risk-of-poverty threshold of elderly people (60+, 65+, 
75+) 
 Gender differences in the at-risk-of-poverty rate of elderly people (65+) 
 At-risk-of-poverty rate for pensioners 
 Median relative income ratio of elderly people (60+, 65+) 
 Gender differences in the relative median income ratio of elderly people (65+, 75+) 
 Inequality of income distribution - S80/S20 income quintile share ratio, elderly 
people (65+) 
 Employment rate of older workers 
 Effective labour market exit age (average exit age from the labour force) 
 Total Current Pension expenditure (% of GDP) 
 Total expenditure on social protection (% of GDP) 
 Housing cost overburden rate by age group (65+). 
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Some more indicators are under preparation at this stage. The indices are annual ones, 
the earliest available data is for 2005 (2000 for some indicators), the data are submitted to 
Eurostat by national statistical institutions and data processing is quite time consuming. The 
undisputable advantage of Eurostat data is their comparability, as the uniformity of 
methodology used in different countries is granted. 
3.2. Adequacy: dimensionality and measurement approaches. Findings of the analysis 
3.2.1. Definitions and approaches 
 Following the wording of the World Bank expert group (see Section 2.3 above), an 
adequate pension system is the one that provides benefits to the full breadth of the population 
that are sufficient to prevent old-age poverty on a country-specific absolute level in addition 
to providing a reliable means to smooth down the lifetime consumption for the majority of the 
population
178
. 
Traditionally, there are two major approaches for defining the adequate levels of old-
age consumption: the first approach considers “adequate” as being above the poverty line, the 
second one measures adequacy in terms of a certain benchmark fraction of monthly income 
during active life (i.e., in terms of replacement rates). The majority of the surveyed pension 
experts have considered such indices to be good measures for pension adequacy in their 
countries (see Figure II.1 in Annex II for more details). Meanwhile, with the development of 
cross-national and cross-‘welfare worlds’ studies, these two approaches show many 
limitations
179
 and there is a demand for better measurement means. 
Many authors are operating with the notion of “pension wealth” i.e. the total projected 
flow of pension benefits through retirement. From an individual’s point of view, pension 
wealth is “the present discounted value of future pension rights, taking into account of 
mortality prospects.”180 In mathematical notation, this can be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑊ℎ =  ∑ 𝛽
𝑠−𝑎𝜋𝑠𝐵𝑠(ℎ)
𝑆
𝑠=ℎ+1     (9) 
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where 𝑃𝑊ℎ is pension wealth at age of retirement (h), S is the age of certain death, β is the 
pure time discount factor, a is the age of the individual, 𝜋𝑠 is the conditional survival 
probability at age (s) for an individual alive at age (a) and 𝐵𝑠(ℎ) is the pension expected at 
age (s).
 181
 
Pension wealth can be also “thought of as the lump sum needed to buy an annuity 
giving the same flow of pension payments as that promised by mandatory retirement - income 
schemes.”182 
The advantages of using pension wealth instead of replacement rates lay in taking into 
consideration the period during which pension benefits will be received. Increased longevity 
increases pension wealth, but it does not impact replacement rates. Similarly an increase in 
pension age decreases pension wealth, while it does not show up in changes in replacement 
rates. The inclusion of a discount factor helps reflects the higher attractiveness of earlier 
income streams compared to those more distant in time. Pension wealth measures the entire 
income stream, rather than focusing on just one payment in time. Thus if pension benefits fall 
in relative value over time, pension wealth would be less than if they stay constant. A 
replacement rate tells you nothing about how it will evolve. A reform changing indexation 
would not change the replacement rate at retirement, but it would clearly show up when 
looking at pension wealth. 
Pension wealth is typically calculated following on of the two methods. The empirical 
method involves using data from income and wealth surveys, and, therefore, tends to be 
retrospective in that it reflects current entitlements and past pension system rules. The 
institutional method uses simulation approach: prospective pension entitlements are calculated 
for a number of “model cases” (with different service record, with or without interruptions in 
employment, having or not having children, etc.) by applying the pension system’s 
parameters, and then grosses up results. 
Unfortunately, no such calculations (neither empirical, nor institutional) have been 
performed for the Baltic States. This concept is still awaiting its acknowledgement. Even 
leading country experts in the field of pensions seem have insufficient knowledge about 
pension wealth approach: only 8 out of 15 experts gave their scoring (see Annex II for more 
details), the rest seven chose the response entries “don’t know” or “not applicable” when they 
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were asked if pension wealth is a good measure for adequacy in their home countries. Among 
the Baltic States experts only one (!) out of seven gave a valid answer. The majority of the 
experts have chosen such traditional indices as average and individual replacement rates and 
pension benefit relation to subsistence minimum as the beast measures of pension adequacy. 
Replacement rate targets have long been a key feature of pension scheme design, and it 
would be desirable to quantify the adequacy of provision against one or more benchmarks 
expressed in such terms. Accordingly, both the social security Conventions of the 
International Labour Organization and the European Code of Social Security demand that 
national pension systems (possibly comprising several schemes) should deliver replacement 
rates of at least 40% of pre-retirement earnings when an individual has paid contributions for 
30 years - the ILO Convention No. 102, the Social Security (Minimum standards) Convention 
of 1952, sets this minimum, and countries that have ratified the Convention must undertake, 
in principle, a binding commitment to ensure that the required minimum level is enshrined in 
national law. Convention No. 128, the Invalidity, Old Age and Survivors’ Benefits 
Convention of 1967 sets a somewhat higher standard, requiring that an individual who 
contributes for 30 years should receive a pension of at least 45 per cent of pre-retirement 
earnings. Countries which have not ratified these conventions are not legally bound in the 
same way, but the fact that the Conventions have been adopted in plenary sitting by the ILO’s 
180-plus member countries means that they can be considered to represent a strong global 
consensus on best practice. Pension systems should be designed in such a way that, even if 
benefits are “capped” for those with relatively high earnings, this standard should be met for 
all those who have earnings lower than the prevailing average. Pension systems in some 
European countries (including Estonia and Lithuania) are already inadequate to provide such 
replacement rates at present, and are likely to fall behind that target by 2060 in a number of 
other countries (also in Latvia), even for those contributing for longer than 30 years
183
.  
Whether or not the target replacement rate of 40 per cent represents an appropriate 
benchmark in relative terms, it is important also to consider how effective pension benefits at 
this level can be in obviating poverty in old age. It is not easy to make such an assessment on 
a global basis, owing to, among other things, the wide range of national poverty lines.  
The recent results, revealed that in 2010 17% of employees in the European countries 
(more than 21% of women and over 13% of men) had earnings below a “low-earnings” 
threshold, defined as two-thirds of median earnings. The highest proportions of low-wage 
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earners were in Latvia (27.8%), Lithuania (27.2%), Romania (25.6%), Poland (24.2%) and 
Estonia (23.8%), while the lowest were in Sweden (2.5%), Finland (5.9%), France (6.1%), 
Belgium (6.4%) and Denmark (7.7%).
184
 
An interesting approach of measuring the adequacy of pensions has been offered by 
Filip Chybalski of Technical University of Lodz
185
. He starts with the definition of three 
dimensions of adequacy: income, poverty, and the differentiation of pensioners’ material 
situation by gender. Next, the sub-indicators measuring the individual dimensions of 
adequacy are proposed, along with an aggregation procedure based on the tools of 
multidimensional statistical analysis. First, the sub-indicators are aggregated into synthetic 
indicators for individual dimensions, and finally the synthetic indicators for individual 
dimensions are aggregated into a single synthetic indicator of the adequacy of the pension 
system. He argues that “the approach to adequacy and its measurement presented in the 
above-quoted publications is generally one-dimensional, as it is based only on income or 
wealth in hand. In fact, it seems that in the context of the goals of the pension system with 
reference to its adequacy, a multidimensional approach is more appropriate, especially if the 
measurement is made for several countries and adequacy is evaluated comparatively. The 
replacement rate alone, particularly if it is based exclusively on pension benefits, may lead to 
false conclusions. This is because today’s pensioners may obtain their income from very 
different sources, including work and capital investments, and this affects their total income 
and consequently their standard of living.” Chybalsky concludes that in order to obtain 
comprehensive information on adequacy, one must use at least a few indicators, meaning that 
the issue must be approached in a multidimensional manner. He further suggests introducing a 
synthetic indicator, derived from the following components: 
 pensioner income indicators – being median relative income ratio of elderly people, 
aggregate replacement  ratio, relative inequality of income distribution ratio and net 
pension wealth by gender;  
 pensioner poverty indicators – being at-risk-of-poverty rate of older people and the 
change in at-risk-of-poverty rate of  older people after retirement; and 
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 indicators of pensioners’ gender differences – these are gender differences in the at-
risk-of-poverty rate of older people, gender differences in the aggregate 
replacement ratio, change in at-risk-of-poverty rate of older people after retirement 
by gender, median relative income ratio of elderly people by gender and relative 
difference in net pension wealth by gender. 
These sub-indicators had been either taken from Eurostat and OECD data, or computed 
by Chybalsky himself. Every sub-indicator was assigned its relative weight and included into 
the formula elaborated by the researcher. He then used the formula to compute the aggregate 
APS (i.e. adequacy of pension system) indicator for EU-25 (i.e. without Bulgaria and 
Romania) and Norway for three years: 2005, 2007 and 2009; and ranked these 26 countries in 
accordance with the value of APS. The lower the APS is – the less adequate pensions does the 
system in a respective country produce. The APS varied from 0.22 (Latvia in 2009) to 0.85 
(Luxembourg in 2007). 
The Baltic States have returned the lowest ranks in the Europe, and are accompanied in 
the group of European underperformance by Cyprus, while the group of top-ranked countries 
includes Luxembourg, Hungary, France and the Netherlands. 
It seems that the approach of F.Chybalsky overvalues the relevance of gender 
disparities, since gender differences in old-age income are mainly resulting from gender 
differences in income during working ages, and the pension systems per se are not 
contributing to the said disparity. What they can, theoretically, contribute to – is the levelling 
of such lifelong inequalities for elderly people
186
, but none of the schemes functioning in 
Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania are intended to facilitate such levelling. For NDC, there are quite 
interesting opportunities of achieving men/women pension income levelling by making joint 
notional accounts for spouses
187
 (pension points could be also shared between 
partners/spouses even easier), but these opportunities exist only in theory at the time being, no 
country has embedded such mechanisms into its pension system. 
In 2013, Simon Brimblecombe of the International Social Security Association 
suggested, that even broader consideration is required: a multivariable analysis should include 
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also the assessment of the quality of service, labour market aims, security of benefits and 
interaction with other stakeholders
188
. 
In September 2015, the International Social Security Association (ISSA) have published 
a 35-pages report
189
 prepared by Brimblecombe, where they introduce the elaborated 
adequacy model consisting of seven parameters: benefit levels, exiting labour market at the 
correct age, administrative adequacy, interaction with other retirement provision, 
intergenerational equity and sustainability of benefit adequacy, security of adequacy and 
coverage. Each of parameters uses from three to seven indicators. 
One more dimension of adequacy presumes that an adequate pension benefit is such 
benefit that is perceived as adequate by its recipient. Johannes Binswanger and Daniel Schunk 
wondered what “adequate” meant for the general public and addressed this question to 
respondents in the U.S. and the Netherlands
190
, using a specifically designed internet survey. 
They found out that a large majority of individuals aimed to achieve a spending profile where, 
under normal circumstances, old-age spending exceeds 80% of working-life spending. They 
further used the respondent’s answers to calibrate minimum (desired) income replacement 
rates for each income quintile. For the U.S. sample, they ranged between 95% for the lowest 
income quintile and 45% for the highest. For the Netherlands, those rates fell between 75 and 
60%. 
3.2.2. Verification of adequacy criterion in pension systems of the Baltic States 
The author has limited her study by assessing pension adequacy in its narrow sense, i.e. 
the ability of pension systems of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to generate adequate old-age 
pension benefits: whether the pension schemes manage to provide income for the existing 
pensioners that is sufficient to prevent absolute and relative poverty of elderly population. For 
this purpose, pension legislation of the three countries is considered in respect of guaranteeing 
minimum pension levels. The analysis of statistical data from different sources (national 
statistical bodies of the Baltic States as well as Eurostat data) is used for the comparison of the 
actual situation and the tendencies in respect of relative indicators of adequacy. Specially 
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tailored public opinion poll data (for Latvia only) have been analysed with SPSS to identify 
patterns of subjective adequacy and expected replacement rate. 
3.2.2.1. Preventing absolute poverty - minimal old-age pension benefits 
The role of pension systems can be divided into income allocation over the life course 
and poverty protection at old age. While the general design of the pension system is focused 
on the former, the minimum pension or other forms of guarantees serve the latter. 
The elderly people are a particular group of poverty risk, it particularly refers to those 
who have been poor on a lifetime basis and therefore are unable to save enough, both through 
voluntary savings and through mandatory pension schemes. Statutory minimum pensions are 
designed to fight absolute poverty in this group of population.  
As mentioned in Section 3.2 above, the eligibility for an old-age social insurance 
pension is restricted by the minimum 15-year mandatory period of work experience. Persons 
of pensionable age who do not qualify for a social insurance old-age pension because of the 
lack of the required years of service can apply for social assistance benefits. In Estonia and 
Lithuania social assistance pensions are set at the level of minimum social insurance pensions: 
158.37 EUR in Estonia and 94.50 EUR in Lithuania. In Latvia, having the lowest minimum 
pension amount – 70.43 EUR, social security benefit (for those not having enough service 
record) is even lower – 64.03, and, moreover, the recipient of such a benefit should have 
resided in the country for at least 5 years before applying for the pension, and the applicant’s 
age must exceed the normal pensionable age by 5 years.   
In Estonia, the minimal amount of the state pension is indexed annually, taking into 
account the inflation rate and the increase in the total wage bill. In Lithuania, the minimum 
amount is set as 0.9 of the so-called basic pension (a component of the general pension 
formula), which, in its turn, lacks any clearly defined indexation procedure and is revised on a 
discretionary basis. In Latvia, the minimum is affixed to the amount of the social security 
state benefit that also lacks any prescribed indexation and has not been changed since 2006. 
All three Baltic States are in a very short list (accompanied by Hungary and Malta) of 
European ‘black sheep” – the countries that have not ratified ILO Social Security (Minimum 
Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102). The Convention sets the lower limit of the old-age 
pension benefit as 40% of the wage of a skilled manual male employee (or 50% of the 
average insured wage). Moreover, our northern neighbours – Finland, Sweden and Norway 
(as well as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Czech, Slovakia and Cyprus) 
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have ratified the more recent and more generous ILO Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' 
Benefits Convention, 1967 (No. 128) prescribing even more generous lower limits: 45% of 
the wage of a skilled manual male employee (or 56.25% of the average insured wage). The 
corresponding figures in the Baltic countries are significantly lower: in 2014, the minimal 
pension made only 9.2 % of the average gross wage (12.6% of the average net wage) in 
Latvia, the respective figures in the other two countries are also very low: minimal pension in 
Lithuania made 14.0% of average gross wage or 17.9% of average net wage, and in Estonia 
14.9% of average gross wage or 17.8% of average net wage
191
 . 
 
Figure 3.2. Minimum and average monthly old age pension benefits in Latvia in 2004-
2014 compared to minimum subsistence level (EUR) 
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, the author’s calculations  
Let us also compare the amount of minimum pension with the such indicator of poverty, 
as ‘subsistence minimum’ that was earlier calculated by the Central Statistical Bureau of 
Latvia (starting from 2014, the minimal subsistence level is not calculated any more) – see 
Fig. 3.2. Since 1990s, the average Latvian pension benefit was below this poverty line and it 
grew up to the subsistence minimum only in 2010. In December 2013, the minimum pension 
benefit made only 27.9% of the subsistence minimum, and even average old-age pension was 
just five euro higher than the poverty line. 
Poverty among the elderly is a problem of vital importance in Latvia, which can be 
evidenced by an extremely high rate of material deprivation in old age (see Table 3.3).  
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Severely materially deprived persons, according to Eurostat methodology, are those who have 
living conditions severely constrained by a lack of resources and experience at least 4 out of 9 
of the following deprivations: cannot afford to i) pay rent or utility bills, ii) keep the home 
adequately warm, iii) face unexpected expenses, iv) eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent 
every second day, v) take a one-week holiday away from home, vi) own a car, vii) own a 
washing machine, viii) own a colour TV, or ix) own a telephone. 
Table 3.3. Severe material deprivation rate among persons aged 65 years and over in the 
Baltic States and Poland compared to EU-27, 2005-2014 (% of total population) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
EU-27 10.0 9.1 8.6 7.5 6.7 6.7 7.2 7.5 6.9  
Estonia 14.9 7.4 7.9 5.8 5.6 6.6 5.8 7.1 6.3 6.4 
Latvia 49.5 38.1 35.8 28.7 25.3 27.5 28.9 26.4 26.6 22.0 
Lithuania 40.5 31.5 20.8 16.5 18.8 24.0 25.1 24.1 18.4 19.3 
Poland 36.7 29.2 23.7 20.8 17.3 16.5 15.4 14.8 11.5 9.7 
Source: Eurostat / EU-SILC [ilc_mddd11] 
All Eastern Europe had quite high rates when joined the EU because of lower living 
standards, however, already since 2006 Estonia has been demonstrating figures lower than EU 
average, while Lithuania and, especially, Latvia, are lagging greatly behind. Poland is 
included into the above table as an example of another post-communist country that had 
introduced the notional defined contribution pension system quite similar to the Latvian one; 
compared to other types (e.g., the so-called ‘point system’ used by Estonia and Lithuania) of 
pension systems, this one,, almost entirely reduces the income redistribution within the 
pension system (see more thorough discussion in Section 3.3 below). However, in contrast to 
Latvia, Poland is a member state to the ILO Convention No. 102, and  the minimum pension 
guarantee set at a decent level is successfully functioning as the principal mechanism of 
income protection of old-age pensioners in the future.  
 As noted by Hagemejer and Woodall, “in the “old-fashioned” defined-benefit social 
security pension schemes, redistributive benefit formulas (usually combined with flat rate 
components or their equivalent) guaranteed higher replacement rates for low wage earners. 
Today, many countries have removed those redistributive formulae, introducing instead either 
defined-contribution (DC) or “notional” defined-contribution (NDC) components, or 
converting defined-benefit (DB) schemes to a purely earnings-related structure. In this 
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situation, the securing to low-wage earners of benefits that would keep them out of poverty 
can be achieved only by strengthening minimum benefit provisions (a matter in which most 
countries have to date fallen short), in general through some form of non-contributory 
minimum income guarantee.”192 This is exactly the Latvian case. While the pension system 
until recently was relatively effective in mitigating the poverty risk of older people compared 
to the general population, the poverty risk in the 65+ age group has been rapidly worsening 
since 2012, as their income increased  much slower the general population. The rate of 65+ at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion reached 39% in 2014, the second highest in the EU. 
3.2.2.2. Average pension levels 
The next figure allows for the comparison of the average old-age pensions in the three 
countries considered. The columns show the amount of a benefit expressed in euro, while the 
solid lines indicate the respective values in PPS – purchasing power standard units193. 
 
Figure 3.3. Average monthly old age benefits in the Baltic States in EUR and PPS 
(purchasing power standards), 2004-2014 
Source: Estonian Statistical Office, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Statistics Lithuania, State Social 
Insurance Fund Board of the Republic of Lithuania, Eurostat, the author’s calculations     
Average pensions were increasing, expressed either in EUR or in PPS. The real value of 
an average old-age pension benefit has increased since 2004 by 78% in Estonia, 81% in 
Latvia and 87% in Lithuania. The growth in PPS was significantly slower than if measured in 
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EUR: nominal growth was faster that the real one by 46% in Latvia, by 35% in Estonia and 
28% in Lithuania – high inflation made the achievements of the Baltic States less impressive. 
Estonia had the highest pension levels (both in EUR and in PPS) in any given year of 
the reviewed period. The relative positions of Latvia and Lithuania were changing with time. 
In 2014, Latvia had nominally higher pension benefit than Lithuania; however, in terms of 
PPS Lithuanian pensioners got slightly more.  
It is noteworthy, however, that the distribution of pension amount among the recipients 
is much more skewed in Latvia due to the difference in the pension formula that produces less 
redistributive effect than Lithuanian and Estonian pension formulae do (discussed more 
thoroughly in the next Section 3.3).  
3.2.2.3. Replacement rates 
A very important indicator of a pension system is the replacement rate it produces. For 
an individual, a replacement rate shows how large (or, rather, how small) his/her pension is 
compared to his/her previous wage (the comparison can be made both to the wage in his/her 
preretirement years or to the average wage s/he earned during all years of service). Such 
replacement rates can also be calculated for specific cohorts, showing whether the pension 
system is more favourable to some generations at the account of the others. The replacement 
rate is measured by percentage or can be expressed as a ratio (i.e. 0.4 = 40%). 
 
Figure 3.4. Net aggregate replacement rates in the Baltic States, 2004-2014 (in %) 
Source: Estonian Statistical Office, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Statistics Lithuania, State Social 
Insurance Fund Board of the Republic of Lithuania, the author’s calculations   
The publicly available data of the national statistical bureaus allow for the comparison 
only the aggregate replacement rates: average pensions compared to average salaries. Figure 
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3.4 presents the net replacement rates (i.e. net pensions that are free of taxes are compared to 
net wages that are free of taxes as well, since salaries and pensions are taxed differently in all 
three Baltic countries and the comparison of gross replacement rates would be less accurate). 
Generally, the three lines follow similar trajectories – sloping down in the pre-crisis years 
when salaries grew up much faster than pensions, then up in 2008-2010 when the decrease in 
salaries occurred everywhere in the Baltics, and then decreasing again in the post-crisis years 
(except for Lithuania). The rates were quite high in 2010, but that was not due to the increase 
in pensions, but rather the decrease in wages. Likewise, the highest net replacement rate 
among the Baltic States that was last year observed in Latvia roots not in higher pensions (as 
was shown in the previous section of this paper), but in relatively lower salaries.  
The Baltic States are below the average levels of the new EU member states (the post-
communist Eastern Europe, accompanied by Malta and Cyprus). As a rule, countries with 
lower salaries have higher replacement rates (because the salaries per se do not exceed the 
subsistence minimum by many times, and pension benefits are strongly influenced by a flat-
rate component, where applicable). Thus, the average NMS12-rates are higher that the EU-27 
averages. Nevertheless, this rule fails in relation to the Baltic States.    
Eurostat offers another indicator of that kind – a ratio of the income from pensions of 
persons aged between 65 and 74 years and the income from work of persons aged between 50 
and 59 years (i.e. those in preretirement years) – see Table 3.4. The most up-to-date data 
currently available relate to the year 2013. 
Table 3.4. Aggregate replacement ratio in the Baltic States compared to EU-27 and 
NMS-12, 2006-2013 (pensions in 65-74 to wages in 50-59) 
 2006 2007 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
EU27 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.56 
NMS12 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.58 
Estonia 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.50 0.50 
Latvia 0.49 0.38 0.30 0.35 0.46 0.53 0.48 0.47 
Lithuania 0.44 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.60 0.52 0.45 0.48 
 
Source: Eurostat, data code [ilc_pnp3], retrieved 02/05/2015 
The trends in this ratio in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are similar to those discussed 
above and these trends do not correspond to the situation in other EU countries, both ‘old’ and 
‘new’ Europe. The Baltic States are below the average levels of the new member states.  
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Everywhere in Europe, elderly people are poorer than average: the relative median 
income ratio of people aged 65 years and over to people aged less than 65 years is lower than 
one. The most recent available indicators on Eurostat can be found for 2013, when the 
average EU-28 ratio was 0.93, the average NMS-12 ratio was 0.94, while the Baltic States 
demonstrated significantly worse figures: Lithuania had the ratio equal to 0.81, Latvia – 0.77 
and Estonia – 0.69194. 
Eurostat – the statistical office of the European Union – is consolidating the national 
indicators in order to allow for the comparison of best practices to be made, as well as to 
measure progress being made towards the common objectives. In May 2006, the social 
protection committee adopted a portfolio of overarching indicators complemented by specific 
indicators on social inclusion, pensions and health. The “pensions portfolio” contains, except 
for the already mentioned aggregate replacement ratio and relative rate of median income, 
such indices as at-risk-of-poverty rate of elderly people (60+, 65+, 75+) and gender 
differences in the at-risk-of-poverty rate of elderly people (65+) as well as a bunch of other 
relative rates. They are meant for the assessment of adequacy of not only pension benefits, but 
the adequacy of the whole pension systems, and even more generally – the adequacy of social 
insurance policies. 
3.2.2.4. Subjective adequacy - pension expectations of Latvian residents 
Various surveys demonstrate that Latvians are not satisfied with the existing pension system, 
as well as that they hardly understand the formula used for pension benefit calculation. In the 
June 2013 survey „Inequality, integration and sustainable development of territories”, 
conducted by LU SZF within the frameworks of the state program „National Identity” for 
Human Development Report 2012/2013 „Sustainable Nation”, there were two questions 
included through the request of the writer of these words: 1) about the desired amount of 
pension satisfactory for meeting basic everyday needs („How big should your pension be to 
suffice for living (food, clothes, housing and health care)?”); and 2) about the presumptive 
wage level sufficient to ensure the desired pension („How big should your (net) salary be in 
order for you to get a pension sufficient for living?”). The respondents were offered to choose 
from the range of interval variables. The survey data has been analysed with SPSS software 
(the averages, variation indices, groups, etc.).   
At the mean, the respondents considered a pension in the LVL 400-500 range to be 
„adequate”. For 44% of the respondents, a smaller pension would suffice, but 37% would 
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require a benefit above LVL 500. There were pronounced differences in the opinions of 
different groups: women are more modest in their requirements than men. Residents of 
Latgale and Zemgale are ready to live with a pension whose amount is less than the country 
average, whereas the demands of Rigans are substantially above the average. The 
requirements of persons  with higher education (including those with incomplete higher 
education) regarding pension amount exceed LVL 500, but the demands of people with  high 
school or basic education fall below this rate. There are no differences between the answers of 
Latvians, Russians, and other ethnical groups. 
The survey has also proved that the population does not understand the methodology 
used for calculating pensions and are unaware of how much they would have to earn in order 
for the desired pension amount to become reality. This is obvious from a simple calculation, 
which is also called the expected replacement rate: take the number from each respondent’s 
answer to the first question and divide it with the number given as the same respondent’s 
answer to the second question. Then the averages are calculated. According to this 
methodology, most of the respondents suppose that their pension would be equal to 60-65% 
of their net salary. Such a view is unsound and misleading, because the Latvian pension 
formula generates a much lower replacement rate
195
. However, this view is widespread among 
population irrespective of region, gender, or educational level (moreover, the actual income of 
the respondents constitutes, on average, less than one third of the salary, which, in their 
opinion, could ensure an adequate pension). This bias is characteristic not only for Latvian 
people: a recent research in the Netherlands studied the relationship between the individual 
expectations of retirement replacement rates in the first and second pillars at the planned 
retirement age and the estimated replacement rate (computed by the researchers according to 
pension formula) at the same age
196
. The expected replacement rate was in general higher than 
the computed one. Larger discrepancies were found for younger cohorts and for individuals 
with less education and working experience. According to the authors, the mismatch is mostly 
related to poor institutional knowledge. Another study show that Italians also expect higher 
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replacement rates compared with the rates they will eventually receive.
197
 Our Estonian 
neighbours also tend to overestimate their future pension income, the National Audit Office of 
Estonia in February 2014 discovered that „the awareness and behaviour of Estonian people 
have not changed much – they still expect to receive a sizable pension in the future. However, 
according to a forecast of the Ministry of Finance, the share that a pension comprises of the 
last wage will generally remain at the same level as today”, that is „somewhat higher than 
average for men (ca 40%) and smaller for women (ca 35%)”198. 
Poor understanding of pension calculation and over-optimistic pension expectations 
may lead to high risk to the individuals to stay without adequate income in old days, as well 
as to increasing demand for other forms of social assistance from the state and local 
governments. 
3.2.3. Adequacy: key findings   
As noted before, there is no consensus among experts and scholars on what constitutes 
adequacy. According to one widely respected definition, pensions are adequate when they are 
sufficient to prevent poverty among the elderly and to provide the majority of people with a 
reliable mechanism for smoothing down the income over their lifetime. 
Although most observers would probably agree that the last decade has brought 
significant progress towards providing better living standards to elderly population, the 
average old-age pension benefits being produced by the existent pension schemes in the Baltic 
States are still too far from being generous. At the end of 2014, the net average pension in 
Latvia exceeded the subsistence minimum (as it was last time defined one year earlier) by 
3.7% only, and the median pension
199
 was about 2% lower than the subsistence minimum. In 
Lithuania, the average old-age pension (expressed in PPS) in 2014 was just 2.5% higher than 
the Latvian one, thus the majority of Lithuanian pensioners live a hand-to-mouth existence as 
well. The average Estonian pension benefit (in PPS-units) in 2014 was 17.7% higher than the 
average Latvian pension, which is, of course, better but also means a very modest income. 
The pension systems in all three countries considered are far from providing adequate old-age 
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income to elderly population, however, as far as we can see, the Estonian system copes with 
this task better than two other neighbouring countries.  
The minimum pension guarantees should be, in our opinion, revised in all three 
countries, an in Latvia in particular, in order to bring the figures in accord with the socio-
economic realities. Clear indexation rules should be formalised in legislation, rather than left 
at the discretion of politicians. 
Until the present, the performance of II pillar private pension funds in all three Baltic 
countries leaves much to be desired. Their ability to produce the promised replacement rates 
for future pensioners causes serious concerns. According to the Estonian National Audit 
Office report presented in February 2014, “although the main goal of second pillar funds is to 
increase the purchasing power of people’s retirement savings, the analyses carried out by the 
Ministry of Finance indicate that the actual returns on the funds amount to zero on average. 
The limited competition between funds has led to a situation where returns are poor and 
investments are made passively, but the management fees are large. The second pillar has also 
failed to meet the other goals set at the time the mandatory funded pension system was 
created. Second pillar funds have had little impact on the development of the Estonian 
economy and financial markets. The mandatory funded pension has not reduced the impact of 
political factors on the pension system or significantly decreased the risks that threaten the 
pension system.”200 These words are fully justified for Latvian and Lithuanian pension funds, 
as well. The problem is exacerbated by poor financial literacy of population, choosing 
inappropriate investment strategies
201
. The default option for young labour market entrants in 
Latvia is a random conservative fund, and the person remains there until s/he makes an 
intentional choice of another pension plan. Instead, life-cycle strategy should be used – with 
active investment strategies in earlier working years shifting to more balanced and 
conservative pension plans closer to retirement.   
                                                          
200
 Mattson, T. (2014). Estonia needs long-term plan to guarantee sustainability of pension system. National 
Audit Office of Estonia, 26/02/2014 http://www.riigikontroll.ee/tabid/168/amid/557/ItemId/704/language/en-
US/Default.aspx 
201
 Stavausis, D. (2013). Izglītības veicināšana finanšu jautājumos kā spējināšanas instruments Latvijā: valsts 
fondēto pensiju gadījums. In Rajevska, F. (Ed.) Sociālā cilvēkdrošība: spēju attīstība, sadarbība, iekļaušana (pp. 
141 – 160). Rīga, LU Akadēmiskais apgāds. 
 129 
3.3. Equity: dimensionality and measurement approaches. Findings of the analysis 
3.3.1. Definitions and approaches 
Ever since G. Esping-Andersen had published his famous “The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism”202, pension systems are considered as a clear indicator of the welfare state 
characteristics and as a powerful tool for comparative analysis of social policies in different 
countries. The ‘degrees of justice’ (fairness, equity) and even the understanding of the 
meaning of these terms vary across countries, as well. 
As was demonstrated in Section 2.3 above, this principle has high priority, both in the 
documents of EU and OECD, and in the conceptual framework for pension system analysis 
elaborated by the WB experts. The latter are distinguishing equity as a separate criterion and 
as one of the major goals of any successful pension system. They offer the following 
definition: “an equitable system is one that provides the income redistribution from the 
lifetime rich to the lifetime poor consistent with the societal preferences in a way that does not 
tax the rest of society external to the system; and one that provides the same benefit for the 
same contribution”203. It is worth to mention, that initially the set of criteria consisted only of 
four factors: adequacy, affordability, sustainability (in its pure financial sense) and robustness. 
Equity and predictability were added to this set only in 2008. The reassessment of what 
constitutes a good target for  pension system reform was influenced, inter alia, by the refocus 
on basic income protection for the  elderly, reforms of earnings-related schemes  towards a 
tighter  contribution-benefit link  limited the capability to redistribute income towards low 
income groups within the schemes. 
However, this definition lacks a very important dimension of equity: the attention is 
paid only to the distribution of benefits, omitting the issue of the fair distribution of burdens 
and risks. 
As shown by August Osterle, “equity is about three types of choices. First, they are 
characterised by the goods to be shared. These goods might include resources and burdens, 
goods in cash as well as in kind, rights and responsibilities, etc. The second choice concerns 
the units among whom these goods, resources or burdens, are shared. These might be 
individuals, families or households as well as institutions or geographical areas. Finally, 
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choices have to be made in terms of principles or criteria according to which the goods are 
shared. Again, a broad range of criteria might be applied”204.  
When applying these three types of choices to pension policy, they turn into the 
following dimensions of analysis: 
1) what is shared, or “the goods”: this is, one the one hand, money flows within pension 
system: both incoming and outgoing, and, one the other hand, risks and burdens, borne 
by various participants of the system;  
2) among whom is shared, or “the recipients”: for old-age pensions, this dimension 
includes not only aged persons receiving pension benefits, their family members, but 
also the state, private pension funds and insurance companies, local self-government 
authorities, as well as the working population paying taxes; 
3) how is shared, or “the principles”: explicitly or implicitly expressed in legislation, can 
be need-related (e.g., social assistance benefits), egalitarian (e.g. basic pensions), 
status-related (e.g., special pensions for civil servants, merit pensions, widow/er 
pension, etc.), economics-related (e.g., means-tested pensions), time-related (e.g., 
pension annuities in funded schemes). Normally, modern pension systems involve a 
combination of all of the above sub-groups.    
An important complicating factor with pensions is that these principles affect not only one’s 
own generation but also other generations. The sustainability of any pension system based on 
intergenerational solidarity (that is, all variations of PAYG schemes) calls for both an 
extension of justice principles across generations and solidarity between different social 
classes within a generation. How should the benefits be distributed between different income 
classes and across generations? Perhaps even more important is the question of how the 
burden in times of distress should be distributed between generations and social classes. A 
similar quandary applies to funded schemes, where the benefits and costs have to be 
distributed between people with different income potential and different risks
205
. 
In his paper “Evaluating Equity in Social Policy: A Framework for Comparative 
Analysis”, A.Osterle refers to the previous research on the subject and identifies four sets of 
equity objectives as follows: 
• guaranteeing minimum standards; 
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• supporting living standards; 
• reducing inequality; and 
• promoting social integration206. 
Three of these objectives address quantitative dimensions but they are not just referring 
to the monetary dimension of income and wealth. Poverty and/or disadvantages may also 
occur in ‘resources’ such as the availability of health services or access to education (as well 
as features such as ‘health status’ or ‘education’). The objective of guaranteeing minimum 
standards aims at reduction and/or prevention of absolute poverty and/or absolute 
disadvantages. 
The second objective, supporting living standards, is aimed at prevention of large drops 
in individual living standards. Here, living standards of individuals measured by income or 
other characteristics before and after the occurrence of a social risk (e.g., retirement) are 
compared. 
The third objective, reducing inequality, relates the individual situation to an average 
situation in society. It aims at reducing and/or preventing relative poverty or relative 
disadvantages. The focus of reducing inequalities can vary. Policies might be aimed at 
redistribution between the rich and poor (vertical equity); they might focus on a reduction of 
inequalities between families with children and families with no children or between the 
employed and the unemployed (horizontal equity), etc. 
The fourth objective, promoting social integration, includes a qualitative perspective. It 
relates to the resource approach to the social and cultural context according to which specific 
resources may have different meanings. Promoting social integration aims to reduce and 
prevent social exclusion. Defining and measuring social integration tends to be more difficult 
than in the case of quantitative objectives considered above. 
3.3.2. Verification of equity criterion in pension systems of the Baltic States 
As quoted above, four sets of equity objectives can be identified: 1) guaranteeing 
minimum standards; 2) supporting living standards; 3) reducing inequality; 4) promoting 
social integration. How these yardsticks can be applied to the subject of our study - pension 
systems of the Baltic states? The questions of minimum standard guarantees and supporting 
individual living standards have been already discussed in the previous section. Promoting of 
social integration lies outside the scope of this paper. Therefore, the section will be focusing 
at reducing inequalities.   
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As has been pointed out by B.Ebbinghaus and J.Neugschwender, the employment 
patterns and income differences during working life may be either mitigated or reproduced by 
the public and private pension contribution-benefit rules.
207
 
While the role of funded pillars is increasing with the ageing of population they do not 
contribute to ensuring compliance with the equitability goal: benefits in funded schemes are 
very much depending on rates of return produced by the pension plan(s) chosen by a 
participant and on volatile security markets, thus the rule “same benefits for same 
contributions” conflicts the very nature of funded pillars. No redistribution from lifetime rich 
to lifetime poor is provided in these pillars, as well. Even more, promotion of third pillar 
voluntary pension plans (by granting tax reliefs on the contributions made to private funds) 
can be successful only among those persons who have enough “extra” money that can be 
directed to long-term savings. Those who live from paycheck to paycheck can hardly afford to 
withdraw any additional amounts from their household budgets and cannot, therefore, expect 
any significant third-pillar supplement to their mandatory 1st and 2nd pillar old-age pension 
benefits. This effect is enhanced by level of financial literacy: as shown in a recent 
international research
208
, persons with higher levels of education – who, as a rule, have higher 
incomes and therefore make larger contributions to pension funds, - are better informed in 
financial matters and are less vulnerable to risks of choosing an inappropriate investment 
strategy. Less educated persons, whose incomes are lower, are more exposed to the risk of 
making a wrong investment choice.  In this context, funded pillars are rendering a disservice 
to lifetime poor, causing further distortion in income distribution in old age. The larger share 
of total pension tax goes to the second pillar – the higher degree of inequity the system 
generates.  
Different elements of the first pillar design also contribute to quite different outcomes in 
relative inequality levels. Lack of any basic component in Latvian formula leads to 
perpetuation of income inequalities after retirement.  
It is recognized (see, for example, a study of Polish researchers
209
) that NDC systems 
almost lack redistribution instruments, and therefore are not adequate for countries with 
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relatively large gap between the rich and the poor (and Latvia has the second highest GINI 
index in Europe after Bulgaria) – material stratification is not smoothed in old age, and 
combined with low replacement rates it leads to massive poverty: in December 2014, more 
than 50% of Latvian pensioners got a net pension benefit lower than the official subsistence 
minimum defined one year before, meanwhile 0.8% got more than 1000 euro per month
210
. 
The actual statistical data demonstrate much higher level of inequality among Latvian 
pensioners compared to their Estonian and Lithuanian counterparts. And the inequality is 
deepening. The lines on the Figure 3.5 show how changed the distribution of old-age pension 
benefits by size from July 2009 (earlier figures are incomparable due to methodological 
reasons) till March 2014. The vertical dashed lines mark the amounts of average pension in 
corresponding periods (253.48 EUR in July 2009 and 278.24 EUR in March 2014). In 2009 
64% of all Latvian pensioners received a monthly benefit below the country average, in 2014 
there were 67% of such persons. As was noted in the previous chapter, public pensions in 
Latvia have no upper limits (and there are pensions of 5,000 EUR and higher), and the 
distribution curves have very long right ‘tail’ not shown on the diagram, because less than 2% 
of pensioners are getting benefits above 700 EUR. A slight slip to the right in the interval 
150-250 EUR is mainly caused by small pensions indexation that took place in autumn 2013. 
Although the average pension has increased by almost 25 euros, the majority of pensioners 
experienced much more moderate increase of their incomes. The peaks are becoming lower, 
meanwhile the left and the right tails – higher. The left tail is upheaving because of the 
growing number of persons, to whom pensions are granted in accordance with the 
international regulatory enactments, i.e., when determining the rights of pension receipt the 
insurance periods of Latvia and other EU/EEZ Member States are taken into account, but each 
country grants the pension on own insurance periods. Regretfully, Latvian statistics does not 
distinguish such pensioners into a separate group
211
. 
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Figure 3.5. Distribution of old-age pension benefits by size in Latvia in 2009 and 2014 
(share of pensioners receiving the corresponding amounts in the total number of pensioners, 
vertical dashed lines show respective levels of average pensions)  
Source: SSIA, author’s plotting 
Estonian and Lithuanian open access sources do not publish data of such distributions, 
but some data – for one time point in each country, including separate figures for men and 
women - was kindly furnished by statisticians of national social insurance boards.
212
 The 
obtained data sets are not ideally comparable: firstly, I got the figures from Latvia and they 
are for March 2014. The interval data was provided with 7.11 EUR increment (rooting in 
former 5-lat grouping). Then Estonian statisticians provided me with the figures for May 
2013, grouped into uneven intervals with width from 15.98 EUR (formerly 250 EEK) to 
319.56 EUR (formerly 5,000 EUR). And the last data came from Lithuania – for January 
2015, grouped into uneven intervals from 25 EUR to 100 EUR. Therefore, Latvian data was 
also regrouped into wider intervals in order to have smoother lines.  
The three diagrams below demonstrate the general patterns of pension benefit 
distribution by size. Average pensions reached 331.30 EUR in Estonia, 278.24 EUR in Latvia 
and 241.92 EUR in Lithuania in respective time-periods. Scaling is intentionally made 
uniform. 
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Figure 3.6. Comparative distribution of old-age pension benefits by size in the Baltic 
States (share of pensioners receiving the corresponding amounts (EUR) in the total number of 
pensioners, vertical dashed lines show respective levels of average pensions)  
Source: national social insurance agencies, author’s calculations and plotting 
Latvian and Lithuanian distributions look much more skewed than Estonian one! In 
Estonia, the median value (calculated by the author from interval data) is almost equal to the 
mean value: 330.66 EUR vs 331.30 EUR respectively. In Lithuania this relation is 231.05 
EUR to 241.92 EUR. And the largest difference is observed in Latvia: 250.56 EUR to 278.24 
EUR. Latvian distribution has also the higher excess, i.e. the heaviest left and right tails (not 
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shown on the plot). Leaving aside the smallest pensions on the left side (that are partially 
explained by people receiving old-age benefits from several countries, as was discussed 
above), Latvia provides the most generous pensions to high-earners: 4.6% of Latvian 
pensioners get more than 500 euro per month, compared to 1.1% in Lithuania and ca. 2% in 
Estonia (despite of higher average pension level in that country). Only 3 (three) pensioners in 
Lithuania had a pension higher than 1000 euro, in Estonia there were about 50 such persons, 
but in Latvia – more than 3,500 persons!  
Another interesting comparison can be made between distribution of old-age benefits 
among men and women in the study countries (see Figure 3.9). In all three countries, 
women’s pensions are lower than men’s; in all three countries income stratification among 
men is more expressed.  
However, gender disparities are demonstrably smaller in Estonia. The most pronounced 
difference between men and women is observed in Lithuania, which is due to larger disparity 
between pensionable age for men and women: hence, in addition to traditionally lower 
salaries and longer interruptions in career (characteristic to other countries as well), 
Lithuanian women have shorter period of accumulation  of pension rights. On the other hand, 
Lithuanians have a special type of pension benefit, which is absolutely missing in Latvia and 
Estonia – a widow(er)’ pension. Widows and widowers (and there are, naturally, much more 
widows, than widowers, since women mainly tend to outlive their husbands) have the right to 
receive widow(er)’s pension if they are not remarried, and are above official retirement age. 
Widow(er)’s pension is supplementary to the recipient’s own old-age pension. According to 
the initial version of the law, it was granted as a percentage of the deceased person’s pension. 
Later, the widow(er)’s pension was transformed into a flat rate benefit (presently amounts to 
EUR 20.30). 
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Figure 3.7. Comparative distribution of old-age pension benefits by size and gender in 
the Baltic States (share of pensioners receiving the corresponding amount (EUR) in the total 
number of pensioners, vertical dashed lines show respective levels of average pensions) 
Source: national social security boards, author’s calculations and plotting 
There is one more underlying condition of Latvian pension formula which is 
contributing to higher level of inequality of a different nature - intergenerational inequality, - 
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and this is the mechanism of pension capital valorisation. As discussed in the previous 
chapters, the accrued notional capital is annually valorised (up-rated) in line with increase in 
the covered wage bill. When the total amount of wages on a nationwide scale drops below the 
last year figure – the interest rate is negative, and all prospective pensioners will suffer lower 
pensions. This mechanism was incorporated into the system in order to maintain financial 
sustainability, and it was anticipated that the constant growth in wage rates and labour 
productivity would neutralise the effect of decreasing working population and the index 
therefore would manage to remain above 1. Nevertheless, crisis years brought negative 
pension capital indexation in three successive years (2009-2011), and the average amount of a 
newly-awarded pension benefit dropped by 15% in the first quarter of 2012 compared to the 
first quarter of 2009. Abolition of the so-called “supplements” (one euro per each pre-reform 
year of service, i.e. prior to 1996) for newly awarded pensions from 2012 had enhanced this 
tendency. It was calculated, that a person with 45 years’ service record who was receiving the 
average nationwide wage throughout his/her career retiring in 2009 got a 24% higher benefit, 
than a similar person retiring in 2012 did.  
Thus, both Latvian and Estonian pension systems include similar balancing mechanisms 
of matching the assets with liabilities by annual wage-bill index (total amount of wages paid 
nationwide). Estonian legislation prohibits diminution in benefits for the newly-qualified 
pensioners: for the same service record (same contributions) they will get as much as those 
who already enjoy retirement. Meanwhile, valorisation of notional pension capital in Latvian 
scheme generates serious distortions: if we compare two pensioners with the same service 
record – for instance, 45 years of service and average salary, a person who retired in 2010 
received (and is still receiving) a 24% higher benefit than one who retired in 2012.  
Indexation of notional pension was negative during the three consecutive years 2009-
2012. The effective value of contributions made prior to 2008 has contracted by almost one 
third from 2009 to 2012. As was mentioned above, the very recent (June 2015) amendments 
to the Law on State Pensions, introduced additional rules for computation of annual indices 
not allowing negative valorisation. This rule has retroactive effect, and all pensions granted in 
2010-2015 shall be recalculated – but the terms and timings are not defined yet. 
Valorisation rules differ among countries - although some authors note that any other 
method of valorisation except for the usage of average nominal wage increase “may be 
considered as a manipulation of the “capital”, hence contradicts to the “true” NDC 
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principle”213. For instance, indexation of notional capital in Poland is linked not only to the 
wage-bill index, but also to consumer price index (and in no case can be lower than inflation), 
in Sweden, valorisation ratio is linked to average wage growth (inflation-adjusted 3-year 
moving average), in Italy – to nominal GDP growth (5-year moving average).  Should Latvia 
have also adopted such valorisation principles, the benefits would substantially differ from the 
observables (see the author’s calculations in the next section). In Sweden, notional capital 
grows not only due to person’s contributions and annual valorisation, but also from the so 
called “inheritance gains”: the notional assets of those who die before reaching pensionable 
age are credited to the surviving members of that birth year cohort
214
. This unique mechanism 
of intra-cohort solidarity is applied in Sweden to the 2
nd
 pillar (premiumpension) either.  
3.3.3. Theoretical pension benefits and replacement rates 
As noted by Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Jorg Neugschwender, systematic cross-national 
analyses of pension income inequality often face the problem of long time-lag between 
accumulating pension rights over an entire working life and withdrawing pensions after 
retirement. Today’s income of current pensioners reflects the combined effects of past and 
current regulation, while reforms enacted today may only gradually affect current retirees. 
There are two possible strategies to cope with this time-lag between policy changes and its 
likely effect. The first is a prospective simulation - by applying a detailed model of today’s 
rules to possible life-course trajectories in estimating future incomes, the result is depending 
on multiple assumptions about future employment careers, demographic changes, future 
returns on capital, and stability of pension rules. The second way is to “link outcomes at a 
point in time with a retrospective analysis of the preceding development, which is the 
common method adopted in most national and comparative studies”215. 
The (retrospective) analyses of legislative norms, average pension levels, replacement 
rates and distributions in the previous sections were performed with the assistance of the 
historic data, and, therefore share the already noted limitations of empirical method. Statistical 
data include pension benefits of those who retired at different stages of pension reform, or 
even before pension reform.  
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A reliable set of prerequisite prognostic data necessary for prospective simulation is 
lacking. ‘Pension calculators’ on various bankers’ web-pages are based on ill-founded 
assumptions and tend to service private pension funds’ advertising goals. As was discussed in 
the Chapter II above, pension legislation in all three Baltic countries is a subject to frequent 
amendments, therefore the use of prospective simulation would be precarious. 
The author, therefore, has chosen to apply a combination of both methods and to run a 
retrospective simulation: to calculate theoretical benefits for a number of model cases for a 
certain point in the past. The aim was to compare pensions a “typical” person retiring in 
December 2014 in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania could have been granted. 
Assumptions and preconditions:  
A generic case is a person: 
- with 40 uninterrupted years of service (the strict condition of unbroken service record 
in post-reform years); 
- retiring in the end of 2014 at official pensionable age (i.e. 63 years for men and 62.5 
years for women in Estonia; 62 years and 3 months for both sexes in Latvia; 63 years for men 
and 61 year for women in Lithuania); 
- having no dependents at the last year of employment; 
- not eligible for any extras for children or other bonuses and supplements; 
- was not participating in II pillar; 
- throughout whole career had average nationwide insured wage - baseline case; 
(or, alternatively, was earning 50% / 75% / 125% / 200% / 250% of average insured 
wage). 
Computation steps and data used for them:  
1. Calculation of gross pension benefit in accordance with the rules as were in force in 
December 2014: 
- based on the statistical data and the rules discussed in the previous chapters.  
2. Calculation of net pension benefit in accordance with the rules as were in force in 
December 2014: 
- according to applicable taxation rules (personal income tax regulation).  
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For more correct comparison amounts in euro are translated into purchasing power 
standards.
216
3. Computation of the replacement rate (net pension to net last salary):
- according to applicable taxation rules (personal income tax and social tax / social 
insurance contributions regulations)
217
.
The full step-by-step computation tables can be found in Annex I (Tables I.1 – I.9), in this 
section only main results are given in below tables and further illustrated by Figure 3.10. 
The least complicated pension formula can be found in Estonia. 
Pension = Basic pension + pre-reform component + insurance component 
Basic pension is the same to all persons and was equal to 126.8183 EUR in 2014. Pre-reform 
component is the same to all persons having uninterrupted post-reform service record:  40 
years are made of 24 years of pre-reform service before 1998 (inclusive) and 16 years of post-
reform service (1999-2014). One point value was set at 4.718 EUR in 2014.  
Table 3.5. Theoretical pensions and replacement rates in Estonia 
50% AW 75% AW 
Average 
wage 
125% 
AW 
200% 
AW 
250% 
AW 
Net benefit, EUR 277.79 296.67 315.54 334.41 383.62 413.82 
Net benefit,  PPS 399.64 426.78 453.93 481.08 551.88 592.73 
Replacement rate 80.3% 58.8% 47.6% 40.7% 29.6% 25.6% 
Source: author’s calculations based on normative and statistical data 
Quite high tax exempt on pensions make the overwhelming majority of pensions in Estonia 
not subject to income tax (see Table I.1 for details). The system demonstrates very significant 
level of progressivity: with high replacement rate for low earners, and low replacement rate 
for high-earners. However, the level of computed replacement rate for the average earner is at 
a quite low level. For example, ISSA experts consider that the adequate replacement rate 
should lie between 60 per cent and 80 per cent
218
.
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Pension formula in Latvia requires more cumbersome computations: 
Pension = (Notional pension capital + initial capital) / G / 12 
G-coefficient was equal to 18.50 for persons aged 62 full years in 2014
219
. Other components 
of the formula need preliminary calculations. In order to calculate the accumulated notional 
capital, one has to multiply the amount of paid contributions by valorisation indices of the 
subsequent years (Table I.2 in the Annex I). 
Likewise, for calculating the initial pension capital for pre-reform years of service it is 
necessary to multiply the wages in 1996-1999 by cumulative valorization indices and obtain 
the average. Further, this ‘average’ is multiplied by the length of pre-reform record and 
“taxed” at 20% (Table I.3 in the Annex I).  
Total accumulated pension capital is 63,558.59 EUR for a person with average insured 
wage, or, respectively, 50% of this amount for a person with 50% of average wage, 75% of 
this amount for a person with 75% of average wage, etc. Knowing tax exempts and income 
and social tax rates, it is possible now to calculate the sought-for quantities (detailed 
calculation is provided in Table I.4 in the Annex I). 
Table 3.6. Theoretical pensions and replacement rates in Latvia 
 50%  
AW 
75%  
AW 
Average 
wage 
125% 
AW 
200%  
AW 
250%  
AW 
Net benefit, EUR 143.15 214.72 273.99 328.38 491.58 600.37 
Net benefit, PPS 227.02 340.54 434.52 520.79 779.6 952.14 
Replacement rate 62.3% 64.0% 62.1% 60.2% 56.8% 55.8% 
Source: author’s calculations based on normative and statistical data 
The untaxable pension amount is much lower in Latvia than in Estonia, and variations 
in replacement rate between the poor and the rich is less expressed. 
Lithuanian pension formula is also quite complicated: 
Pension = Main pension + bonus for long service + insurance component 
‘Main pension’ is equal for all persons having 40 years record: 396 LTL or 114.79 EUR 
(110% of the ‘basic pension’ that was set at that time at the level of 360 LTL). Bonus for long 
service is also equal for all persons having the same length of record
220
: 108 LTL or 31.30 
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EUR (3% of ‘basic pension’ for each year in excess of 30). To calculate the insurance 
component it is necessary to find the average number of pension points earned by our 
‘typical’ worker (see Table I.5 in Annex I). It is equal to 1.120444. 
A person with 50% of average wage would get 50% of this figure = 0.560222 points per 
year, a person with 200% of average wage would get 200% of this figure = 2.240888, etc. 
The insurance component is then calculated according to the following formula: 
0.005 x years of service x average points per year x insured income 
which gives 96.58 EUR for average wage earner; other model cases are prorated respectively. 
(look for detailed calculus specification in Table I.6 in the Annex I). 
Table 3.7. Theoretical pension and replacement rate in Lithuania 
 50%  
AW 
75%  
AW 
Average 
wage 
125% 
AW 
200% 
AW 
250% 
AW 
Total benefit, EUR 191.25 218.52 242.67 266.82 339.25 387.53 
Total benefit, PPS 345.00 393.99 437.55 481.11 611.78 698.90 
Replacement rate 77.4% 61.0% 51.79% 46.0% 37.1% 34.1% 
Source:  author’s calculations based on normative and statistical data 
 
The obtained figures are illustrated by Figure 3.8 that clearly demonstrates very 
different patterns of pension sizes in dependence to person’s wage during working life. Small 
coloured rhombi are marking the levels of net average salaries in 2014, expressed in PPS. 
Despite of significantly lower salaries in Latvia, an average wage earner would get practically 
the same pension in Latvia and Lithuania. 
Latvian case is an example of almost linear proportionality: twofold earnings would 
bring twofold pension, the only shadow of progressivity is obtained through tax exempt. The 
difference in replacement rate for low- and high-earner is less than 10 percentage points. On 
the opposite side is Estonia with a strongly pronounced redistribution from rich to poor: 
among all three countries its pension system provides the highest replacement rate for low-
earners – 80.3% and the lowest replacement rates for high-earners – 25.6%, the amplitude 
reaching almost 55 percentage points. To a great degree, this progressivity is achieved 
through egalitarian approach to pre-reform service record, where everyone got exactly one 
pension point for one year.  
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Figure 3.8. Theoretical pensions and replacement rates in the Baltic States 
Source: author’s calculations based on statistical data of national social insurance agencies and pension 
legislation norms 
Lithuania demonstrates an intermediate example of distribution, being however much 
closer to Estonian pattern than to Latvian one. The difference in replacement rates for low- 
and high-earners reaches 43 percentage points. 
So, in Latvia the poor are poorer, and the rich are richer. Pensions of low-earners (50% 
and 75% of average wage) are the lowest in the Baltics, while those of high-earners (125%, 
200% and 250% of the average) are the highest in the region. Pensioners, who had average 
wage during their working careers, can afford very similar living standard: the purchasing 
power of their pension is almost the same - 454 PPS in Estonia, 438 PPS in Lithuania and 435 
PPS in Latvia. One PPS is close to a purchasing power of one euro in Germany and The 
Netherlands, so, actually, 40 years of uninterrupted service record in any of the Baltic States 
entails a very modest living standard, compared to other EU member states.  
It is interesting to note, that the case of three Baltic States is in contrast with the findings 
of Raj Aggarval and John Goodell
221
 for OECD countries. Those scholars have demonstrated 
that average relative pension levels are negatively related to pension progressivity, i.e. the 
lower average pensions are found in the countries with high degree of progressivity. This is 
not the case for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, where the situation is the opposite: the country 
with the highest average pensions (Estonia) has the most progressive distribution. 
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Another regularity evidenced in OECD, does not work in the Baltics, either: Aggarwal 
and Goodell contend that lower mutual social trust encourages pension progressivity. For 
measuring social trust they use a variable taken from the World Values Survey – namely, the 
percentage responding affirmatively to the question that most people can be trusted. 
Respondents of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were recently also asked the same question at 
the 4
th
 wave of European Values Study in 2008
222
 and the least social trust was observed in 
Latvia (25.5% of respondents) where pension system is the least progressive, Estonians 
having the most progressive pension system returned the rate of 32.6% (which is higher than 
EU-27 average 32.4%), Lithuanians are somehow more suspicious: 29.9% of them trust in 
people. Aggarwal and Goodell proceed from the premise that national pension plans in 
democratic states reflect the expectations of their citizens. It works for OECD countries, but 
does not work for Latvian case, where pension reform was to a great extent choreographed by 
foreign experts and bank lobbyists.  
As concerns Latvia, the above model allowed to test one more hypothesis: whether 
those persons who voluntarily joined the II pillar benefited from that decision or not. Let’s 
consider the same average wage earner, who made a decision to participate in the II pillar 
starting from 01/01/2004
223
 and compare him/her to our model case, a non-participant in the 
funded scheme.  
Such person’s accumulations in the first NDC pillar would make 27,693.78 EUR (see 
Table I.7 in Annex I). The initial capital would remain the same as in the base case (i.e. 
34,867.73 EUR). 
Part of his/her contributions was directed to the II pillar, and after deduction of the SSIA 
administrative fee was transferred to one of pension funds. 
Further, a person could then choose a pension plan with active, balanced or conservative 
investment strategy. For ease of calculations, let us suppose that annual average yields (as 
presented in FCMC reports) can be extended to the whole corresponding year. The results of 
calculations are presented in Table 3.8 (the detailed description of intermediate computations 
can be found in Tables I.8 – I.8 of Annex I): 
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Table 3.8. Theoretical pension of II pillar participant in Latvia 
 
Active     
strategy 
Balanced 
strategy 
Conservative 
strategy 
‘Average’ 
strategy 
Accumulated capital 1098.98 1121.71 1116.16 1101.88 
Net pension, EUR 274.34 274.41 274.40 274.35 
Gain / loss compared to 
non-participant  
+0.35 EUR +0.42 EUR +0.41 EUR +0.36 EUR 
Source: author’s calculations based on normative and statistical data 
Quite surprisingly, there practically is no difference either a person participated in II 
pillar or not, as well as either the chosen pension plan was active, balanced or conservative. 
Since the resulting figures are averaged and close to zero, in practice this means, that some of 
voluntary II pillar participants could face though small but loss. 
As described in the previous chapter, II pillar legislation in Estonia and Lithuania 
offered more choices to participants, therefore, it is more difficult to define a ‘typical’ case for 
modelling there (at least, based on the information in open access sources). 
And the last simulation in this section is related to the most recent changes in Latvian 
pension legislation, namely, the amendments to notional capital valorization procedure. The 
author has calculated what would be the pensions, should these rules be in force in 2014 
(interim steps of calculation omitted in the Table 3.9):   
Table 3.9. Theoretical pension and replacement rate in accordance with the revised 
valorisation rules 
 50%  
AW 
75%  
AW 
Average 
wage 
125% 
AW 
200%  
AW 
250%  
AW 
Net benefit,  
old rules (EUR) 
143.15 214.72 273.99 328.38 491.58 600.37 
Net benefit,  
new rules (EUR) 
160.56 239.44 300.45 361.46 544.50 666.53 
Gain, EUR 17.41 24.72 26.46 33.08 52.92 66.16 
Gain, % 12.2% 11.5% 9.7% 10.1% 10.8% 11.0% 
Replacement rate, 
new rules 
69.9% 71.4% 68.1% 66.0% 63.0% 61.9% 
Gain in replacement 
rate, percentage points 
+7.6 +7.4 +6.0 +5.8 +6.2 +6.1 
Source: author’s calculations based on normative and statistical data 
Although the procedure for uprating the pensions that were granted in 2010-2015 in 
accordance with the amended law is not developed yet, the author’s calculations show, that 
those who retired in the end of 2014 may expect increase in their net pensions by 
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approximately 10%. In general, the relative increase will be the highest for those retired in the 
beginning of 2013, who suffered most from negative indices, and the lowest for those who 
retire in the 2
nd
 half of 2015, who suffer least.  
This is a very positive sign and an important step to make the Latvian pension system 
more equitable and more adequate. The author’s dares to hope that co-authorship in the 
Latvian Human Development Report 2012/2013
224
 contributed to promotion of pension 
awareness among Latvian politicians and general public.  
As was noted above, other countries with NDC-system use different methods for 
valorisation of notional capital. Should Latvia have chosen the same method as Poland, 
Sweden or Italy, or should the new Latvian rules have been in force from the very 
commencement of the reformed system, the results for our theoretical average wage earner 
would be significantly discrepant – see Figure 3.9. Interim stages of calculations are not 
shown
225
.  
 
* - without inheritance gain 
Figure 3.9. Theoretical net pension benefit for average wage earner with 40 years record 
depending on methodology of notional capital valorisation 
Source: author’s calculations based on normative and statistical data 
                                                          
224
 Rajevska, F., Rajevska, O., Stavausis, D. (2014). Challenges for the Sustainability of Latvian Pension System. 
In Bela, B. (Ed.), Latvia. Human Development Report 2012/2013. Sustainable Nation. Riga: Advanced Social 
and Political Research Institute of the University of Latvia, pp. 13-33. 
225
 Methodology of calculus for Poland and Italy picked from OECD (2013). Pensions at a Glance 2013. Country 
Profiles. Description of Swedish rules can be found in Axelsson, R., Wadensjo, E., Baroni, E. (2010). ASISP 
Annual National Report 2010. Pensions, Health and Long-term Care. Sweden. p. 10. Consumer price indices and 
nominal GDP rates are taken from online database of Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. 
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As can be seen, Polish rules (increase in countrywide wage-bill, but not lower than 
inflation rate and no diminution) would produce by now the most generous pension to a 
Latvian average-wage earner. The second place is held by Italian method (moving 5-year 
average of annual increase in nominal GDP). Then follows Latvian new formula, prescribing 
retroactive recalculation of capital indices starting from 2009. Should, however, these new 
rules be applied to earlier „fat” years, not allowing indices be above 1.15, then the result 
would be much worse. Swedish formula (moving 3-year inflation-adjusted average of annual 
increase in  average wage) returns quite low pension, either. It should be noted, however, that 
such rating is not valid for all years.  
 
Figure 3.10. Theoretical trajectories of notional capital valorisation depending on 
methodology of calculation 
Source: authors’ calculations based on normative and statistical data 
The above diagram (Figure 3.10) shows, as example, a value of contributions made in 
2000 from an average insured wage (i.e. 466.54 EUR) valorised according to different 
methods over a period from 2006 till 2014. The relative positions  of trajectories vary: until 
2009 ‘Polish’ and ‘Latvian’ lines coincide, but afterwards the former goes up, while the latter 
falls down; in 2011-2013 ‘Swedish’ method guaranteed higher pensions than ‘Latvian’, but in 
other years – vice versa. ‘Italian’ method gave lower results than ‘Latvian’ before 2010, but 
then the roles reversed. 
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It should be noted, that there is no ‘first-best’ methodology: each of them has its 
advantages and disadvantages: the method, used in Latvia presently and its new amended 
version guarantee the fastest matching PAYG assets with its liabilities, but does not take 
inequitable inter-cohort relations into consideration; Polish rules prevent individual notional 
account accumulations from diminution, but can generate excessively high liabilities to social 
insurance budget. Italian formula links notional capital growth to overall economic capacity 
of the state, 5-year moving average helps to avoid sharp variations but does not guarantee 
notional capital from melting in the long-run. Swedish valorisation formula does not react on 
decrease in number of working population – instead, the system uses additional balancing 
mechanism of matching assets with liabilities, making the total computation extremely 
complicated.   
To summarise, in terms of equity those methods are better which 1) ensure more smooth 
lines (e.g., by using moving averages); 2) do not allow capital diminution; and 3) save the 
accumulations from inflation.  
3.3.4. Equity: key findings 
Pension systems in Estonia and Lithuania demonstrate more signs of a fair distribution 
of benefits and risk both in I and II pillars, and therefore have better compliance with the 
principles of equity.  
The presence of flat demogrant and diversified pension indexation rules in Estonia not 
only ensure income  redistribution  for  the  benefit  of  most  needy,  but  also  provide 
adherence to the rule “same benefits for same contributions” in inter- and intragenerational 
dimensions. Point systems in Estonia and Lithuania allow uprating pensions in payment and 
pension rights in accumulation with the same pace, while in Latvia the rules of pension 
indexation and the order of pension capital valorisation have almost nothing in common.   
The most equitable method of translating the pre-reform service record into new 
systems was chosen by Lithuania, the Estonian approach is too egalitarian, while Latvian 
formula looks more like an extemporary measure.  
Lithuania, contrary to other two countries, has a unique mechanism, rewarding not only 
for financial contributions, but also for the time in service, which is positively perceived as a 
manifestation of justice, albeit non-financial one. 
The design of Latvian pension system is de facto inducing the reverse redistribution: 
from poor to rich – by imposing ceiling on taxable earnings, tax incentives for voluntary III 
pillar savings are more effective to those having more money to save, high-earners are 
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normally better educated financially and make more reasonable choices in II pillar pension 
plans, are less often employed in shadow economy, etc. In countries where median salary is 
quite close to subsistence minimum, pension system should treat low income groups with 
positive discrimination instead of negative one.   
Statistical data demonstrate that gender inequality is better addressed in Estonia. This 
country has also launched comprehensive parents pension programme, from which women 
will be the major gainers.  The other two countries should learn by this example, especially in 
view of the accelerating ageing of Baltic societies. Another interesting example of addressing 
gender inequality can be learned from Sweden, where a person may transfer his/her pension 
entitlements in the II pillar (premium pension) to his/her spouse or registered partner. The 
contributions continue to be transferred until the person gives a notice that they should cease 
to do so. In the event of transfer the amount is reduced by 8 percent. This money is distributed 
among all pension savers. The reduction is the same for men and women. The decrease is due 
to the fact that it is expected that there will be more transfers from men to women than vice 
versa, and that women live longer on average than men
226
.  
Minimum rates of return (either absolute or relative) are not secured in pension 
legislation of any Baltic country, thus putting all the risks on the population and relieving 
pension fund managers of any responsibility for wrong investment decisions. Financial 
literacy of population is quite low, especially of people with low incomes, which leads to 
higher risk of choosing inappropriate pension plan or pay-out method in that group. Inequity 
of II pillar in Latvia is exacerbated by unjust order of succession. 
The surveyed experts stressed the importance of pronounced pension progressivity (i.e. 
higher replacement rates for low-wage earners and lower replacement rates for high-wage 
earners) in achieving equitable pensions (see Annex II for more details), but the first place 
they gave to the handling of gender inequalities in pension distribution. This dimension of 
equity is underestimated in all three study countries.    
 
  
                                                          
226
 Swedish Pensions Agency (Pensionsmyndigheten).  Premium pension can be transferred to your partner 
https://www.pensionsmyndigheten.se/PremiumPensionCanBeTransferredToYourPartner_en.html 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
1. The analysis of academic literature demonstrates the variety of pension system 
institutional design forms. Those systems comprise various functional and 
organizational elements, each contributing to one or more system objectives. These 
objectives are: poverty relief, individual consumption smoothing, insurance against 
longevity risk, income redistribution.  
2. The major criteria of assessment pension systems are: adequacy, affordability, 
sustainability, equity, predictability, robustness. Pension adequacy is evaluated in 
terms of a) minimum and average levels with respect to absolute and relative 
poverty lines; b) individual and aggregate replacement rates; c) pension wealth; d) 
subjective perceptions of income adequacy.  Pension equity is evaluated in terms of 
a) proportionality between contributions and benefits; b) income redistribution 
(progressivity); c) fair distribution of risks and burdens; d) fair distribution between 
genders and generations. 
3. The defined-benefit pay-as-you-go pension systems inherited by the Baltic 
economies from the Soviet era were in need of reforms to address short-term fiscal 
imbalances and longer-term issues relating to population aging. Reforms were also 
needed to adjust benefit and contribution structures to market economy. The 
countries initiated a process of pension reform motivated by the need to reform their 
existing systems and by the trend toward multipillar structures. All Baltic countries 
reformed their existing pay-as-you-go, first-pillar schemes, to become earnings 
related in the sense that benefits in retirement depend, in varying degrees, on 
earnings received and contributions paid while working. Latvia, at the suggestion of 
the World Bank, has introduced NDC-system, Estonia and Lithuania use variations 
of pension points systems combined with non-contributory component. 
4. The Baltic States reduced first-pillar benefits for future beneficiaries and 
complemented their first-pillar schemes with mandated (or quasi-mandated, as in 
Lithuania) earnings-related, funded second-pillar schemes. These schemes are 
defined-contribution schemes that rely on privately managed pension funds for 
administration and asset management. Until now, second-pillar pension funds have 
not proved their effectiveness, neither in providing good rates of return for their 
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participants, nor in contributing to development of national economy and financial 
markets. The myths about ‘intrinsic’ advantages of funded schemes, which were 
shaping pension reforms in the Baltic countries in 1990s, are being debunked by real 
experience. 
5. The post reform experience demonstrates divergence in the levels of adequacy and 
equity of old-age pensions between the study countries, despite of very similar 
external environment. With the analysis of historic data and retrospective 
simulation, it was proved that the variations in pension adequacy and equity 
between the Baltic States can be substantially explained by differences in pension 
system design elements. 
The main hypothesis of the dissertation was confirmed. Despite the resemblance in the 
organization of pension systems in the Baltic States some varying principal features of 
their institutional design exert a decisive influence on their adequacy and equity. 
Institutional design is a fundamental determinant for pension system performance. 
6. The pension systems in all three countries are far from providing adequate old-age 
income to elderly population. The Estonian system ensures relatively higher average 
pensions, while Latvian system returns higher average replacement rates. But in 
absolute figures the well-being of the elderly in the Baltics is significantly below 
European averages. 
7. Pension systems in Estonia and Lithuania demonstrate more signs of a fair 
distribution of benefits and risk both in I and II pillars, and therefore have better 
compliance with the principles of equity. The design of Latvian pension system is de 
facto inducing the reverse redistribution: from poor to rich n of Latvian pension 
system is de facto inducing the reverse redistribution: from poor to rich.  
8. Point systems in Estonia and Lithuania allow uprating pensions in payment and 
pension rights in accumulation with the same pace, while in Latvia the rules of 
pension indexation and the order of pension capital valorisation have almost nothing 
in common.   
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9. The most equitable method of translating the pre-reform service record into new 
systems was chosen by Lithuania, the Estonian approach is too egalitarian, while 
Latvian formula looks more like an extemporary measure. 
10. Patterns generated by pension systems of the Baltic States differ from the results 
valid for OECD countries: lower average pensions and lower mutual social trust 
negatively correlate with high pension progressivity. Baltic pension systems stay out 
of the line with other CEE states, either.  
11. Pension systems of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were designed in mid 1990s, when 
the countries were to a much lower extent included into global economic and 
financial markets. The systems were tailored for a country, where people do not 
move abroad for work and pension funds are investing into domestic economy. The 
crisis has demonstrated that the systems were not prepared enough to the risks 
brought by globalisation. 
 
Upon analysing pension systems’ design and studying the functioning of their separate 
elements, the following strengths and bottlenecks were identified and respective 
recommendations for legislators and policy makers were elaborated: 
I. The following systemic elements responsible for ensuring pension adequacy have been 
identified in the pension schemes of the Baltic countries: 
1.  Minimum guaranteed pensions linked to average workers’ wage 
Although statutory minimums are set, their amounts are inadequately low and not 
bound to average wages in the country, as prescribed by ILO Conventions. 
2. Basic pension 
Presence of basic pension in Estonia and Lithuania plays positive role in 
contribution to adequacy. Lack of this element in Latvia is a serious disadvantage. 
3. Indexation rules – preventing pensions in payment from losing purchasing power 
Lack of clear indexation mechanisms in Lithuania is a disservice to pension 
adequacy and predictability. Limiting pension indexation in Latvia with increasing 
only part of the benefit devaluates pensions with time, worsening their adequacy. 
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4. NDC – notional capital valorisation rules preventing its diminution from inflation or 
other reasons 
Lack of protection mechanisms against inflation in Latvian formula for notional 
capital valorisation does not secure accumulations in I pillar from devaluation. 
5. Administrative fees in II pillar 
Enormously high administrative fees in all countries erode future pensions of fund 
participants. Private pension funds after almost 15 years of operation have 
accumulated great assets that should bring lower marginal costs. 
6. Minimum guaranteed rates of return in II pillar 
Lack of minimum guaranteed rates of return does not secure accumulations in II 
pillar from devaluation.   
II. The following systemic elements responsible for ensuring pension equity have been 
identified in the pension schemes of the Baltic countries: 
1. Earnings-related schemes   
 Old-age pension benefits depend on earnings received and contributions paid while 
working. Pension points are in use in Estonia and Lithuania, and notional accounts 
– in Latvia.  
2. Methodology of converting pre-reform service record into new schemes 
The three Baltic countries have applied very different methods: the most equitable 
method is found in Lithuania, the most egalitarian, contributing to pension 
progressivity – in Estonia, the most contradictory – in Latvia.  
3. Tax exempts and progressive taxation 
Tax exempts protect the poorest groups of elderly population. 
4. NDC – notional capital valorisation rules preventing from abrupt jumps (moving 
averages, balancing mechanisms)  
More smooth trajectories of capital indices contribute to more equality between 
cohorts. 
5. Point system – regular update of denominator (close link to average wage) 
Lack of functional relation between average wages and the denominator in pension 
points computation creates inequity in weights of points earned in different years.  
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6. Pension ‘ceilings’ 
Since state social insurance system is mainly addressed to the less prosperous 
groups of population, it should not assume generous obligations towards more 
affluent ones.  
7. Indexation rules – beneficial to low pension recipients 
A good example can be found in Estonia, where non-contributory and contributory 
components grow at different paces. A less effective solution is offered by Latvian 
formula, where only part of pension benefit is subject to indexation.  
8. Parental pensions 
Special provisions for rewarding the period of parenthood promote equitable 
solution for women spending their productive years on child-care. 
9. Bonus for length of service 
Bonus for longer work career adds a non-financial dimension of equity, prising 
socially useful values of honest employment. In Estonia it is expressed in equal 
reward for pre-reform years of service irrespectively of actual earnings, in Latvia – 
in different rates of minimum pension depending on service record; in Lithuania – 
as an integral part of basic pension. 
10. Actuarially fair rules for early / deferred pension calculation 
A well-designed layout offering flexible time of taking retirement promotes longer 
stay in labour markets without extra burden on pension schemes. 
11. Possibility to participate in several II pillar pension funds simultaneously 
Diversification of investment strategies mitigates risks of suffering losses from non-
optimal choice of pension plan. 
12. In NDC and in II pillar – inheritance gains and/or hereditability of II pillar 
accumulations 
Fair principles of hereditability strengthen intra-generational solidarity and 
contribute to overall social trust and justice. 
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Recommendations to legislators in the Baltic States for improvement of pension adequacy: 
1. Minimum pension levels should be linked to average wages; ILO Social Security 
(Minimum Standards) Convention No. 102 or ILO Invalidity, Old-Age and 
Survivors' Benefits Convention No. 128 should be ratified 
2. Non-contributory element in the form of basic pension should be introduced in 
Latvian pension system 
3. Indexation rules should be revisited in Latvia to prevent loss in pension value with 
the course of time. In Lithuania, a bright-line indexation rule should be legislated, 
linking increase in pension amounts with inflation and wage growth. 
4. Notional capital valorisation rules in Latvia should be revisited to guarantee that the 
annual index cannot be lower than consumer price index.  
5. The administrative fees of private pension funds should be legislatively capped on 
the significantly lower levels in all three study countries. Additional SSIA 
administration fee in Latvia should be cancelled. 
6. Minimum guaranteed rates of return should be introduced in the Baltic pension 
legislation on the model of CEE countries in order to protect participants and 
promote more competition among pension funds. Such guaranteed yield may be 
expressed in relative value on the basis of industry’s average; or in the form of 
absolute return guarantee of protection of nominal (“at least zero”) or real (“at least 
real value of accumulated assets”) rate of return. 
Recommendations to legislators in the Baltic States for improvement of pension equity: 
1. Latvian formula for converting pre-reform service record into NDC needs revision.  
Among possible options are: excluding non-productive periods from the reference 
period for calculation of initial capital: extending the reference period from 4 years 
1996-1999 for a longer one; extending of supplements also to those retired after 
2012. 
2. Tax exempt for pensions should be either removed (as in Lithuania), or linked to the 
amount of average wage (and be made significantly higher than average pension) to 
improve the relative well-being of low earners. 
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3. Notional capital valorisation rules in Latvia should be revisited to include the 
method moving averages. 
4. The ‘insured income’ rate in Lithuania should be annually re-linked to actually 
observed average wage. 
5. In Latvia, ceilings should be imposed on pension benefits, and not on contributions, 
and linked to average wages 
6.  Indexation rules should be revisited in Latvia to ensure indexation of full pension 
amount. In Lithuania, a bright-line indexation rule should be legislated, setting the 
relative increases in contributory and non-contributory part in favour of low pension 
recipients. 
7. Parental pensions’ mechanisms should be developed in Latvia and Lithuania 
following the example of Estonia. 
8. Elements rewarding for longer work careers should be enhanced to guarantee more 
sensitive response of individual benefits to longer service record irrespectively of 
contributions. 
9. The formulae of early / deferred pension benefits should be revisited in order to 
provide effectual mechanism for later retirement. The incentives should be strong 
enough and adequate to the current situation, e.g. the possibility of combining work 
and pension. 
10. Individuals in Latvia and Lithuania should be given an option to participate in more 
than one mandatory pension plan. 
11. Latvia should follow the example of Sweden and consider a possibility to introduce 
the scheme of inheritance gains in the NDC. The funds accumulated by individuals 
in II pillar funds should be made fully hereditable. 
The above recommendations are also applicable in other countries looking for 
improvement of their pension systems.  
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Recommendations to scientists on public administration and public policy in the field of 
pensions:  
1. This doctoral dissertation is looking at „how” pension systems in the Baltic States 
differ from each other. It intentionally leaves aside the question “why” they are so 
different. Surely, this topic deserves an intensive study. 
2. The notion of pension wealth is high-potential instrument for comparative analysis of 
different pension systems’ performance, both in respect to historical data and to future 
prospects. For the first case, it requires longitudal data from income and wealth 
surveys. For the second case, it requires calculations for a number of “model cases” 
(with different service record, with or without interruptions in employment, having or 
not having children, etc.) by applying the varying system’s parameters. This task could 
be a ‘greenfield’ for a whole team of researches. 
3. The Baltic States should be compared not only among themselves, but also to Nordic 
and or Eastern European countries. Or – focusing on NDC-schemes – to compare 
actual performance of Latvian NDC with Polish, Swedish and Italian experience. 
Range of possible research is very extensive, and the author is looking forward to seeing new 
work on the subject. 
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Annex I. Step-by-step calculation of theoretical pensions and 
replacement rates 
This annex contains computation tables derived in the course of retroactive simulation 
analysis described in Section 3.3.3 of Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
Table I.1 Theoretical pensions and replacement rates in Estonia 
 
50% AW 75% AW 
Average 
wage 
125% 
AW 
200% 
AW 
250% 
AW 
Basic pension 126.82 126.82 126.82 126.82 126.82 126.82 
Pre-reform part  113.23 113.23 113.23 113.23 113.23 113.23 
Insurance part  37.74 56.62 75.49 94.36 150.98 188.72 
Gross benefit 277.79 296.67 315.54 334.41 391.03 428.77 
Tax exempt 354.00 354.00 354.00 354.00 354.00 354.00 
Income tax 20% - - - - 7.41 14.95 
Net benefit, EUR 277.79 296.67 315.54 334.41 383.62 413.82 
Net benefit,  PPS 399.64 426.78 453.93 481.08 551.88 592.73 
Gross wage  396.38 594.56 792.75 990.94 1585.50 1981.88 
Tax exempt  144.00 144.00 144.00 144.00 144.00 144.00 
Income tax 20% 50.48 90.11 129.75 169.39 288.30 367.58 
Net wage 345.90 504.45 663.00 821.55 1297.20 1614.30 
Replacement rate 80.3% 58.8% 47.6% 40.7% 29.6% 25.6% 
Source: author’s calculations based on normative and statistical data 
Table I.2 Notional pension capital accumulated in 1996-2014 (Latvia) 
Year Average 
wage (W) 
Contributions 
paid 
Valorisation 
index (annual) 
Valorisation index 
(cumulative) 
Notional 
capital 
1996 131.41 315.38 1 4.7918684 1511.26 
1997 158.17 379.61 1.03 4.6522994 1766.05 
1998 174.40 418.56 1.12 4.1538387 1738.63 
1999 182.13 437.11 1.117 3.7187455 1625.51 
2000 194.39 466.54 1.069 3.4787142 1622.95 
2001 206.83 496.39 1.0835 3.2106269 1593.73 
2002 219.93 527.83 1.0453 3.0714885 1621.23 
2003 245.19 588.46 1.1645 2.6376028 1552.11 
2004 272.96 655.10 1.1754 2.2440044 1470.06 
2005 312.92 751.01 1.1712 1.9159874 1438.92 
2006 389.77 935.45 1.2333 1.5535453 1453.26 
2007 518.71 1244.90 1.3593 1.1429010 1422.80 
2008 625.65 1501.56 1.3106 0.8720441 1309.43 
2009 560.31 1344.74 0.9622 0.9063023 1218.74 
2010 537.52 1290.05 0.7978 1.1360019 1465.50 
2011 547.68 1314.43 0.9945 1.1422844 1501.46 
2012 565.28 1356.67 1.0618 1.0758 1459.51 
2013 594.06 1425.74 1.0758 1 1425.74 
2014 622.50 1494.00 1.0766 1 1494.00 
Total accumulated notional capital:    28,690.88 
 Source: SSIA, author’s calculations 
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Table I.3 Initial pension capital (Latvia) 
Year Average wage (W) Valorisation index (V) Valorised wage (W x V) 
1996 131.41 4.7918684 629.70 
1997 158.17 4.6522994 735.85 
1998 174.40 4.1538387 724.43 
1999 182.13 3.7187455 677.30 
Average 1996-1999 (Wave) 691.82 
Initial capital = Wavg x 12 x 21 pre-reform years x 20% 34,867.71 
Source: SSIA, author’s calculations 
Table I.4 Theoretical pensions and replacement rates in Latvia 
 50%  AW 75%  AW 
Average 
wage 
125% 
AW 
200%  AW 250%  AW 
Pension capital 31779.30 47668.94 63558.59 79448.24 127117.18 158896.48 
Gross benefit 143.15 214.72 286.30 357.87 572.60 715.75 
Tax exempt 235.00 235.00 235.00 235.00 235.00 235.00 
Income tax - - 12.31 29.49 81.02 115.38 
Net benefit, EUR 143.15 214.72 273.99 328.38 491.58 600.37 
Net benefit, PPS 227.02 340.54 434.52 520.79 779.6 952.14 
Gross wage 311.25 466.88 622.50 778.13 1245.00 1556.25 
Soc. tax 10.5% 32.68 49.02 65.36 81.70 130.73 163.40 
Tax exempt 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 
Income tax 24% 48.86 82.28 115.71 149.14 249.43 316.28 
Net wage 229.71 335.57 441.42 547.28 864.85 1076.56 
Replacement rate 62.3% 64.0% 62.1% 60.2% 56.8% 55.8% 
Source: author’s calculations based on normative and statistical data 
Table. I.5 Average pension points in Lithuania in 1995-2014 
Year Average 
wage (W)* 
Insured 
income (D)* 
Points 
(W/D) 
Year Average 
wage (W)* 
Insured 
income (D)* 
Points 
(W/D) 
1995 425.30 427.00 0.996019 2005 336.90 300.58 1.120834 
1996 556.20 538.00 1.033829 2006 396.30 332.75 1.190971 
1997 702.60 694.00 1.012392 2007 474.50 389.57 1.218025 
1998 827.00 845.00 0.978698 2008 559.10 418.84 1.334875 
1999 851.00 886.00 0.960497 2009 516.40 431.30 1.197298 
2000 867.00 886.00 0.978555 2010 496.00 431.30 1.150000 
2001 893.00 886.00 1.007901 2011 507.30 431.30 1.176200 
2002 918.10 886.00 1.036230 2012 518.20 431.30 1.201472 
2003 280.10 259.13 1.080923 2013 550.40 431.30 1.276129 
2004 303.80 269.86 1.125789 2014 574.60 431.30 1.332238 
Total sum of points for 20 years 22.40888 Average points per year 1.120444 
* - figures for 1995-2002 are in Litas, later – in euro 
Source: Sodra, author’s calculations 
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Table I.6 Theoretical pension and replacement rate in Lithuania 
 50%  AW 75%  AW 
Average 
wage 
125% 
AW 
200% 
AW 
250% 
AW 
Main pension 114.79 114.79 114.79 114.79 114.79 114.79 
Bonus 28.17 31.30 31.30 31.30 31.30 31.30 
Insurance comp. 48.29 72.44 96.58 120.73 193.16 241.46 
Total benefit, EUR 191.25 218.52 242.67 266.82 339.25 387.53 
Total benefit, PPS 345.00 393.99 437.55 481.11 611.78 698.90 
Gross wage  287.30 430.95 574.6 718.25 1149.2 1436.5 
Soc. tax 9%  25.857 38.7855 51.714 64.6425 103.428 129.285 
Tax exempt 165.22 165.22 165.22 165.22 165.22 165.22 
Income tax  14.433 18.969 55.589 73.258 132.083 171.299 
Net wage 247.01 337.20 467.30 580.35 913.69 1135.92 
Replacement rate 77.4% 61.0% 51.79% 46.0% 37.1% 34.1% 
Source:  author’s calculations based on normative and statistical data 
 
Table I.7 Accumulated notional capital for a person participating in II pillar in Latvia 
Year Average 
wage (W) 
Contributions paid Earnings 
index 
Valorisation 
index 
Notional 
capital 
to  pillar I to pillar II 
1996 131.41 315.38 - 1 4.7918684 1511.26 
1997 158.17 379.61 - 1.03 4.6522994 1766.05 
1998 174.40 418.56 - 1.12 4.1538387 1738.63 
1999 182.13 437.11 - 1.117 3.7187455 1625.51 
2000 194.39 466.54 - 1.069 3.4787142 1622.95 
2001 206.83 496.39 - 1.0835 3.2106269 1593.73 
2002 219.93 527.83 - 1.0453 3.0714885 1621.23 
2003 245.19 588.46 - 1.1645 2.6376028 1552.11 
2004 272.96 627.80 27.30 1.1754 2.2440044 1408.79 
2005 312.92 719.72 31.29 1.1712 1.9159874 1378.97 
2006 389.77 896.47 38.98 1.2333 1.5535453 1392.71 
2007 518.71 1141.16 103.74 1.3593 1.1429010 1304.23 
2008 625.65 1251.30 250.26 1.3106 0.8720441 1091.19 
2009 560.31 1288.71 56.03 0.9622 0.9063023 1167.96 
2010 537.52 1236.30 53.75 0.7978 1.1360019 1404.44 
2011 547.68 1259.66 54.77 0.9945 1.1422844 1438.89 
2012 565.28 1300.14 56.53 1.0618 1.0758 1398.69 
2013 594.06 1306.93 118.81 1.0758 1 1306.93 
2014 622.50 1369.50 124.50 1.0766 1 1369.50 
Total accumulated notional capital:    27,693.78 
Initial capital (the same as in the base case): 34,867.73 
Source: author’s calculations based on normative and statistical data 
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Table I.8 Accumulated financial capital for a person participating in II pillar in Latvia 
(average investment strategy) 
Year II pillar 
contrib. 
SSIA fees Monthly 
transfer 
to a fund 
Average 
yield 
Accumulated capital 
% EUR By year 
end 
By end 
2014 
2004 27.30 2.5% 0.68 2.22 3.76% 27.08 37.47 
2005 31.29 0.51% 0.16 2.59 6.74% 32.11 41.63 
2006 38.98 1.25% 0.49 3.21 2.82% 38.99 49.17 
2007 103.74 0.47% 0.49 8.60 2.50% 104.44 128.48 
2008 250.26 0.27% 0.68 20.80 -11.50% 236.84 329.19 
2009 56.06 0.27% 0.15 4.66 12.33% 59.15 73.19 
2010 53.75 0.63% 0.34 4.45 7.59% 55.31 63.61 
2011 54.77 0.79% 0.43 4.53 -1.96% 53.85 63.17 
2012 56.53 0.76% 0.43 4.68 8.96% 58.46 62.94 
2013 118.81 0.37% 0.44 9.86 2.29% 119.62 125.90 
2014 124.50 0.32% 0.40 10.34 5.25% 127.13 127.13 
Total accumulated II pillar capital: 1101.88 
Source: author’s calculations based on normative and statistical data 
 
Table I.9 Accumulated financial capital for a person participating in II pillar in Latvia 
(depending on investment strategy) 
Year Monthly 
transfer 
to a fund 
Conservative Balanced Active 
Average 
yield 
Accumul
ated by 
end 2014 
Average 
yield 
Accumul
ated by 
end 2014 
Average 
yield 
Accumul
ated by 
end 2014 
2004 2.22 3.42% 36.66 4.44% 39.03 6.07% 38.39 
2005 2.59 2.55% 41.64 5.76% 43.43 9.50% 41.66 
2006 3.21 -1.32% 51.26 1.56% 51.86 3.96% 48.30 
2007 8.60 -1.96% 139.85 3.05% 135.93 3.03% 125.22 
2008 20.80 1.99% 337.51 -5.71% 334.76 -14.63% 327.14 
2009 4.66 9.03% 71.59 9.69% 73.34 13.27% 73.47 
2010 4.45 6.17% 63.61 7.88% 64.44 8.09% 63.43 
2011 4.53 1.89% 62.27 -0.57% 63.42 -3.78% 63.51 
2012 4.68 8.42% 61.11 9.20% 62.71 9.12% 63.76 
2013 9.86 0.20% 123.91 1.78% 125.64 3.28% 126.80 
2014 10.34 4.58% 126.74 5.28% 127.15 5.52% 127.29 
Total II pillar capital: 1116.16  1121.71  1098.98 
Source: author’s calculations based on normative and statistical data 
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Annex II. Expert survey 
The research included expert poll and expert interviews 
A. Expert poll 
The questionnaire (see the model below) was elaborated by the author using the 
discussed conceptual framework for pension system analysis and included three major 
questions: assessment of measurement instruments of pension adequacy, assessment of 
measurement instruments of pension equity, assessment of pension sustainability threats. 
The proposed answers ‘entries have been developed on the basis of the analysis of 
respective academic literature (see Sections 3.2.1, 3.3.1 and 2.3.1 respectively).  
The answers were collected in person (by Feliciana Rajevska during ESPN meeting in 
Brussels on 28-29/09/2015) and electronically by e-mail. The total amount of the responded 
questionnaires – 15.  
Mainly the pollees are European Social Policy Network (ESPN) national coordinators. 
ESPN was established in 2014 to provide the European Commission with independent 
information, analysis and expertise on social policies. In particular, the ESPN supports the 
Commission in monitoring progress towards the EU social protection and social inclusion 
objectives set out in the Europe 2020 strategy.  
For the Baltic States, more than one expert was included from each country (two from 
Estonia and Latvia and three from Lithuania): in addition to ESPN Network country experts, 
the questionnaires were sent also to ASISP Network country pension experts Ruta Zilvere 
(Latvia) and Teodoras Medaiskis (Lithuania) (in Estonia the ESPN country pension expert 
and ASISP country pension expert is one and the same person – Andres Vork), as well as to 
Jolanta Aidukaite in Lithuania, known for her numerous publications on a social policy 
development in the three Baltic States, and to Avo Trumm in Estonia, expert in social policy 
analysis.   
The list of experts in the alphabetical order: 
1) Aidukaite Jolanta (Lithuania), Lithuanian Social Research Centre  
2) Cabrero Gregorio Rodriguez (Spain), University of Alcalá, ESPN national coordinator 
for Spain, Country Expert in Social inclusion, Long-term care and Pensions 
3) Gerovska Mitev Maja (FYR of Macedonia), Institute of Social Work and Social 
Policy, Faculty of Philosophy, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, ESPN national 
coordinator for FYR of Macedonia, Country Expert in Social inclusion and Pensions 
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4) Kangas Olli (Finland), Social Insurance Institution of Finland – Kela, ESPN national 
coordinator for Finland, Country Expert in Social inclusion, Healthcare and Pensions 
5) Kvist Jon (Denmark), Roskilde University, ESPN national coordinator for Denmark, 
Country Expert in Social inclusion, Long-term care and Pensions 
6) Lazutka Romas (Lithuania), Vilnius University, ESPN Country Expert in Pensions and 
Social inclusion 
7) Marxer Wilfried (Liechtenstein), Liechtenstein-Institut, ESPN national coordinator for 
Liechtenstein, Country Expert in Social inclusion, Healthcare, Long-term care and 
Pensions 
8) Medaiskis Teodoras (Lithuania), Vilnius University, ASISP Country Expert for 
Lithuania on Pensions 
9) Olafsson Stefan (Iceland), University of Iceland, ESPN national coordinator for 
Iceland, member of ESPN Network Core Team, Country Expert in Social inclusion, 
Healthcare, Long-term care and Pensions  
10) Pedersen Axel West (Norway), Institute for Social Research, ESPN national 
coordinator for Norway, Country Expert in Social inclusion and Pensions 
11) Rajevska Feliciana (Latvia), Vidzeme University of Applied Sciences, ESPN national 
coordinator for Latvia, Country Expert in Long-term care and Pensions 
12) Topinska Irena (Poland), Centre for Social and Economic Research, CASE 
Foundation, ESPN national coordinator for Poland, Country Expert in Social inclusion 
and Pensions 
13) Trumm Avo (Estonia), University of Tartu 
14) Võrk Andres (Estonia), Praxis Centre for Policy Studies, ESPN national coordinator 
for Estonia, Country Expert in Healthcare, Long-term care and Pensions 
15) Zilvere Ruta (Latvia), ASISP Country Expert for Latvia on Pensions and Long-Term 
Care. 
The experts’ responses have been analysed with the assistance of SPSS. The major 
results are summarised in the below table Annex 2.1.   
It clearly demonstrates that all proposed answers’ entries are eligible. At least one 
expert gave a high score (from eight to ten) to all entries but one (“significant difference in 
social security standards between Eastern and Western Europe”), where the observed 
maximum value is seven. 
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Annex 2.1. Descriptive statistics on expert poll results (September - October 2015) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximu
m 
Mean Std. 
deviation 
Mode Median 
average replacement rate 15 4 10 7.67 2.024 9 8 
average pension to subsistence minimum 15 1 10 6.00 3.000 8 7 
individual perception 13 1 8 4.54 2.106 3 4 
individual replacement rate 14 2 10 6.21 2.806 8 8 
minimum pension to subsistence minimum 13 1 10 6.77 2.555 7 7 
minimum pension to median income 14 1 10 6.71 2.367 7 7 
pension wealth 8 3 9 5.75 2.188 3; 5 5.5 
share in GDP 15 2 9 4.80 2.757 3 3 
average replacement rate 14 1 10 5.86 2.797 7 6.5 
distribution by gender 15 5 10 8.00 1.309 8 8 
distribution by size 15 2 10 7.20 2.210 8 8 
individual perception of equity 13 1 9 5.15 2.641 4; 8 4 
individual replacement rate 14 1 10 6.29 3.197 8 8 
minimum pension to subsistence minimum 12 1 10 5.00 2.594 5 5 
minimum pension to median income 13 3 10 6.08 1.891 5 6 
pension progressivity 12 3 10 7.83 1.946 8 8 
late start 13 2 10 5.92 2.900 8 7 
fragmentised careers 14 1 10 6.14 2.685 8 6.5 
part-time employment 
14 2 10 6.21 2.517 3;6;7;8;
9 
6.5 
freelance 14 3 8 6.50 1.506 6; 7; 8 7 
labour market globalisation 14 1 10 6.64 2.790 7; 10 7 
poor performance of II pillar 14 1 10 5.36 2.649 7 5.5 
ageing 15 3 10 8.07 2.017 8 8 
shadow economy 14 2 10 6.43 3.435 10 7 
gap between East and West 
11 1 7 4.00 1.949 2; 3; 5; 
6 
4 
unemployment 15 2 10 6.53 2.532 4; 5; 8 7 
excessive reliance on state 13 1 8 4.38 2.434 2 4 
overoptimistic expectations 14 2 8 5.21 1.718 4; 5; 7 5 
poor financial literacy 14 2 8 4.86 1.875 3 5 
Source: author’s calculations using SPSS, the answers were given using ordinal scale 1-10,  
where 1- fully disagree to 10 - fully agree 
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On the other hand, the answers of experts vary significantly, proving the complexity and 
multi-dimensionality of the studied phenomena. This is visibly demonstrated on the Figures 
II.1 – II.3 below. 
 
 
Figure II.1 Evaluation of adequacy measurements 
Source: author’s plotting using SPSS 
The majority of the experts have chosen such traditional indices as average and individual 
replacement rates and pension benefit relation to subsistence minimum as the beast measures 
of pension adequacy. 
Compared to the concept of adequacy, which is quite developed and supported by 
numerous publications, especially in the last years, the notion of pension equity is more 
indistinct and waiting for further conceptualisation. Experts’ answers on the second group of 
questions vary to a much greater extent. 
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Figure II.2 Evaluation of equity measurements 
Source: author’s plotting using SPSS 
Variations in experts’ scorings are strongly pronounced. The ‘top picks’ are pension 
progressivity and benefit distributions by size and gender.  
The last group of questions, those regarding systemic risks, has also brought broad-
ranging responses, since the listed negative factors (e.g., shadow economy or unemployment) 
are of different importance in different countries, and the experts were requested to evaluate 
them for their home country. Even within one country, the views of experts are quite 
dissimilar: for instance, when evaluating the importance of potential underperformance of II 
pillar pension funds, three Lithuanian experts returned “2”, “7” and “10”. 
The two main almost unquestioned risks include population ageing and interruptions in 
service record due fragmentation of labour careers and unemployment. 
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Figure II.3 Evaluation of threats to pension systems sustainability 
Source: author’s plotting using SPSS 
The experts have also provided the author with a number of valuable comments and 
references to useful publications. 
B. Expert interviews 
Apart from the questionnaire, the author has communicated (by e-mail, telephonically and in 
person) with country experts on pension statistics:  
- Ruta Avotiņa, Financial Statistician at the Statistical Department of SSIA (Latvia) 
- Raselė Bernotienė, Senior Specialist of  Statistics, Analysis and Forecasts Department 
of Sodra (Lithuania)  
- Evita Česka, Statistical Department Head of SSIA (Latvia) 
- Dalia Janušauskaitė, Deputy Head of Statistics, Analysis and Forecasts Department of 
Sodra (Lithuania) 
- Merle Sumil-Laanemaa, Deputy Head of Pensions and Benefits Department of 
Estonian Social Insurance Board (Estonia) 
- Sabīna Rauhmane, Senior Statistician at the Statistical Department of SSIA (Latvia) 
 182 
The author is grateful for invaluable help, many hours of fruitful discussions, 
worthwhile academic contacts received from my first and foremost reviewer, co-author of a 
number of papers and conference presentations, ESPN Country Expert of Pensions and Long-
Term Care, Associate Professor of Vidzeme University of Applied Sciences, Dr. pol. sc. 
Feliciana Rajevska. 
   
       
Dear Sir / Madam! 
We approach you as a leading expert in the field of pensions in your country and we kindly ask you to share 
your opinion on the below questions which are relevant for research conducted at the University of Latvia on 
pension systems in the region as a part of State Research Programme EKOSOC-LV (project name “Social and 
political transformations in Latvia in the post-crisis period”). It would take you approximately 10-12 minutes to 
complete this questionnaire. The response entries are put in alphabetical order.   
1. Do you agree that the below indicators are good measures of pension adequacy in your country?                    
(Evaluation scale 1-10, where 1 – fully disagree, 10 – fully agree) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Don’t know 
Not 
applicable 
1 Aggregated replacement rate (average pension to 
average working income) 
            
2 Average pension in relation to subsistence minimum             
3 Individual perception of person’s own pension as being 
adequate (as a sufficient one) 
            
4 Individual replacement rate (first pension to last salary)             
5 Minimum statutory pension in relation to subsistence 
minimum 
            
6 Minimum statutory pension in relation to median 
working income 
            
7 Pension wealth             
8 Share of pension spendings in GDP             
9 Other (please indicate and evaluate):             
              
              
 
2. Do you agree the below indicators are good measures of pension equity in your country?                                 
(Evaluation scale 1-10, where 1 – fully disagree, 10 – fully agree) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Don’t know 
Not 
applicable 
1 Aggregated replacement rate (average pension to 
average working income) 
            
2 Distribution of pension benefits by gender             
3 Distribution of pension benefits by size (e.g., Gini 
index)  
            
4 Individual perception of person’s own pension as being 
equitable (as a fair one) 
            
5 Individual replacement rate (first pension to last salary)              
6 Minimum statutory pension in relation to subsistence 
minimum 
            
7 Minimum statutory pension in relation to median 
working income 
            
8 Pension progressivity (higher replacement rates for 
low-wage earners) 
            
9 Other (please indicate and evaluate):             
              
              
 3. Do you agree the below factors threaten pension system sustainability in your country?                                    
(Evaluation scale 1-10, where 1 – fully disagree, 10 – fully agree) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Don’t know 
Not 
applicable 
1 Changing labour patterns  
- late start (youth unemployment) 
            
 - more fragmentised careers             
 - part-time employment              
 - spread of freelancing and self-employment             
 - other (please indicate and evaluate)             
 -              
 -              
2 Globalisation of labour markets causing migration of 
working age population 
            
3 Poor performance of funded pension schemes              
4 Population ageing             
5 Shadow economy (earnings uncovered with social 
insurance) 
            
6 Significant difference in social security standards 
between Eastern and Western Europe 
            
7 Unemployment             
8 Views and expectations of the population  
       -      excessive reliance on the state 
            
 - overoptimistic individual expectations             
 - poor financial literacy             
 - other (please indicate and evaluate)             
 -              
 -              
9 Other (please indicate and evaluate):             
              
              
 
Thank you! 
More information about survey Olga Rajevska - Olga.Rajevska@lu.lv, phone +371 29110545  
 
Your name, surname _________________________________      
Country  ______________________________________    
Date   ______________________________________ 
